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Preface
There is an increasing tendency to expect that foreign direct
investment will satisfy the Third World's need for financial, technical and
entrepreneurial resources. However, heavily indebted developing coun-
tries may not only be constrained in terms of new private lending but
also in terms of equity capital inflows. Therefore, this study reconsiders
the determinants of foreign direct investment under the changed inter-
national capital market conditions of the 1980s. In addition to traditional
explanations, the relevance of political and economic instability as well as
sovereign risk and debt overhang arguments is assessed empirically.
Moreover, the host countries' attitudes towards foreign direct investment
are explicitly taken into account. The analysis focuses on German equity
participation in developing countries and compares the investment be-
haviour of German investors with that of foreign investors from other
source countries.
The study reveals that the reaction of German investors to economic
problems of host countries was not as pronounced as the response of
investors from other source countries. Due to their traditionally strong
market orientation, the former became trapped in economically and politi-
cally unstable host countries with considerable debt problems. This
rendered it more difficult for German investors to devote more invest-
ment funds to well-performing developing countries which had been
largely neglected before. Notwithstanding the relatively stable German
investment behaviour, the study suggests that economic reforms are
indispensable in developing countries experiencing serious economic
problems in order to restore their overall attractiveness for foreign
capital. The chances of those countries to restructure the external
financing significantly by narrowly defined and costly promotion schemes
for foreign investors are considered as limited at best. It is argued that
host countries should rather improve the general policy framework for
more competition and real capital formation. Openness towards world
markets appears to be crucially important in this respect, as is the
revitalization of domestic investment. The authors conclude that devel-
oping countries succeeding in this respect will remain or become at-
tractive locations for foreign capital. Otherwise, however, the prospects
for the inflow of foreign direct investment look fairly bleak.The study was commissioned and partly financed by the World
Bank's International Economics Department. It represents the joint ef-
forts of Jamuna P. Agarwal and Peter Nunnenkamp from the Kiel In-
stitute of World Economics and Andrea Gubitz who worked as a con-
sultant to the World Bank. The authors are indebted to the Deutsche
Bundesbank for generous help in collecting and interpreting essential
data on German direct investment in developing countries.
Thanks are also due to all those individuals who provided valuable
information and participated in the discussion of the research project.
The authors benefited especially from the constructive criticism and many
helpful suggestions by their colleagues at the Debt and International
Finance Division of the World Bank and the Development Economics
Department of the Kiel Institute. They wish to thank Gretel Glissmann
and Christiane Schroder for typing and retyping many parts of the
study, and Angela Husfeld and Michaela Rank for extensive statistical
computations. Bernhard Klein and Sibylle Ruhnke of the editing staff
deserve credit for painstakingly checking the manuscript.
May 1991 Horst SiebertI. Introduction
During the 1970s and early 1980s the share of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDD in net resource flows to developing countries (DCs) from all
sources dwindled from 20 per cent to about 10 per cent [ World Bank, a,
p. 21]. The subsequent increase of FDI flows remained insufficient to
match the drastic decline of other types of private capital transfers (es-
pecially bank loans) to the Third World [OECD, b, p. 224]. Recently,
overall FDI flows have been increasingly concentrated in the industrial-
ized world although many Third World economies have adopted more fa-
vourable attitudes and policies towards FDI since the beginning of the
1980s [Alworth, Turner, forthcoming; UNCTC, b]. Economic reforms in
Eastern European countries may render it even more difficult for DCs to
attract further FDI in the future.
The question of how to revitalize FDI flows to DCs is today all the
more relevant, as expectations are being pinned increasingly on FDI to
alleviate foreign debt problems and to satisfy the need of these countries
for financial, technical and entrepreneurial resources. However, many
heavily indebted countries may not only be constrained in terms of new
private lending but also in terms of FDI inflows. Attempts to alter the
external financing structure towards increasing the role of transfers
involving some form of risk- and profit-sharing may suffer from sub-
stantial bottlenecks. In order to overcome constraints in the supply of
FDI, the determinants of FDI flows have to be identified in the first
place. It is the major aim of this study to provide empirical evidence in
this respect. A reconsideration of the major factors determining FDI in
DCs is required for several reasons:
- Most of the available studies are rather outdated. They mainly refer to
conditions prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the climate for
international capital transfers has changed dramatically since the debt
crisis erupted in the early 1980s. It is open to question whether-tra-
ditional arguments still hold.
- Typically, FDI flows to DCs have been analysed in the literature at a
very aggregated level. But the determinants of FDI are likely to differ
between the home countries of investors and major sectors in which
foreign investors are engaged. Most importantly, FDI in the primarycommodity sector, in manufacturing and in the service sector has to be
dealt with separately.
- The question of sovereign risk was largely neglected in earlier
studies. Arguably, the decisions of foreign investors are affected by
sovereign risk considerations in a similar way as the decisions of for-
eign creditors. The set of explanatory variables has thus to be ex-
tended to include aspects of sovereign risk, possible disincentives for
FDI arising from a debt overhang, and elements of political and eco-
nomic instability of host countries.
- In previous empirical research, the host countries' attitudes towards
FDI were hardly considered as an important factor influencing FDI
flows. Whatever the determinants of the decisions of foreign investors
on their engagement in DCs might be, however, the role of supply
factors will be partially disguised by the rules and regulations govern-
ing the demand for FDI in these countries. Therefore, host DCs have
to be grouped according to the degree of restrictions imposed on the
activities of foreign investors in order to achieve a less distorted pic-
ture of the relevance of supply factors.
This study aims at overcoming the above-mentioned conceptual
weaknesses that characterize the current state of research on the deter-
minants of FDI. The analysis focuses on German FDI in DCs and com-
pares the investment behaviour of German investors with that of the
"average" foreign investor from all other source countries. In addition
to Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, Germany is one of
the most important sources of FDI for the Third World. Moreover, the
case of Germany provides an interesting example to discuss the possible
consequences of recent developments affecting the worldwide competition
for foreign capital on the relative attractiveness of DCs for FDI. Es-
pecially the German unification, the completion of the internal market in
the EC and the recent economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe
may prove relevant in this respect.
The study is organized as follows. Chapter II lays the ground for
the subsequent empirical analysis. It provides an overview of major hy-
potheses on the determinants of FDI in DCs as well as the theoretical
In the following, the notion "Germany" refers to the former Federal
Republic of Germany, i. e. West Germany.foundations of these hypotheses. In addition, previous empirical results
are summarized. Chapter III portrays current patterns and past develop-
ments of German FDI in DCs. After shortly describing the principal data
sources and discussing the constraints that empirical analyses on FDI
have typically to face, German FDI is considered in relation to other
types of international activity. Furthermore, the structure of German
FDI is presented with respect to major destinations and sectoral distri-
bution.
The purpose of Chapter IV is to give an overview of the most im-
portant rules and regulations governing the demand for FDI in major
host DCs of German FDI. This information is then compressed into an
indicator for the degree of openness of the host countries towards FDI.
Finally, this indicator is used to assess empirically whether differences
in the host countries' attitudes towards FDI had a significant impact on
German FDI flows to these countries. The results presented in Chapter
IV provide some evidence that the degree of openness should be taken
into account in the empirical analysis of Chapter V, as it captures a
specific characteristic of host countries, which helps to improve the
specification of the equations. Data problems render it impossible to sub-
ject the hypotheses on the supply of German FDI to a single equation.
Chapter V rather proceeds by analysing major clusters of hypotheses one
by one:
- It is evaluated whether traditional trade relations give a particular
incentive for FDI as suggested by the theory of optimal timing of FDI.
Import restrictions of host countries are taken into account in order to
assess the chances to attract FDI through import substitution policies
(Section V. 2).
- The issue of whether relatively low production costs abroad stimulate
German FDI flows is investigated in Section V. 3. It is argued that
especially the role of labour costs is likely to depend on the type of
investment and the specific motivation of German investors.
- Subsequently, the hypothesis that Third World economies offering
promising markets and cost advantages may nevertheless not be con-
sidered as attractive locations by foreign investors is tested empiri-
cally. In Section V. 4, efforts are made to find out how far German FDI
in DCs was affected by economic and political instability as well as the
overall investment climate. Section V. 5 analyses whether the existenceof a debt overhang has not only discouraged further lending, but also
the inflow of FDI. Moreover, the recent discussion of sovereign risk in
the case of foreign debt is applied to the case of FDI by hypothesizing
that FDI is related to the potential benefits and costs of sovereign
measures against foreign investors.
- Finally, Section V. 6 investigates how far the risk perception of German
investors was reduced by public investment guarantees granted by the
German government.
The chances of DCs to restructure their external financing by re-
ferring to German FDI are discussed in Chapter VI. First, the current
role of German FDI in the external financing of major host countries is
summarized. Second, it is assessed if the potential for financial restruc-
turing may be enhanced by implementing debt-equity swap programmes.
For this purpose, the relationship between debt conversions and German
FDI flows is analysed empirically. Third, the prospects of German FDI in
DCs are evaluated by discussing to which extent significant changes in
the international economic environment (e.g. German unification, EC
internal market, reforms in Eastern Europe) may affect the Third World's
position in the worldwide competition for foreign capital. Chapter VII
summarizes and draws policy conclusions.II. Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries - Theoretical
Considerations and Major Hypotheses
1
1. An Introductory Review of the Theoretical Literature
The inflow of FDI in developing countries depends on various fac-
tors in both host and home countries of investors. But there is as yet
no well-developed and generally applicable theory of FDI encompassing
all these factors. Even the most popular and comprehensive "eclectic
theory of international production" [Dunning, 1973; 1977; 1988] falls
short of being a general theory of FDI. Moreover, it is almost impossible
to verify this theory in its existing form by means of empirical tests.
Whatever empirical work has been published, is usually related to one or
several of the components of this theory [Dunning, 1980; Casson, 1987a;
Clegg, 1987; Kumar, 1987]. Notwithstanding, the causes and effects of
FDI have occupied the attention of economists for a long time, especially
since the international flow of FDI began to take on impressive dimen-
sions in the 1960s. This chapter seeks to give a short review of selected
2
literature on those theories or hypotheses that tend to explain the
determinants of FDI either in host or home country or both.
The subsequent presentation concentrates on major factors that may
determine the supply of FDI to DCs. First and foremost, however, FDI
flows are likely to depend on the host countries' demand, i. e. their
general attitudes towards FDI. The degree of restrictions imposed on the
activities of foreign investors varies greatly between different DCs (see
e.g. Corsepius et al. [1989]; for a detailed analysis, see Chapter IV of
this study). Since the early 1980s, many Third World economies have
adopted more favourable policies towards FDI, sometimes in the context
of structural reform packages [ UNCTC, b]. Because of the relaxation of
restrictions on FDI, supply factors have probably gained in importance
as far as FDI flows in the 1980s are concerned. Nonetheless, the relative
importance of supply factors is likely to differ between host countries
with relatively restrictive attitudes towards FDI and host countries that
The generous help received from Horst Thomsen of our library while
researching the literature for this chapter is thankfully acknowledged.
2 For a comprehensive survey, see Agarwal [ 1980].are more open to FDI. That is why the role of supply factors is assessed
for subgroups of host countries displaying different attitudes towards
FDI in Chapter V.
The difficulties in developing a general theory of FDI also stem
from the fact that the determinants of FDI are likely to differ between
major sectors in which foreign investors are engaged. For example, FDI
in the primary commodity sector may be motivated by the investor's de-
sire to secure access to important raw materials in the first place. In
contrast to this, considerations of production costs and market access
may be more important for FDI in manufacturing. In the literature, FDI
flows to DCs are generally analysed on a very aggregated level. Since
the bulk of FDI takes place in manufacturing, most of the theoretical
work implicitly deals with this sector. However, for the purpose of this
study it is crucially important to distinguish between major sectors in
assessing the empirical relevance of possible FDI determinants (see
Chapter V).
The following review starts with a brief description of three tra-
ditional micro-theories of FDI. They are: (1) the theory of differential
rate of return, (2) the portfolio theory, and (3) the product-cycle
theory. These theories enable us to understand the objectives of the
decision-making process of firms. At the second stage, the eclectic
theory of FDI is briefly discussed. It combines both micro- and macro-
factors to explain the flow of FDI. In Section II. 2, major hypotheses and
previous empirical findings on macroeconomic determinants of FDI are
surveyed. As is shown in Chapter V, they are of main concern to this
study. This should not imply that micro-factors are unimportant for FDI.
In practice, every FDI is a micro-event and the conditions in and around
the investing firm are likely to play the primary role in its FDI de-
cisions. Yet, the selection of host country, site of factory, form of in-
vestment (joint venture or fully owned subsidiary), mode and extent of
financing, etc. , is bound to be influenced by conditions prevailing at
the macro-level. An analysis of these macro-variables in relation to FDI
may enable us to draw conclusions with regard to the general behaviour
of investors and thus prove useful for those interested in the monitoring
of the flow of productive capital especially to DCs.a. Micro-Theories
Rate of return: This theory postulates that FDI is a function of
international differences in rates of return on capital investment. Capital
flows from low to high return countries. Among those who found evi-
dence in support of this hypothesis are Popkin [ 1965], Stevens [ 1969a],
Reuber et al. [1973], and Blais [1975]; and those who did not are R.
Weintraub [1967], Bandera and White [1968], Bander a and Lucken
[1972], Hufbauer [1975], and Walia [1976]. The results are ambiguous
mainly because an empirical test of this~ hypothesis is faced with serious
problems. Firstly, the underlying reasoning behind this theory is that
FDI is a function of expected profits. But the available data are on re-
ported profits which need not be the same or similar. Moreover, it is not
always sure that investors try to maximize profits in the short run or
are necessarily interested in earning a higher rate of profit on FDI than
on domestic investment [ see Clark, 1940; Baumol, 1959; Cyert, March,
1963].
Portfolio theory: Much like the above differential rate of return
theory, the portfolio theory is an extension of domestic observations to
international investment. Stevens [1969b], Prachowny [1972], Cohen
[1975], and Rugman [1979] have attempted to apply the theory of port-
folio selection developed by Markowitz [1959] and Tobin [1958] to FDI.
The main hypothesis is that besides maximizing profits, investors try to
reduce total risk by distributing their direct investments among various
countries. It is possible that corporations with a wider international dis-
persion of their productive activities have smaller fluctuations in their
global profits. But on the.whole the empirical evidence in favour of this
theory is weak. Risk diversification is, of course, only one of the objec-
tives of investors. Otherwise they would be contented by portfolio in-
vestments and would not undertake FDI.
Product cycle theory: According to product cycle theory, FDI is
associated with the life cycle of goods [ Vernon, 1966; Hirsch, 1967;
1976]. It says that the maturity of a product in terms of standardization
In DCs, however, securities markets are usually not well developed
and their governments impose severe restrictions on the movement of
capital across borders. In such cases, capital inflows can occur only in
the form of FDI.of its quality and production techniques forces firms to produce near the
final market, instead of exporting from their home countries, in order to
face successfully the competition from local firms. Gruber et al. [1967],
Juhl [ 1979] and Parry [ 1975] have found some evidence for this theory
at the empirical level. They have investigated the US, German and Brit-
ish FDI, respectively. The scope of this theory has often been widened
[Vernon, 1974; Hirsch, 1976; Agmon, Hirsch, 1979]. It takes into ac-
count not only labour costs as locational advantage of host countries but
other factor costs also, and it is no longer strictly dependent on a se-
quential relation between product innovation, export and FDI. Notwith-
standing, its power to explain FDI is limited to highly innovative indus-
tries [Solomon, 1978], and with shortened product cycles even in these
industries, this theory has lost much of its importance for FDI flows.
The micro-theories show that firms may have different objectives
when investing abroad. Profit maximization - though of primary impor-
tance in the long run - may be overruled in the short run by other ob-
jectives such as risk diversification or market access. They may be of
alternative or of simultaneous importance for the investors' decisions
depending on a particular case. A generalization in this regard is not
possible on the basis of these micro theories of FDI. A more modern
theory, which seeks to give a general answer to locational questions re-
lated with FDI, is the eclectic theory which is summarized in the fol-
lowing .
b. Eclectic Theory
During the last two decades, the main attention has been focused
on the eclectic theory of FDI. It has picked up ideas from various fields
and combined them into a broader theory of FDI. It postulates the fol-
lowing three necessary and sufficient conditions for an FDI to be under-
taken by a firm:
1) Firm-specific advantages: Foreign investors must possess some com-
petitive advantages over firms in host countries such as patented or
unpatented proprietary technology, trade marks, managerial or
marketing know how, and control of market entry. These specific
advantages should be able to compensate the foreign firm for disad-vantages and costs arising from operating from abroad in a foreign
environment where local firms may have cheaper access to required
information, labour and capital markets or benefit from preferential
treatment in government procurement. This condition in Dunning's
[ 1977) eclectic theory is in line with Hymer's [ 1976] and Kindle-
berger's [ 1969] approach to FDI. It is, however, not a sufficient con-
dition for FDI. In order to be able to undertake FDI in a particular
case, the following two other conditions have to be fulfilled as well
[see also Stehn, 1989].
2) Internalization incentives: The costs of exploitation of the above in-
tangible assets through FDI by the firm should be less than those of
any other means such as licensing or outright sale of a patent or
even export of the final product. This is the well-known internali-
zation hypothesis. It draws on the market failure and information
asymmetry hypotheses of Coase [1937], Arrow [1962] and Williamson
[1975]. Its initial proposition by McManus [1972] and Buckley and
Casson [ 1976] has been further developed by many other authors
[e.g. Magee, 1977; Casson, 1979; Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981;
Teece, 1981; 1983; Caves, 1982; Hennart, 1982]. Its main proposition
is that external markets for the transfer of intangible assets from
sellers to buyers are inefficient especially in terms of their trans-
action costs. Therefore, owners of these assets prefer to transfer
them internationally only to their affiliates.
Market failure and inefficiency arise from the nature of intangible
goods. For example, they are sometimes embodied in the skills of per-
sonnel which the owning firm may not like to part with. Further, in
some cases (e.g. unpatented process technology) the owner is not
willing to disclose all the details to an interested third party. Other-
wise he will lose the monopoly of that asset and thus the rent which
accrues from it. For assets like goodwill based on brand names, own-
ers are afraid that buyers may not be able to maintain the quality
standards. Quite often sellers and buyers of an intangible asset may
have very different opinions about its market value involving high
The latter is, however, not always an alternative to FDI, especially in
DCs with import restrictions.10
costs of transfer negotiations. As a result firms have an incentive to
opt for internal in place of external markets of intangible assets.
However, internalization of markets also involves costs, for example,
for administration and communication across national boundaries.
Therefore, internalization is useful only if these costs are not more
than the benefits of internalization arising from reduction of time
lags, avoidance of bargaining and buyer uncertainty, minimization of
the impact of government intervention with the help of transfer
pricing by the firm and from ability to use discriminatory pricing.
The internalization hypothesis has been tested empirically by many
economists [see, for example, Casson, 1987a; Kumar, 1987]. It is
particularly relevant for the horizontal type of FDI in industries
characterized by high R&D intensity, advertising and product dif-
ferentiation.
3) Locational advantages: The third essential condition of the eclectic
theory is that the host country must possess one or more locational
advantages over the home country of the investor, in order to moti-
vate him to directly invest there instead of exploiting his competitive
advantage through exporting or any other channel. These advantages
could emanate from the host country's relatively lower wage costs,
cheaper energy or raw materials, investment incentives, membership
of preferential trade areas, tariff and non-tariff protection, creation
of free trade zones, etc. These or other means with which govern-
ments compete with each other to attract foreign resources for pro-
ductive purposes fall under this category of locational advantages of
host countries.
A great part of empirical research on FDI has concentrated on this
point in attempting to find out the determinants of FDI, especially in
DCs [Baldwin, 1979; Pugel, 1981; Owen, 1982; Saunders, 1982; Lall,
Mohammad, 1983]. The analysis in this study is also devoted mainly to
these factors. Before we discuss them in detail in the following, it
may be reiterated that the eclectic theory is the most comprehensive
explanation of FDI. It is difficult to be mathematically formulated or
empirically tested in a single model. Nonetheless, it does offer plau-
sible explanations why and where FDI is most likely to flow.11
2. Overview of Major Empirical Hypotheses
In this section a short survey is given on those macroeconomic fac-
tors that have been - relatively speaking - often considered in the
literature to be of major importance in determining the movement of FDI,
especially in DCs. These are: size and growth of the host country mar-
ket, trade relations, import protection, currency valuation, and labour
costs. In addition to these, a brief review of the discussion on internal
liquidity of firms is also included. This is because some researchers are
of the opinion that investors are normally not neutral with regard to
sources of financing of their FDI. Moreover, hypotheses on the impact of
political and economic instability as well as sovereign risk on FDI flows
are discussed.
Size and growth of host country market: These are the most popu-
lar variables in empirical research done on determinants of FDI. The
rationale of hypothesizing a positive relation between FDI and the size
and growth of markets is derived from the domestic experience that in-
vestment and economic growth are associated with each other. Bandera
and White [1968] as well as Scaperlanda and Mauer [1969] found a statis-
tically significant relation between US FDI in EC member countries and
their GNP. The main motive of US investors was to penetrate the large
and growing EC market. But it is a controversial point whether the size
or growth of a market is a stronger pulling factor for FDI [ Morley,
1966; Goldberg, 1972; Stevens, 1972; Reuber et al. , 1973; Ahmed, 1975;
Schwartz, 1976; Sabirin, 1977; Torrisi, 1985].
Takahashi [1975] found GNP of the host country as well as the dif-
ference between the GNP growth rates of the host and home countries to
be relevant for his analysis of short-run fluctuations in US FDI. He ap-
plied his model, however, only to domestically and not to export-oriented
FDI. Schwartz [ 1976] distinguished between initial and later investments
of a firm; she concluded that the former are dependent on the size and
growth of host country markets, but the latter more on sales and profits
of the affiliates [see also Barlow, Wender, 1955; Penrose, 1956; Richard-
son, 1971a; 1971b]. In contrast to Takahashi and Schwartz, most of the
studies have not distinguished between different kinds of FDI. This is
rendered difficult, if not impossible, by the absence of FDI statistics
required for that purpose.12
Market access has been the main motive of German FDI in DCs.
About two fifths of the firms interviewed voted in favour of this variable
[Schroder, 1986]. A similar opinion was expressed by the German inves-
tors in the early 1970s [ Jung nickel et al. , 1974]. Market access is, of
course, interesting for the investors only in those countries which al-
ready have a certain minimum size of markets or are growing fast enough
to offer good prospects for future sales. Otherwise firms are likely to
remain contented with servicing these markets through exports in the
short run. Later, when growth prospects improve, they may think of
investments. This leads us to the relation between trade and FDI.
Trade relations and FDI: From historical observation and theory it
can be deduced that trade is generally followed by FDI, both at micro-
and macro-level. The theory of optimal timing of FDI states that once a
company has developed a certain market share in a foreign market by
exporting, it is likely to become a foreign direct investor. This is be-
cause higher fixed costs associated with a production plant abroad (as
compared to exports) are compensated by lower variable costs when
economies of scale can be realized [Buckley, Casson, 1985]. Roch [1973]
found a significant correlation between US trade with DCs and US FDI
there. He also argued that firms supply a foreign market initially with
exports. But when it reaches a critical size or when it is threatened by
tariff or non-tariff barriers the exporter may have to shift to local pro-
duction involving FDI. Roemer [ 1975] examined the historical development
of trade and foreign investment of the United States, the United King-
dom, Germany, and Japan. He found a country passing through different
stages demarcated in terms of changing mutual strength of its trade and
FDI. Trade comes first and then it is followed by FDI.
For Germany, Agarwal [ 1978] found that its FDI is significantly
related to its foreign trade with respect to both regional and sectoral
distribution. Baumann et al. [ 1977] and Milton [ 1984] have come to simi-
lar conclusions. This is confirmed also by more recent studies for Ger-
many [Schroder, 1986; Gubitz, 1988]. The former study reveals that 17
per cent of the firms which started business with exports entered into
cooperation agreements with foreign firms in the same year [Schroder,
1986, pp. 267-272]. Trade relations enable investors to gain more know-
ledge not only about the final demand for their products in the partnerfur WeStwirtecfraft Kiel
13
country but also about its factor markets which are essential for FDI
decisions.
Import protection: The observation that trade is frequently followed
by FDI is also due to import substitution policies that most of the DCs
have followed since the 1950s, albeit in varying degrees. Policy-induced
import substitution implies protection of local markets against foreign
goods. If this protection is prohibitive, foreign firms may be compelled
to invest in that country in order to keep that market, depending on the
size and growth prospects of that economy. Sometimes only a prospect of
impending protection may encourage foreign suppliers to opt for local
production in place of their exports, as is the case with some of the
Japanese car makers in the United States. In small economies, however,
this strategy may not at all be successful. In the long run, import pro-
tection as an instrument for attracting FDI is likely to be inefficient for
larger countries as well. The goods produced in sheltered economies in-
volve usually high costs and are not competitive in international markets
[Donges, 1976b; Hiemenz, Langhammer, 1986; Hiemenz, 1987].
Several studies have assessed the impact of import protection on
FDI flows. In a study on India, Kumar [ 1987] found the import substi-
tution variable to be significant in explaining foreign involvement in In-
dian industry. Also in the case of FDI in the United States, protection
was found to be a significant explanatory variable of the share of for-
eign-controlled companies in total net sales of an industry [ Lall, Sidd-
harthan, 1982]. Import restrictions have motivated South Korean firms in
the case of electronic goods to undertake FDI in America and Europe to
escape quota restrictions [ Euh, Min, 1986]. In a very extensive study,
the German Association of Industry and Trade [Kayser et al. , 1981]
came to the conclusion that FDI is often undertaken by the German firms
to overcome trade restrictions in DCs. However, no such relation be-
tween protection and FDI could be detected in the Canadian case [Caves,
1974; Caves et al. , 1980; Owen, 1982; Gupta, 1983].
Currency valuation: Exchange rate effects represent another factor
that may influence the relation between trade and FDI. Aliber [ 1970;
1971] in his currency area theory of FDI maintained that firms from
countries with harder currencies are able to borrow at lower rates of
interest than firms from countries with weak currencies. As a result,
FDI is likely to flow from the former into the latter depending on the14
share of capital in value added and the valuation of the host country's
currency vis-a-vis the source country's currency. Empirical studies
available on this subject have tried to find out an association between
FDI flows and exchange rate changes of home and host countries. Many
of them have shown that devaluation of the local currency encourages
the inflow of FDI and discourages the outflow of FDI [Alexander, Mur-
phy, 1975; Logue, Willet, 1977; Kohlhagen, 1977; Sachchamarga, 1978].
The results are, however, not very dependable. Some other studies
[Scaperlanda, 1974; Boatwright, Renton, 1975] have shown that the op-
posite effect of devaluation on FDI is also possible.
Aliber's theory had been able to draw considerable attention be-
cause of its simplicity and success in explaining the outflow of the US
FDI during the 1950s and 1960s. But in the later decades, which have
been marked by flexible exchange rates and greater participation of a
larger number of countries in international direct investments, the scope
for application of this theory may have been considerably reduced. In a
world with mobile capital, the possibility of a relationship between for-
eign acquisitions and exchange rates is dismissed by most international
economists (for the following. reasoning, see Froot and Stein [1989]).
Assuming that all investors - domestic and foreign - have access to the
same international capital market, it is argued that a country becomes a
cheaper place for any firm to produce when its currency depreciates;
i. e. depreciation does not alter foreigners' opportunities relative to those
of domestic investors. Froot and Stein have shown, however, that this
conclusion cannot be maintained once wealth effects influence the agents'
demand for investment and globally integrated capital markets are subject
to informational asymmetries. Informational imperfections cause external
financing to be more expensive than internal financing. It then follows
that, to the extent that foreigners hold more of their wealth denominated
in their home currency, a depreciation of the currency of the host
country increases the relative wealth position of foreigners and hence
lowers their relative cost of capital. This allows them to bid more
aggressively for assets than domestic investors of the host country.
Another important question is about the effect of the prevailing
high volatility of exchange rates on FDI flows. Since trade is likely to
be negatively affected by this volatility [S. Weintraub, 1981; Davidson,
1982], it is possible that firms may be encouraged to substitute trade by15
FDI with a view to bypass the foreign exchange market to some extent.
Harvey [ 1989/90] has examined this question recently for US FDI and
concluded that exchange rate variation is a factor influencing FDI deci-
sions. But a general answer to our question with regard to all industries
or with respect to short- and long-run effects on FDI flows is not pos-
sible from his empirical results.
Labour costs: Exchange rate movements may affect FDI flows also
through their effect on production costs in the source country and po-
tential host countries. As far as DCs are concerned, availability of cheap
labour as a determinant of FDI inflows has attracted much attention in
research since the 1970s. Riedel's [1975] study on Taiwan showed that
relatively lower wage costs had been one of the major causes of the ex-
port-oriented FDI in that country. Similar conclusions were reached by
Donges [ 1976a; 1980] in the case of Spain and Portugal. Agarwal's
[ 1978] study showed that a higher increase in labour costs in Germany
than in Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, and Nigeria led to higher
flow of FDI from Germany to these host countries. Similar results were
achieved by Juhl [ 1979] at the sectoral level for German investments in
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. In a study based on survey
data of German firms [Schroder, 1986], 20 per cent of them declared to
have undertaken FDI in DCs in order to achieve lower costs of pro-
duction and labour costs were one of them.
However, the relative importance of labour costs for FDI decisions
is not as straightforward as it might appear from the above-mentioned
studies [e.g. Kravis, Lipsey, 1982]. A more recent analysis [Agarwal,
1989] on the effect of relative changes in real earnings of employees in
host and source countries on FDI revealed mixed results. While Japanese
FDI in DCs was responsive to labour costs, this was not the case for
investments from the United States, West Germany and the United King-
dom. The difference between this study and earlier ones may be because
Agarwal's analysis is confined to Pacific-rim developing countries where
wage costs have risen considerably during the 1980s. But it is also pos-
sible that the increasing robotization of production processes has gener-
ally reduced the importance of low-skilled human labour and thus of
wage costs as a locational advantage of many countries in the Third
World. Furthermore, rising labour costs may encourage foreign investors16
who are already holders of FDI in a country to substitute capital for
labour [Stevens, 1973].
Internal liquidity: Research on domestic investment seeks to estab-
lish a relation between internal cash flow (undistributed profits, depre-
ciation allowances) and investment outlays of a firm. It is based on the
assumption that the cost of internal funds is viewed by investors to be
lower than the cost of external funds [Meyer, Kuh, 1957; Duesenberry,
1958]. Drawing on this literature, some economists have attempted to
examine the effect of cash flow of parent companies or their affiliates on
investments in the host countries. Barlow and Wender [ 1955] are of the
opinion that local profits of the affiliates are treated as "gambler's earn-
ings" and firms are more easily prepared to reinvest them than to commit
fresh capital for expansion of their operations. Brash [1966], Safarian
[1969], Kwack [1972], and Hoelscher [1975] have also produced evidence
in favour of this hypothesis. Brash examined the US FDI in Australia
and Safarian examined the same in Canada. In both cases, a strong rela-
tion was established between internal cash flow (undistributed profits,
depreciation allowances) and expansionary investments of the US sub-
sidiaries. Kwack found a statistically significant relation between the US
corporate cash flow (net of dividends) and the US FDI. He concluded
that changes in US tax policies to increase the cash flow would have a
positive effect on FDI. Some other studies [Stevens, 1969a; Severn,
1972] have failed to find any evidence to support the internal liquidity
hypothesis.
Another group of economists has made a more differentiated ap-
proach to this problem. Stobaugh [1970] concluded on the basis of inter-
view data that smaller firms with sales of less than US$ 50 mill, are less
willing to make additional investments in already established subsidiaries
abroad. Reuber et al. [ 1973] distinguished between parent companies and
their subsidiaries. They found on the basis of firm interviews that the
cash flow of subsidiaries in DCs exercises a substantial influence on
their new investment outlays. This is, among other things, also the re-
sult of the existing restrictions on repatriation of funds in these coun-
tries. Though the extensive study of Reuber et al. is nearly two dec-
ades old, their conclusion that internal liquidity of the subsidiaries in
DCs has a role to play in total flow of FDI to the Third World may hold
today no less than in the past. With the exception of some of the newly17
industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia, economic conditions have gener-
ally worsened in DCs after the debt crisis. This has rendered the trans-
fer of funds from there more difficult, if not impossible. Consequently,
there may be often no alternative but to reinvest the profits of subsidia-
ries.
Political and economic instability: Third World economies offering
promising markets and cost advantages may nevertheless be often unat-
tractive for foreign investors. The aforementioned economic determinants
of FDI may be overruled if host countries are found politically and eco-
nomically instable. It is widely believed "that the flow of FDI to DCs has
not been sufficient to foster rapid economic growth. Therefore, econo-
mists have been looking for factors which may have hindered the flow of
private capital to these countries. One of these factors may be political
and economic instabilities of these countries.
Political instability has been found by a majority of survey reports
as discouraging for foreign investors [see, e.g., US Department of Com-
merce, 1954; Robinson, 1961; Basi, 1963; Aharoni, 1966; Swansbrough,
1972; Reuber et al. , 1973]. But econometric studies based on cross-
country data have produced only mixed results. Among those who have
discerned a negative association between FDI and political instability are
Ahmed [1975], Levis [1979], and Schneider and Frey [1985]. Some
others who have not been able to find out any such relation between
these two variables are Green [1972],
1 Green and Cunningham [1975],
Kobrin [1976], and Situmeang [1978].
The most important reason for differences among the quoted studies
is the concept of political instability, which has often been defined in
different ways in these studies. Further, the degree of risk arising from
political and economic instabilities in a host country is likely to vary for
FDI of different origins and in different industries [Thunell, 1977],
which has not always been taken into account in previous studies. More-
over, the influence of political risk on FDI flows may have abated since
the introduction of various guarantee schemes in developed countries.
Roch [1973] showed that in the period before the introduction of invest-
ment guarantees in the United States, political instability of host coun-
Kopplinger and Wolfram [ 1986, p. 227] suggest that an evaluation of
political risks should be carried further to firm-specific aspects.18
tries was negatively related with FDI; but in the period after the imple-
mentation of guarantees such an association no longer existed. Thus it
may be correct to conclude that investment guarantees have reduced the
negative effect of political instability on the inflow of FDI in host DCs.
However, according to recent evidence presented by Wallace [ 1989, p.
11] there are also companies which "are simply not conducting operations
in areas where the risk is so great as to necessitate insurance".
Debt overhang and sovereign risk: Many DCs have been badly af-
fected by the international debt crisis since the beginning of the 1980s.
Failure or less than expected success to solve this crisis have led many
people to think that equity capital is a real and promising alternative to
existing and future loans to the Third World. But little research has
been done on the feasibility of this alternative (on debt vs. equity fi-
nance, see Corsepius et al. [1989]). The prevalence of considerable dis-
counts on existing Third World debt in the secondary markets is a seri-
ous obstacle to new voluntary lending (see Nunnenkamp [1989a] and the
literature given there). Similarly, the profitability of new FDI may be
impaired by a debt overhang. The expected income from productive in-
vestment which remains with the foreign investor is likely to decline due
to higher expected taxes and stagnating markets. In other words, once a
country is trapped into a foreign debt burden and the economic conse-
quences of it, the determinants of the inflow of equity capital and pri-
vate credits from abroad may not be very different.
Related with this is the discussion on sovereign risk in the case of
foreign debt [e.g. Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981; Sachs, 1984; Stuven, 1988].
The risk of willful default on external debt may have its counterpart in
the risk of expropriation and restrictions on profit and capital remit-
tances in the case of FDI. So FDI may be negatively related to the po-
tential benefits which the host countries may reap from sovereign mea-
sures against FDI and positively related to the potential costs of such a
behaviour. Empirical evidence in this respect is largely lacking and ex-
tremely sketchy (for an exception, see Picht and Stuven [1988]). More-
over, it is open to question whether subsidies for FDI granted in the
context of debt-equity swaps provide an adequate means to compensate
for sovereign risk (for a detailed discussion, see Section VI. 2).19
III. German FDI in Developing Countries: Patterns and Past
Developments
1. Data Sources
Before entering into the analysis of patterns and determinants of
German FDI in developing countries some comments on the data base are
necessary. The statistical information on FDI at an aggregate level, i. e.
stocks and flows, is based on the collection and compilation of data by
the Deutsche Bundesbank. Data collection is based on federal law (as is
generally the case in Germany), which provides regulations for reporting
acquisitions and/or liquidations of assets (including reinvested earn-
ings), which give the owner an effective voice in the management of an
enterprise in the host country. In principle, all financial transactions
between parent and affiliated companies are covered. Short-term liabili-
ties and trade credits are, however, excluded and reported in the short-
term capital account. The flow data on FDI in the balance of payments as
well as the data published by the Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft
(Ministry of Economic Affairs) are based on this reporting system.
Under the same law companies are also obliged to report stock data once
4
a year. These stock data, compiled since 1976, contain the most detailed
information on German FDI on a country-by-country basis and with re-
Foreign Trade and Payments Law (AuBenwirtschaftsgesetz).
2
Usually shares of 25 per cent or more are considered as FDI. Shares
in non-equity enterprises are generally assumed to be FDI regardless
of the size of the share. Transactions below DM 20,000 are usually not
reported. Data are collected on a monthly basis; for details see Wolff
[1987].
Deutsche Bundesbank [a]; BMWi [various issues]. A regional break-
down is published annually as a supplement to the above-mentioned
publication of the Bundesbank.
4
The data cover all financial linkages between the parent companies and
their foreign affiliates, i.e.: (own capital + reserves + profit carried
forward - loss carried forward) • capital share of the German parent
company + liabilities of the affiliate vis-a-vis the German parent com-
pany, including trade credits.20
spect to sectors. In addition to primary FDI as covered in the trans-
action data the stock numbers also include secondary FDI, i. e. the ap-
propriate share of FDI of holding companies with German participation
2
minus German FDI in those holding companies. This data base also in-
cludes total assets, annual turnover and employment of enterprises with
German participation. Due to the different valuation principles the dif-
ference of the increase in primary FDI stocks and FDI flows can be
large.
2. German FDI and Related Activities
Germany used to be a fairly good example of what is called a "small
open economy". It exports roughly a third of its GNP and imports about
a quarter in relation to GNP. It has also been a major recipient of FDI,
which played a major role in turning what was at that time called Ger-
many into an industrialized country in the 19th century, and the Federal
Republic of Germany to become one of the wealthiest countries after the
Second World War. In 1976, FDI stock in Germany (DM 63.5 bill.) ex-
ceeded German FDI stocks abroad by DM 14.5 bill. [Deutsche Bundes-
bank, b]. In 1988, the picture looked quite different: German FDI
stocks abroad amounted to DM 184 bill. , exceeding FDI stock in the
country by DM 75 bill. Transaction data for 1989, although only a rough
Foreign shares of less than DM 500,000 (book value converted to DM at
the end of the year) are usually not reported. Data are published once
a year as a supplement of the regular balance-of-payments publication:
"Die Kapitalverflechtung der Unternehmen mit dem Ausland nach Lan-
dern und Wirtschaftszweigen" (International capital links between
enterprises) [Deutsche Bundesbank, b].
2
Brazil, for example, hosts DM 6.4 bill. FDI invested directly from Ger-
man companies, of which DM 0.9 bill, are in holding companies with
German participation, including those located in Brazil itself. In order
to avoid double counting and assure an appropriate regional break-
down, the net investment via the holding companies is added to the
directly invested capital. Total FDI stocks in Brazil (DM 8.5 bill. )
would be underestimated, if only primary FDI is taken into account.
The contrary, for example, applies to the Netherlands Antilles, where
primary FDI amounts to DM 1.3 bill. , while total FDI after correcting
for investments to and from holding companies is only DM 0.6 bill. All
numbers refer to the end of 1987.21
indicator for the increase of the stock data, indicate a further develop-
ment in this direction.
German FDI outflows have grown rapidly in recent years, in fact
much faster than, for example, exports. But they are still of minor
importance compared to other international transactions. FDI is only one
option in a set of several possible international economic activities. There
are two alternatives: (i) the investment could be undertaken at home and
the product exported, or (ii) a licence could be given to a company out-
side the home country. In the case of an investment in the primary com-
modity sector the option to invest at home is often not available; how-
ever, instead of producing the raw materials abroad and importing from
the subsidiary, they could be bought from an independent supplier.
Price and quantity risks can be reduced by long-term contracts and in-
surance contracts. Also, investments in the service sector could be sub-
stituted by long-term contracts with local companies, i. e. agency agree-
ments. Thus, the existence of FDI indicates that internalization pays, or
to put it differently, that markets fail to offer suitable contracts (see
Section II. 1).
In Table 1 the size of the related international transactions is
shown. It clearly reveals the strong preference of the German economy
to export, no matter whether it is to the EC or to DCs. In fact, the re-
2 gional pattern of FDI roughly reflects the regional pattern of exports.
The average ratio of net FDI outflows to exports is 3.7 per cent (United
Also in relation to German (non-residential) gross domestic investment
(GDI), gross German FDI outflows increased steadily, from 5 per cent,
on average, in 1970-1975 to 9 per cent, on average, in 1982-1987
[Deutsche Bundesbank, b]. This ratio is, however, of limited infor-
mative value. The two data sets on FDI and GDI are not strictly com-
parable because conceptually, balance-of-payment data on FDI do not
capture the increase in the capital stock abroad, not even its financ-
ing, as the part that is financed from other than domestic sources is
not covered in the balance of payments.
2
There is, however, one exception in the overall picture of the overly
strong weight of exporting: In 1988, German net FDI outflows to the
United States were 21 per cent in relation to exports respectively. The
United States offer a large market with attractive investment oppor-
tunities in new as well as in existing enterprises and the US market
for German products is well established. The ratio between German FDI
and exports increased steadily as far as transactions with the United
States are concerned; in 1976, this ratio was much more in line with
today's overall pattern [Deutsche Bundesbank, a; b; c]. This indi-22





































(a) Industrialized countries. - (b) Country list: Bundesbank (exclud-
ing European DCs and centrally planned economies). - (c) Country list
according to OECD [b]. - (d) Primary and secondary FDI.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [a; b; c].
States: 15.4 per cent). In sharp contrast to that, licensing is negli-
gible. Income from licences and patents is only less than half the reve-
nue from FDI, for the DCs it is only about a fourth. These numbers,
however, have to be taken with great caution: Both revenues on FDI
and income from licences and patents are most likely highly underre-
ported, as there are strong incentives to hide these yields due to tax
2
reasons and repatriation restrictions. As the downward bias is, how-
ever, likely to be similar, the numbers indicate that FDI is the preferred
activity in relation to licensing.
Exporting, licensing and FDI can be considered as three different
modes of servicing a foreign market in ascending order of fixed costs
cates that apart from favourable investment conditions well-established
trade relations are an important stimulus for German FDI outflows.
This hypothesis will be tested in a DC context in Section V. 2.
Average capital outflows of 1986 and 1987 as a ratio of total exports in
the respective years [IMF, d].
This view was supported in interviews with representatives from pri-
vate and public institutions dealing with projects in DCs.23
and descending order of variable costs [Buckley, Casson, 1985]. Thus,
one would expect activity shifting from exporting to licensing to FDI as
foreign markets grow. Licensing can, however, be an inefficient way of
servicing a market, because costs of monitoring and controlling the li-
censee are particularly high. In that case the firm would switch from
exporting to FDI immediately (see also Chapter II). This might be one
reason why licensing is the least important international activity of Ger-
man companies.
3. The Importance of DCs as Hosts for German FDI
Typically the ICs invested relatively more in other ICs than in
DCs. This has been particularly true for Germany, where FDI stocks in
DCs as well as net outflows to DCs declined at least in relative terms.
Excluding the OPEC countries, the German FDI stock in DCs was
DM 20.7 bill, by the end of 1988 which is almost the maximum value of
DM 21 bill, reached at the end of 1984 [Deutsche Bundesbank, b]. The
declining share of FDI in DCs (Table 2) is mainly due to Latin America,
while FDI stocks in the Asian countries, although small in absolute mag-
nitude, increased steadily [Deutsche Bundesbank, a]. The flow figures
of Table 3 underscore the dramatic decline of the share of the DCs after
the eruption of the debt crisis.
The regional picture of FDI stocks is somewhat distorted by valu-
ation effects, especially by the high volatility of the DM/USS rate. The
increase in total FDI stocks (primary FDI only) over the two years of
1986 and 1987 was only DM 1.2 bill. , while the net outflow during the
same period amounted to DM 19.1 bill. [Deutsche Bundesbank, a; b].
For similar reasons the stock of FDI in DCs declined by DM 0.7 bill. ,
while there was a positive outflow of DM 1. 4 bill. The Bundesbank esti-
mates that total valuation losses in those two years amounted to about
DM 15 bill. , which is to a great extent due to the depreciation of the
US$ vis-a-vis the DM to the extremely low value of DM 1.58 at the end
of 1987 (for details, see Deutsche Bundesbank [e]).
Apart from the peculiar regional pattern of German FDI stocks with-
in the group of DCs characterized by the high weight of problem coun-
tries in Latin America, there are other reasons for the strong orientation24











total OPEC non-OPEC Brazil
74 34 14 20 3.5 17 9.5
76 29 26 18 3 15 7.5
84 39 27 12 1 11 5
jers do not add up to 100 per cent mainly due to FDI-related
: holding companies which cannot be broken down by region.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [b].















































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [a].
of German FDI towards ICs. First, the coming of the Single Market in
the EC in 1993 gave a special stimulus to invest in Europe rather than
outside (see also Section VI. 3). Second, there has been a growing tend-
ency to buy existing companies, especially so within the wave of take-
overs in the United States, instead of establishing new production25
plants. Third, participation of German companies in the increasing trend
of becoming a multinational enterprise is a relatively new phenomenon, as
more and more German companies are growing beyond a certain size,
which gives them the capacity to become a foreign direct investor. Com-
panies which are relatively unexperienced investors are more likely to
stick to areas they feel more familiar with.
4. Major Destinations of German FDI in the Third World
Whatever flaws the stock data might have, in the case of Germany
it is the only data base that shows the amount of FDI in single countries
over a longer period of time in a consistent way. Table 4 lists the ten
major host countries in the developing world.












(a) In all other countries









































the stock figures are below DM 300 mill. -
.987. - (d) 1986. - (e) 198.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [b]; IMF [d]; World Bank [c].
The Ministry of Economic Affairs [BMWi, various issues] publishes
transaction data on a single country basis or by sector since 1986.
However, due to major changes in the methodology of compilation, only
the numbers for 1987 and 1988 are comparable. Furthermore, data do
not include reinvested earnings and investment in real estate.26
Although not generally the biggest recipient any more, Brazil is still
by far the most important single host country of German FDI. In terms
of GDP it is also the biggest country in the "top ten" list. However,
size is not all that matters; India, the second largest economy, is at the
very bottom of this list. Four of the major host countries are offshore
banking centres. It should also be noted that some of the latter coun-
tries are also major hosts of non-financial FDI. In Singapore, for ex-
ample, almost a third of the total stock is in manufacturing, of which
half is in electrical engineering [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data].
5. Sectoral Distribution of German FDI in DCs
Germany has traditionally held a strong competitive position in the
manufacturing sector, especially in the chemical industry, in vehicle pro-
duction and in electrical engineering. Being a country short of natural
resources, one might expect FDI in the mining sector to constitute a
large share of total FDI stocks. Although significantly higher than in the
ICs, the share of German FDI in the mining sector of all DCs (OPEC and
non-OPEC) is only 8.7 per cent (weighted average of figures given in
Table 5 for OPEC and non-OPEC). The breakdown by sectors in DCs
reflects the preference to do in DCs what has been successful at home:
the average share of FDI in manufacturing of OPEC and non-OPEC DCs
is 63.4 per cent. In ICs the respective share is only 42.4 per cent
[Deutsche Bundesbank, b]. Here, investment in the service sector is
much higher.
The breakdown by domestic branches shows an even higher concen-
tration in manufacturing; i.e. companies in manufacturing also invest in
other sectors, namely mining and, especially in ICs, in distribution
[Deutsche Bundesbank, b]. With company size being a prerequisite to
becoming a foreign direct investor it is not surprising that FDI is con-
centrated in the German manufacturing sector, where the largest com-
panies are (Volkswagen, Hoechst, Siemens, etc.). On an aggregated
basis these companies diversify their FDI between sectors more in the
industrialized world than in DCs. In the latter, especially investment in
distribution is much lower. This might suggest that export-substituting27
Table 5 - German FDI Stocks by Branches in the Third World, 1988























































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [b].
FDI is relatively higher in DCs than in ICs (a related hypothesis will be
tested in Section V. 2).
The breakdown by branches within the manufacturing sector in the
non-OPEC DCs shows in more detail where FDI comes from and where it
goes. The biggest shares come from the German vehicle industry (23.6
per cent) and the German chemical industry (22.2 per cent), and the
biggest shares go to the respective sectors abroad (22.4 and 18.9 per
cent). The other important sector is electrical engineering. The sectoral
distribution is strongly determined by the pattern in a few major host
countries. In Brazil, which hosts 43.5 per cent of the FDI stock in non-
OPEC DCs, almost 90 per cent of FDI is in manufacturing, about a third
in vehicle production alone [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpublished data]. A
similar picture arises for Mexico: of the DM 2.5 bill. FDI stock DM 2.2
bill, is in manufacturing. Within the manufacturing sector in Mexico
about half is invested in the chemical industry. As mentioned above,
within Asia, Singapore attracted FDI in electrical engineering. In Africa28
the most important host country is Egypt (DM 0.5 bill.). Here a break-
down by sector is not possible, because the numbers get to small to be
shown due to confidentiality. Among the OPEC countries Libya is by far
the biggest recipient (DM 0.6 bill. ) and investment is almost completely
allocated in the mining sector.
A breakdown of German FDI stocks by country and sector is - due
to confidentiality - available only for a small number of countries. This
demonstrates how highly concentrated German FDI is in a few countries
in the developing world. It has to be mentioned that this is not a special
characteristic of the German FDI structure, but reflects the overall pic-
ture of FDI in DCs.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Among the overall international economic activities FDI still plays a
rather limited role for the German economy. But its weight is increasing
in the international as well as in the domestic context. FDI itself is
highly and increasingly concentrated in the industrialized world. Within
the group of DCs there is a high concentration by sector in manufactur-
ing and by region in Latin America.
While high concentration with respect to sectoral distribution helps
to explain FDI data, as they measure a rather homogeneous activity com-
pared to FDI data for the ICs, the high concentration with respect to
countries will cause some difficulties in the empirical analysis. To analyse
many of the determinants of FDI in host DCs, cross-section or panel
data have to be used. Taking into account all countries, for which stock
data are reported (about 50), most of the numbers will be small. Thus
we get a low sample mean and high variation. As the explaining variables
are likely not to follow the same kind of dynamic behaviour, the explana-
tory power of some equations might be lower compared to what empirical
researchers are normally used to. Probit and log it models are often a
reasonable way to tackle that kind of data. Unfortunately these ap-
proaches are not applicable here, because there are no rules according
to which certain values can be assigned to certain activities. A decrease
of a stock value can be (and often is) caused by a negative valuation
effect higher than a positive transaction value, i. e. it cannot be asso-29
ciated with a disinvestment. For similar reasons zero values cannot be
interpreted as inactivity. Transaction data, which would reveal that kind
of information, are in general not published on a country-by-country
basis and were made available for the purpose of this study only for a
rather limited number of countries. In any case, a selection bias cannot
be avoided completely, as those countries which host only one or two
projects are not covered in the data base due to confidentiality reasons.
Another problem is that a major part of FDI in DCs, namely rein-
vested earnings, are estimated by the compiler. The regional breakdown
is particularly unreliable, and there is no a priori reason to assume that
errors of reinvested earnings in single countries are uncorrelated.
After having raised the problems that have to be faced one way or
the other, it has to be mentioned that explaining FDI in DCs from source
countries' data has major advantages over explaining host country data.
The major source countries have comprehensive statistics on FDI and the
performance of their company sector. Most measurement problems can at
least be traced. Although the regression results cannot be expected to
meet the same standards as those in related fields, for example, in trade
analysis where much more comprehensive data are available, understand-
ing of the determinants of FDI can be improved.30
IV. Economic Policies of the Developing Countries towards FDI
Whatever the economic determinants of FDI in DCs are (see Chapter
II for an overview of major hypotheses), their empirical investigation will
be partially disguised by the rules and regulations governing the inflow
of foreign capital in DCs. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first,
to give an overview of the most important aspects of investment legis-
lation and policy in the host countries and, second, to develop and test
indicators for the degree of openness of the host countries.
The first issue has been covered thoroughly in various studies
[e.g. IMF, e; Becsky et al. , 1989; Rosenn, 1989]. Apart from special
studies, the IMF [c] and the UNCTC [c] supply regular information on
this topic. So only a few illustrative examples are described here. A
synopsis of selected aspects of host countries' investment policies is
given in Appendix 2 for major recipients of German FDI.
As the major aim of this study is a quantitative assessment of the
determinants of FDI, the qualitative information of the above-mentioned
sources has to somehow be quantified in order to fit into the regression
analysis. For this purpose it is translated into an indicator that de-
scribes the degree of openness of a country. It can be argued that this
procedure is rather arbitrary. Moreover, as the available indicators rely
on "expert knowledge", they are likely to have some common bias. How-
ever, these problems can be partly overcome by developing one's own
assessment and by choosing indicators from rather separated sources.
1. Obstacles to FDI: Some Major Issues
The regulations and policies of DCs to influence the inflow of for-
eign capital can be quite complex and are often rather inconsistent.
When relating the actual size of German FDI stock in a single country to
the country's regulatory framework one has to keep in mind that in most
cases the FDI stock is the result of decisions of very few companies
It should be mentioned that measurements of the investment climate are
more readily available (see Section V. 4). They include, however, eco-
nomic performance and stability aspects. The focus here is narrower,
i. e. restricted to institutional rules and habits.31
(sometimes only one), for which a particular component of the regulatory
framework - at that point in time - might have outweighed all the
others. On an aggregate level, however, there are a few components of
the rules and regulations that are generally considered to be crucial.
A major if not the most serious obstacle to FDI is restrictions on
ownership. German companies have a strong preference for 100 per cent
ownership. The reasoning for this is similar to the one for the prefer-
ence for direct investment over licensing. It eases the decision process
inside the company and allows for a better control over intangible assets
such as technology, product quality and credibility (see also Section
II. 1. b). But joint ventures have their particular advantages too.
Country-specific aspects of production and distribution can be more
easily handled with a local partner sharing the risk burden. Especially
small and medium-sized companies appreciate these advantages of joint
ventures.
According to a study of the HWWA Institute, companies own on
average 84 per cent of their affiliates abroad [Scharrer, Kragenau,
1988]. In Latin America the percentage share is even higher (87.3 per
cent), in Asia significantly lower (56.3 per cent). Companies are gener-
ally more restricted with respect to 100 per cent ownership (often even
with respect to majority ownership) in DCs than in ICs. This is clearly
reflected in the concentration of companies with respect to their owner-
ship in their foreign affiliates (Table 6).
As listed in Appendix 2, many DCs prefer joint ventures. Some
countries have codified limits varying from sector to sector with a total
foreign ownership being the exception, often approved particularly to
export-oriented companies (for example in Malaysia). Other countries
decide on a discretionary basis (like Thailand), and many countries' re-
gulations require a gradual increase in national participation (for
example, Peru). An important qualification to the above-described re-
gional pattern of shares has to be made, however. Most DCs, especially
so in Asia and Mexico, liberalized their investment policies substantially
The percentage shares given in Table 6 are based on a survey con-
ducted by the HWWA Institute for Economic Research in Hamburg on
financing German FDI. The survey covers 144 German companies and
information about 233 of their foreign affiliates [Scharrer, Kragenau,
1988].32
Table 6 - Percentage Shares of Ownership of German Companies, 1985
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Source: Scharrer, Kragenau [ 1988].
and received increased FDI inflows in recent years. In particular, pos-
sibilities for fully foreign-owned investment projects were extended. The
most important holder of German FDI, Brazil, is, however, following a
more restrictive stance, at least in comparison to other countries.
Another important factor indicating a DCs attitude towards FDI
concerns restrictions on the repatriation of profits and capital. This is-
sue also involves the access to foreign exchange (for detailed information
on single countries, see IMF [c]). Even if the repatriation of profits and
capital is granted under the investment code of the country or by a bi-
lateral investment treaty, this is not of much use if access to foreign
exchange is restricted. This is especially true for companies which main-
ly operate in the domestic market of the host country. Most countries
with severe debt problems restrict repatriation of profits and capital.
Argentina, for example, used to prohibit the repatriation of capital un-
der an emergency legislation due to foreign exchange shortages, and
capital acquired under the debt-equity conversion programme cannot be
repatriated for ten years. Other countries, for example, Kenya, restrict
the repatriation of capital gains.
Although no country completely prohibits the repatriation of profits,
many countries have certain restrictions which distort optimal financing
conditions. In Kenya the repatriation of profits is restricted to the cur-
rent year. Although reinvested earnings can in principle be repatriated
Exchange controls started being liberalized in October 1987 and are
completely abolished by now.33
as capital, this rule gives incentives to repatriate earnings immediately
and therefore reduces the flexibility of financing decisions. Many coun-
tries restrict the repatriation of profits to a certain percentage of the
registered capital. Earnings repatriated above that amount are highly
taxed. Brazil, for example, restricts the repatriation of profits to 12 per
cent of the registered capital (in foreign currency) calculated over a
three year average. Although this regulation might appear harmless at
first sight, it turns out to be a major flaw, because registered capital is
usually not allowed to be adjusted for inflation; as a lot of FDI stock is
registered a long time ago, often only a small porportion of the actual
profit can be remitted. This gives a strong incentive to invest in form of
a loan rather than in form of equity capital, because remittance of inter-
est earnings on foreign loans is geared to market rates (for a detailed
discussion, see Rosenn [1989]).
According to a survey on German firms' investment behaviour in
DCs, done by the Ifo Institute in Munich dating back to 1980, "the most
important individual factor for German investors is the difficulties in
dealing with the state authorities (bureaucracy) in developing countries.
Only just under one-fifth of the ratings classified this as a minor factor"
[Pollak, Riedel, 1984, p. 29]. Obtaining a complete picture of this issue
for all the countries included in the investigation is, of course, beyond
the scope of this study. There are countries which are known to have a
particular tedious approval procedure, for example, Nigeria and Kenya.
On the other hand, there are a few countries which have a codified,
straightforward approval process. In South Korea, for example, many
investment projects are approved automatically. Other countries made
their approval procedures more straightforward recently, most notably
Mexico [Shah, Slemrod, 1990]. In the discussion on improving FDI poli-
cies in DCs some emphasis was given to the establishment of a "one-
stop" agency, which is the only institution a foreign investor then has
to deal with [ e. g-. Becsky et al. , 1989, Chapter 8]. A lot, however,
depends not only on the way the approval procedure is formally insti-
tutionalized, but on how it is handled in practice. Thus the pure exist-
ence of a one-stop agency alone is a rather poor indicator for the clas-
sification of the approval process. For most countries the approval pro-
cess is evaluated by scoring it on the basis of expert knowledge.34
Apart from the three issues discussed above, there are many others
which are crucial for assessing the FDI policies of a DC. Countries
which are restrictive with respect to the above-mentioned factors often
have numerous exceptions from their rules for specific purposes. Among
those are export processing zones, tax exemptions, and a high degree of
industry protection. Other countries, like Chile and recently South
Korea, rather rely on a more even treatment for foreign and domestic
investors alike. Among the various exemptions from taxes, tariffs and
duties, preferential treatment is often available for joint ventures in
particular (Algeria, Egypt, Mexico). On" the other hand, there are some
popular disincentives like quotas mandating employment of host country's
nationals (Malaysia) and performance requirements like local-content re-
quirements (Venezuela). The pattern of incentives and disincentives
often varies substantially between different sectors and has been
changing tremendously in recent years.
2. Measuring the Degree of Openness
Measurements of the degree of openness towards FDI in DCs take
the above-mentioned issues into account. However, the perception of the
host countries' attitudes towards FDI varies from source country to
source country. This is due to traditional and/or cultural links as well
as. to political factors. Germany never had colonies on a large scale and
thus has little particular cultural links to the developing world. On the
other hand, it has a strong competitive position in the classical sectors
of manufacturing (e. g. chemistry) and thus might find it easier to
operate in some DCs than other industrialized countries. Furthermore,
Germany has a large number of bilateral investment treaties (63) and
double taxation agreements (33) [ BMZ, 1986]. In order to measure the
degree of openness for German FDI these factors should be taken into
account.
For the purpose of this study, the degree of openness has to be
quantified in order to be taken into account in the regression analysis.
This is of course a rather subjective task. One way to approach it is to
summarize the information given in Appendix 2 and classify countries
into very restrictive ( = 0 ), restrictive ( = 1 ), semi-open ( = 2 ), and35
open ( = 3 ) on the basis of the researcher's own judgement (GU; see
Table 7). Another way of dealing with this problem is to rely on the
compilation and evaluation of information which other institutions col-
lected. Two sources are available:
- a measurement conducted by Frost & Sullivan, Inc. , in 1988 for the
United States Agency of International Development based on their own
research and expert knowledge [Frost & Sullivan, 1988].
- a measurement conducted by the Ifo Institute in Munich in 1980 based
on several sources of expert knowledge from German institutions deal-
ing with foreign affairs (for details, "see Osterkamp [1983]).
The advantage of relying on one's own jugdement is that the re-
searcher is aware of the limits of the resulting classification, which is in
this case purely based on published information. Furthermore, certain
bilateral aspects, i. e. investment treaties and double taxation agree-
ments, are explicitly taken into account. Aspects of political and eco-
nomic stability, however, are explicitly not taken into account. They are
a separate issue which will be dealt with in Section V. 4. The disadvan-
tage of this option is that the measurement is less comprehensive, as the
list of sources is limited and incomplete. This flaw can be avoided by
relying on the measurement of other institutions which collect information
from various country experts. But there are shortcomings to this ap-
proach as well. First, the quality of the index has to be taken for
granted, and second, the indices available do not strictly measure the
degree of openness, but the investment climate; i. e. they take factors
into account that are not strictly institutional.
The index constructed by Frost & Sullivan (FS) is based on 14 dif-
ferent criteria. For each country (the total number of countries covered
is 95) a score ranging from 1 (worst case) to 5 (best case) is given for
each criterion. For the purpose of this study the five "non-institutional"
criteria have been excluded (domestic economic performance, international
economic performance, labour conditions, security of operations, regime
stability). This index is thus the unweighted average of nine criteria:
controls on ownership, approval process, dispute settlement, employment
of nationals, performance requirements, exchange controls, repatriation
restrictions, investment incentives, and tax rates. An advantage of the
FS index is that it is fairly recent. It is, however, uncontrollable, in36
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Source: Frost & Sullivan [1988]; Osterkamp [1983]; own judgement
based on Appendix 2.37
how far the scoring of one criterion is influenced by the scoring of
others including those which are excluded for the purpose of this study.
The index constructed by the Ifo Institute (IFO) is based on 17
criteria for 36 countries and mainly covers regulations, but also aspects
of political stability. Information was collected by sending questionaires
to country experts in different institutions located either in Germany
(for example, the GTZ) and abroad (for example, German embassies).
For each criterion, experts were asked to give a score ranging from 1
for "very restrictive" over 2 for "somewhat restrictive" to 3 for "little
restrictive". The index itself is an unweighted sum of the scores, i.e.
the maximum value attainable is 51. The IFO index implicitly takes into
account German aspects of the investment environment in a DC. Its main
flaw is that it is somewhat outdated. Again it is uncontrollable in how
far answers to the different criteria were influenced by each other and
by outside factors such as the general economic performance of a
country.
Table 7 lists the classification of selected countries with respect to
2
the three different indicators discussed above. There are a few devia-
tions in the classification of a country depending on which indicator is
used. Two of them are worth mentioning. The degree of openness for
Brazil is judged to be low by FS and high by IFO. Probably, this is
mostly due to a national bias of the two indicators. The sectoral struc-
ture of German FDI has made it easier to fit into Brazil's investment
regulations. Thus German experts judge Brazil to be more open than US
experts. Another reason for the deviation is that the FS index is far
more recent, thus taking into account the rather restrictive Informatics
Law, which might affect US FDI more than German FDI. Even though
Brazil did not change dramatically with respect to its overall openness,
other major recipients liberalized FDI regulations, leaving Brazil with a
relatively poor image in recent years. Another major deviation occurs
with respect to South Korea. The much higher scoring with respect to
the FS index is due to the fact that South Korea became more open in
recent years, especially so in 1988.
The Gesellschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is a govern-
ment-owned company that advises and conducts projects in DCs. Their
services are usually free of charge for the DC.
2
The countries are major holders of German FDI stocks.38
3. Influence of the Degree of Openness on German FDI Outflows to DCs
The discussion on measuring the degree of openness revealed that
an index observed over time would be ideal to explain FDI flows. On the
other hand, the perception of the attitudes towards FDI of a country
probably changes only slowly. Thus it is quite justified to use a con-
stant indicator to pick up the influence of host countries' policies on
their FDI inflows from Germany. In order to find out whether the degree
of openness is a significant determinant of FDI and whether the above
described indicators behave differently, it is assumed that German FDI
outflows to single DCs depend on the host country's market size, mea-
sured by its nominal GNP, its real growth rate, its inflation rate, the
exchange rate vis-a-vis the DM, entrepreneurs' income of the private
sector in Germany, and one of the indicators measuring the degree of
openness. Although there are other factors that might play a significant
role, let us assume for the purpose of this chapter that these variables
explain FDI sufficiently well to lead to unbiased estimators of the coef-
ficients of the equation. Even under this (possibly heroic) assumption,
data for some of the explaining variables are not readily available.
The sample that the analysis is based on contains ten years from
1977 to 1986. In order to test the significance of the influence of host
countries' investment policies on German FDI, as many flow data to
single countries as possible should be taken into account in order to
reduce the possibility of a selection bias. Furthermore, as new invest-
ments and liquidations are likely to be influenced quite differently by
the investment policy of a country, gross flow data would be desirable.
However, all the data requirements cannot be met in practice. The most
broadly based regional as well as sectoral data set is the stock statistic,
which covers time series for 43 countries for the period under investi-
gation. The countries covered are either major holders or holders of
several small amounts of German FDI. If a country is not listed or its
numbers are not shown, it can, however, not be concluded that its Ger-
The start year is due to the fact that FDI stock data are unavailable
before 1976. The final year had to be chosen, because no more recent
numbers were available for some of the explaining variables for some
countries included in the sample.39
man FDI stock is close to zero; it could as well be a holder of one or
two large investments which are not shown due to confidentiality.
Another more serious problem occurs when "net outflows" are cal-
culated from an increase in stocks, because capital gains and losses due
to valuation changes and exchange rate variations are included. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, valuation changes due to exchange rate
movements are a particularly severe problem in German data. The stock
values are usually historical book values converted to DM using end-of-
period exchange rates. Thus converting stock values back to the respec-
tive local currency, taking first differences and converting those back to
DM at period average exchange rates should lead to a better approxima-
tion of the transaction data as compiled for the balance of payments.
Indeed the correlation between the increases in stocks and the flow data
is higher when the increase in stocks is measured the way described
above. There are, however, a few major recipient countries for which
this kind of adjustment is not applicable, namely those which suffer from
high inflation rates and currency depreciations respectively. In these
countries book values are usually adjusted for inflation. Thus, first dif-
ferences of the stock values measured at the period average exchange
rate exaggerate the historical transaction values.
In the following, first differences of the original stock data are
used as a proxy for net outflows and end-of-period exchange rates are
included in the equation to capture both valuation and volume effects.
The equation is thus an error correction approach to explain FDI stocks.
Among the other explanatory variables the real growth rate and the in-
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flation rate are left out due to missing data. The only index for the
degree of openness available covering all the 43 countries is the FS
index. The resulting regression equation is:
The coefficient of the exchange rate variable can therefore not be in-
terpreted as the effect of exchange rate movements on FDI activity.
Cross rates derived from market rates vis-a-vis the USS as published
by the IMF [d] were used.
2
Although the real growth rate turned out to be significant in a sub-
sample the results with respect to the degree of openness did not
change much.
For detailed definitions of variables and data sources, see the list of
variables in Appendix 1. All variables, except FS, are expressed in
logarithmic terms. The prefix "d" denotes annual changes. The suffix40
























2 = 0.11; number of observations: 430
Chi-squared » 62.8 (critical value: 33.9)
where: SITOT = German FDI stocks;
EXDM = local currency per DM;
GNP = gross national product of host countries
in DM;
BUV = entrepreneurs' income in the private
sector in Germany;
FS = FS index.
Although changes in FDI stocks are measured at an aggregate level
the numbers often reflect the behaviour of only a few investors. Thus
heteroscedasticity is a potential problem, not only with respect to the
different countries, but also over time. Therefore the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity of the error term had to be tested. The null hypothesis
was rejected for Equation [IV.l]. Therefore, corrected standard errors
of the estimated coefficients were used to calculate the t-values given in
parentheses. The OLS estimators of the coefficients are still consistent
but not most efficient any more.
The overall explanatory power of the equation is rather weak. Of
the coefficients only one is significant at the 5 per cent level and has
the expected sign, the rate of change of the exchange rate (dEXDM);
i.e. valuation effects strongly determine the development of FDI stocks.
The coefficient of entrepreneurs' income (BUV) has an unexpected sign
and is significant. This could be due to strong substitution effects be-
tween FDI to different DCs as well as between DCs and ICs. The other
coefficients, especially that of the degree of openness (FS), turned out
to be insignificant (or significant only at a 15 per cent level).
"(-1)" denotes once-lagged variables. Adjusted t-values in parenthe-
ses. Chi-squared: White-test on homoscedasticity; for testing for
homoscedasticity and correcting the standard errors, see White [1980],
Leaving out BUV does not alter the estimates of the other coefficients
much. Host countries' GNP becomes significant at the 5 per cent level.41
There are various possible reasons for this outcome: First, the de-
gree of openness might in fact be irrelevant for investment decisions.
Second, the FS index might be unsuitable to measure the degree of
openness. Third, the measurement of the FDI outflow by changes in
stocks is inappropriate as well as it is to look at net outflows. Fourth,
the omission of other explanatory variables may lead to biased estimates.
One way to further investigate this issue is to improve the data
base. But there is a price to pay: The number of countries for which
more data are available decreases to 18, leaving us with a potentially
higher selection bias. Estimating Equation [IV. 1] in a subsample and
varying the indicator for the degree of openness does not lead to any
further insight. The results actually become implausible when using the
index based on FS and on the researcher's own judgement (GU), and the
coefficient for the degree of openness using the IFO index is insigni-
ficant.
As argued above what is really influenced by the degree of open-
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ness are new investments in DCs as shown in the balance of payments.
These data are less distorted by valuation changes. They do not, how-
ever, contain secondary FDI, i. e. , the regional distribution is distorted
by investment activities of the holding companies especially in the off-
shore centres. The regression results based on transaction values for
the period 1977-1988 are summarized in Table 8. The lag-endogenous
variable (NEW(-D) is included to capture the dynamic behaviour.
The results based on gross transaction values are much better than
those based on stock values. Apart from the first equation the other two
passed the heteroscedasticity test. All three indicators of openness have
These countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
2
On a bilateral basis these data are published only for outflows to the
United States. However, for a selection of DCs the data were kindly
made available by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
As the sample contains only 12 years for each country a more sophisti-
cated dynamic approach is inapplicable. Note that Equation [ IV. 1 ] has
the form of an error correction approach (although rudimentary), while
the equations of Table 8 are of autoregressive form. As the dependent
variable contains zero observations a small constant was added before
taking logs.42
Table 8 - Host Countries' Openness towards FDI and German Gross FDI















































(a) For the definition of variables and data sources, see Appendix 1.
Dependent variable: gross German FDI outflows based on transaction
data (NEW). All variables, except openness indicators, expressed in
logarithmic terms. The suffix (-1) denotes once lagged variables. **,
* significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels. Adjusted t-values in pa-
rentheses. Number of observations: 216. - (b) Equation [1]: FS; Equa-
tion [2]: GU; Equation [3]: IFO. - (c) Critical value: 26.3.
Source: Own calculations.
coefficients of correct sign, but only two are significant at a 10 per cent
level at least. The IFO index is insignificant (Equation [3] in Table 8).
This is probably due to the fact that the expert knowledge which the
index is based on is rather outdated for the sample under investigation.
The other two measurements perform about equally well. Equation [1] in
Table 8 containing the FS index suffers from heteroscedasticity and more
from the problem of collinearity than the one containing the dummy vari-
able reflecting the researcher's own judgement (GU; Equation [2] in
Table 8). It is therefore suggested to preferably use this dummy vari-
able (available for 30 countries) in the following analysis. Both the lag-
endogenous variable (NEW(-l)) and the host country's market size (GNP)
have significantly positive coefficients. This supports the view that Ger-
man FDI in DCs is mainly market oriented and taking place in the form
of a capital widening of existing companies. Additional explanatory vari-
ables, real growth rate and inflation rate (measured by the consumer
price index), turned out to be insignificant. Again the coefficient of
entrepreneurs' income (BUV) is of unexpected sign and significant. The
results are stable with respect to sample variations (not shown).43
4. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss and summarize
factors that contribute to the degree of openness with regard to FDI in
developing countries. The evidence is then compressed into a single in-
dicator that allows a ranking of the DCs. This indicator is used to test
the influence of the degree of openness on German FDI outflows to DCs.
The results offer some support for the view that liberalization of
investment regulations in DCs helps to increase new foreign investments.
The empirical support is, however, somewhat mixed, depending on which
index is used to capture the effect of FDI policy rules and whether
stock or transaction data are explained. Therefore, the focus on liber-
alizing investment codes might have been too sharp, in relation to other
policy instruments, which will be analysed in the subsequent sections, in
the recent discussion. The more countries liberalize FDI regulations and,
in addition to that, offer tax and tariff exemptions, the less effective
these policy measures may become for single countries, since foreign in-
vestors will start taking them for granted everywhere.44
V. Determinants of German FDI: Empirical Analysis
1. Introduction
The first three chapters of this study have laid the groundwork for
a detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of German FDI in DCs.
The hypotheses that are to be tested were outlined in Chapter II. In
Chapter III the characteristics of German FDI and the quality of FDI
data were discussed, while Chapter IV focused on the demand for FDI
by reviewing the openness of host countries towards foreign equity
finance. The difficulty in deriving a general, consistent theory to ex-
plain FDI and verify such a theory empirically lies in the nature of FDI
itself. Under the heading of FDI a bunch of rather heterogeneous activi-
ties is summarized. Most theories explain an increase of real capital stock
owned by a foreign company, often associated with a production facility
in manufacturing. The data, on the other hand, are financial in nature.
Compiled within the balance of payments it can be anything from financ-
ing exports of capital goods to an affiliated company to acquiring a share
in a holding company in an offshore centre. Thus, in general, compiled
data and the theoretical concept of the variable to be explained fall
apart. Although this measurement problem is frequently encountered in
applied econometrics, it is particularly severe in this case. The fact that
this study deals only with FDI in DCs reduces the extent of it, as most
of German FDI in DCs is in manufacturing (see Chapter III) and take-
overs play a less important role in DCs.
Some of the problems related to the distortions of the regional pat-
tern of FDI outflows taken from the balance of payments (for the treat-
ment of secondary FDI in the different data sets, see Chapter III) can
be omitted by analysing stock data. As mentioned before, however, one
has to put up with capital gains and losses due to revaluation of the
book values or exchange rate variations when using changes in stocks as
an indicator for net outflows. In this chapter, most hypotheses will be
Takeovers accounted for 35 per cent of total FDI in DCs in the second
half- of the 1980s, whereas this figure is about 86 per cent in ICs
[FAST, 1990].45
tested on the basis of both stock and transaction data. Both flow and
stock data record items on the liability side of the balance sheet of the
affiliated company. FDI theory, on the other hand, is related more to
the asset side. As FDI as reported in the statistics is only one part of
the total financing of FDI activity, the implicit assumption underlying the
analysis is that the financial structure of the affiliated company remains
constant over time. This assumption turns out to be. not quite as un-
realistic as it appears at first sight. The ratio of FDI stocks and total
assets in DCs varied between 33 and 39 per cent in the 1980s [ Scharrer,
Kragenau, 1988].
The empirical analysis is not only complicated by measurement prob-
lems of the dependent variable, but also because of the existence of
trade and investment restrictions in the DCs, which might in some cases
disguise the economic fundamentals quite severely. Trade barriers (as
well as exchange rate variability) are frequently discussed as deter-
minants of FDI (Chapter II). Investment policies, however, although
having a direct impact on FDI inflows are less often considered as an
important determinant of FDI. This is probably due to the fact that most
studies on FDI concentrated on ICs, most of which are fairly open. In
Chapter IV, some evidence could be found that the degree of openness
with respect to FDI has a significant effect on FDI inflows to DCs. The
degree of openness as defined in the last chapter is constant over time
and was used as a country-specific factor in a regression equation in
which the other coefficients were assumed to be constant with respect to
country variation. Alternatively, one can group the countries with re-
spect to their degree of openness and run separate regression equations.
The choice is, however, often constrained by the number of degrees of
freedom.
In the following sections, a wide range of potential determinants of
FDI are investigated for German FDI outflows and/or stocks to/in DCs.
As the study is mainly concerned with specific features of German FDI in
DCs, the investigation of German FDI data will be at the heart of this
chapter. In some cases, however, a comparison with regression results
based on total inflows of FDI to DCs leads to some interesting further46
insight into German FDI behaviour.
Since the international debt crisis erupted in the early 1980s the
climate for capital transfers to DCs has changed dramatically. This is
most evidently so for credit flows where a net outflow of foreign capital
out of many DCs took place in the recent past. But some parts of the
Third World also suffered from the recent drying-up of FDI inflows and
the radical shift of FDI towards ICs (for details, see Chapter III; see
also Alworth, Turner [forthcoming]). This may indicate that former re-
sults on the determinants of FDI in DCs do not hold under the changed
international capital market conditions. Hence the following empirical
analysis is concentrated on the 1980s.
In some cases, however, the relatively short time horizon reduces
the sample size below an acceptable level. This is particularly true when
variables in real terms are chosen as explanatory variables, as many DCs
lack far behind in reporting those numbers. In other cases, time series
are available only for a very small number of countries, for example,
when total hourly labour costs are considered. On the other hand, the
time series dimension of a panel data set bears valuable information,
especially when "traditional" hypotheses concerning FDI are tested. The
choice of the time horizon therefore varies with respect to the problem
tackled and is often determined by the rather pragmatic argument of the
availability of the data. For these reasons the first two sections extend
the time horizon as far back as possible (i.e. to 1977) while the sub-
sequent sections, which mainly deal with risk and stability aspects, use
a shorter time period.
It is also due to data constraints that the degree of sectoral break-
down in German FDI flows differs between the subsequent sections. Typ-
ically, FDI flows to DCs have been analysed in the literature on a very
aggregated level [e.g. Edwards, forthcoming]. But the determinants of
FDI are likely to depend on whether foreign investors are engaged in
the primary commodity sector, in manufacturing or in the service sector
It has to be kept in mind, however, that the empirical equations are
not exactly the same for world and German FDI flows. Even if it is
only the compilation of the data that varies among different sources, it
can cause deviations among the results which are large enough to
warrant caution when making a direct comparison of the two sets of
equations.47
of the host country (see Chapter II). Such a breakdown proved impos-
sible in several instances, however. German FDI in the primary commo-
dity sector could not be analysed separately because of an insufficient
number of observations. The evaluation of FDI in the service sector,
where actually possible, had to be restricted to FDI in trading activities
in order to avoid distortions arising from the German engagement in a
few financial offshore centres. Sometimes the analysis is confined to
manufacturing on which German FDI in DCs is strongly concentrated (see
Chapter III).
The aforementioned data problems render it impossible to subject
the hypotheses on the determinants of German FDI in DCs to a single
equation. We rather proceed by analysing major clusters of hypotheses
one by one in the subsequent sections. Distortions in the estimated
parameter values due to misspecification are kept to a minimum by in-
cluding controlling variables in the regressions. Detailed definitions of
all variables used in this chapter as well as data sources are given in
Appendix 1.
2. Trade and FDI
The theory of optimal timing of FDI states that once a company has
developed a certain market share by exporting into a foreign market, it
is likely to become a foreign direct investor (Chapter II). As Germany's
share in world trade is significantly higher than its share in world FDI
2
the potential for FDI is supposedly large. The theory of optimal timing
seems to explain quite well the development of German exports and FDI
outflows to the United States (see Chapter III; see also Gubitz [1988]).
In general, however, this issue cannot be verified by a simple inspection
of the data. The period under investigation is quite short (1977-1987),
and both trade and FDI flows are influenced by growth and price differ-
entials. Furthermore, there are competing hypotheses about the relation-
For reasons described in Chapter III, licensing is omitted from the
following analysis.
2
The share of German exports in world total has been above 10 per
cent in the 1980s, while the share of its net FDI outflows amounted to
around 7 per cent of world total [ IMF, a].48
ship between FDI and exports. While the above-mentioned approach im-
plies a substitution of exports by output from the affiliated company, the
establishment of a new company abroad might as well cause an increase
in exports, as market positions can be strengthened and/or investment
goods are imported by the foreign subsidiary. Thus, FDI might cause
growth as well as substitution effects on exports. For an understanding
of the relationship between exports and FDI, it is therefore necessary to
investigate both aggregates. The issue is complicated by the existence of
trade barriers that disguise the underlying economic determinants and
have to be included in the analysis.
a. The Effect of FDI on Trade
From the angle of the German economy the question of whether FDI
induces or reduces exports is of major interest as exports are a big
share of the domestic output. Therefore, this issue attracted consider-
able attention in the research and policy debate about the effects of
FDI. In an earlier analysis on German FDI and exports to the United
States, it was found that there is a significantly negative effect of an
increase of gross FDI outflows on exports, although the effect was found
not to be large [Gubitz, 1988]. A similar analysis on German exports to
DCs will be conducted here, using a panel data set pooling country and
time series data for 18 countries and 11 years.
As bilateral export data are not available in volume terms, export
values (recorded in DM) are deflated by the export unit value for total
German exports. This leads to an unbiased indicator for real exports if
export prices are mainly determined by domestic costs. It is assumed
that real bilateral exports (EXR) depend positively on real GNP of the
host country (YR) and negatively on the real bilateral exchange rate
(EXDMR); i.e. a real appreciation of the DM vis-a-vis the host country's
currency causes a decline in real exports. The equation is specified in
growth rates in order to avoid country-specific level effects such "as
A case study of a joint venture of two small companies, a German and
a Southeast Asian one, serves as a highly illustrative example [ Gubitz,
1990].49
different levels of trade barriers, which will be discussed later.
Furthermore it is assumed that real exports depend on respective "real"
2
FDI (FDIR) in the host country. The sign of its coefficient is am-
biguous. The equation has the following form (expected signs in pa-
rentheses below the respective variables):
[V.I] dEXR = a± • dEXR(-l) + &2 • dEXDMR + a3 • dYR + a4 • dFDIR.
FDI is measured in three different ways: 1) the stock of FDI in the
host country (primary and secondary), which reflects present and past
investment and disinvestment decisions as well as capital gains and los-
ses, 2) accumulated net outflows reflecting acquisitions and liquidations
at transaction values (without regional corrections), and 3) gross annual
outflows. These data are only available in value terms. The values (in
DM) were therefore deflated by the unit value of German gross domestic
fixed investment (GDI). While deflating bilateral export values by the
general export unit value is based on a reasonable assumption, the as-
sumption that FDI deflated by the GDI deflator is an unbiased indicator
for real FDI is quite heroic, as it is assumed that purchasing power
parity measured on the basis of the unit values for GDI holds. Real bi-
lateral exchange rates, however, fluctuated widely during the sample
period. Thus, the data are more appropriately thought of as being de-
flated FDI than real FDI.
The empirical results are summarized in Table 9 below. The coef-
ficients of real GNP growth and the rate of change of the real bilateral
exchange rates are of expected sign and significant. Their size is more
or less in line with estimates for total real exports of Germany. The
equation shows little dynamic behaviour: the coefficient of the lag-endo-
The specification is similar to the export equations as they appear in
German econometric macro-models, for example the econometric model of
the Deutsche Bundesbank [d].
2
It was not feasible to calculate real exports at a disaggregated level.
Consequently, the respective FDI variable refers to total German FDI.
Moreover, sector-specific deflators for German FDI in nominal terms
were not available so that FDIR could not be calculated at a sectoral
level. Therefore, the subsequent analysis does not differentiate be-
tween FDI in manufacturing and trade.50




































(a) For the definition of variables and data sources, see the text
and Appendix 1. All variables expressed in logarithmic terms. **, *
significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels, t-statistic in parentheses;
number of observations: 198. - (b) Equations [1], [2] and [3] refer
to the different definitions of FDIR as given in the text. -
(c) Critical value: 19.68.
Source: Own calculations.
genous variable is negative in all versions, but rather small in size and
barely significant. The coefficient of FDIR is insignificant regardless of
how FDI is specified, i. e. no significant influence of FDI on exports
could be found. In contrast to earlier findings on exports to the United
States, neither the hypothesis of a substitution nor of a growth effect
could be supported by the results in the case of exports to DCs.
Exports to DCs might be affected by trade barriers. By investigat-
ing growth rates instead of levels it was assumed that trade barriers
remain constant over time and can thus be neglected. But even if a mea-
sure for trade barriers changing over time is not readily available, the
differences in the level of trade protection from country to country
might bear some valuable information that was missed out in the above
estimated specification. Two indicators were used to measure the degree
of restrictiveness with respect to trade in DCs: the unweighted average
of total import charges (i.e. tariffs and para-tariffs; TAR) and an in-
dicator for the frequency of non-tariff measures (NTM) as compiled by
UNCTAD [b]. Data refer to the situation as of the end of 1987. Basically
the same kind of indicator is used as in Chapter IV to measure the de-51
gree of openness with respect to investment restrictions. It is, however,
narrower and more precise. As both indicators are relatively highly cor-
related, only one at a time is taken into account. The real export
equation [V.I] is now extended into the form of an error correction
equation for the log-levels of real exports, and the level of trade pro-
tection is introduced to the equation:
[V.2] dEXR = a • EXR(-l) + a • YR(-l) + a • EXDMR(-l) + a • FDIR(-l)
( + ) (.-) ( + /-)
+ a • dYR + a • dEXDMR + a • dFDIR + a • TAR (or NTM).
For deflated FDI only one specification was used, namely deflated
accumulated net outflows (as in Equation [2] of Table 9). The results of
this equation are very similar to the ones of Table 9, as can be seen
from the estimated coefficients shown in Table 10 for the case of TAR
included in the equation. The relatively low coefficient of EXR(-l) in-
dicates a high autocorrelation of the dependent variable. The coefficient
of real GNP is, though significant and of the correct sign, unreasonably
low. The equation is probably not very well specified and might be not
suitable to investigate the effect of trade protection on German exports
to DCs. Both trade policy indicators were found to be insignificant as
well as both the level and the change of the deflated FDI stock (the
equation with NTM is not shown here).
Table 10 - Impact of FDI and Trade Restrictions on German Exports to
DCs, 1977-1987: Regression Results (a)
EXR(-l) YR(-l) EXDMR(-l) FDIR(-l) dYR dEXDMR dFDIR TAR
-0.06* 0.01* -0.002 -0.00 2.09** -0.43** 0.01 -0.002 0.35
(-2.5) (1.8) (-0.6) (-0.0) (6.4) (-5.5) (0.7) (-0.2)
(a) Dependent variable: real bilateral exports (dEXR). For the defi-
nition of variables and data sources, see the text and Appendix 1. All
variables expressed in logarithmic terms. **, * significant at 1 and
10 per cent levels, t-statistic in parentheses; number of observations:
198.
Source: Own calculations.52
b. The Effect of Trade on FDI
After not having found a significant influence of FDI and trade
measures on German exports, the hypothesis about the relation between
trade and FDI is now reversed: Is there a significant effect of the trade
variables on FDI? There are two channels through which FDI might be
influenced. First, the theory of optimal timing of a FDI predicts a po-
sitive impact of present and past exports on FDI. Second, FDI is often
viewed as a way to overcome protectionist trade barriers of a DC (Chap-
ter II). This property of FDI postulates a positive impact of trade pro-
tection on FDI. The two hypotheses are incompatible. If exports are a
necessary predecessor for direct investment, trade protection should
rather be an obstacle than an incentive for FDI. Furthermore, trade
restrictions make imported inputs more expensive for the affiliated com-
pany abroad. Hence a positive coefficient for one or both of the trade
policy variables is only consistent with an insignificant coefficient of
present and past exports. Otherwise the coefficient of the trade policy
variable should be insignificant or negative. The functional form of the
equation for FDI is similar to the one in Chapter IV. The data set is the
same as in the case of the export equation. FDI is measured by gross
outflows deflated by the unit value of GDI in Germany. The real bilateral
exchange rates are now based on GDI deflators as well.
The problem of investigating the impact of exports on FDI is that
both variables are strongly influenced by the size of the foreign market.
What we are really interested in here is whether exports give any ad-
ditional incentive to FDI coming on top of market size. Therefore, in-
stead of introducing exports itself into the equation, the ratio of exports
to host country's GNP (both in real terms; EXRG) is added as an ex-
planatory variable. As in the case of export equations, the trade policy
indicators were introduced separately. The statistical equation to be
estimated has the following form:
[V.3] FDIR = a • FDIR(-l) + a • YR + a • EXRG + a • EXDMR
(+) (+/) (+/)
+ a • TAR(or NTM) + a • GU.
(+/) (+)53
Table 11 - Impact of Trade Variables on German FDI Flows to DCs, 1977-
1987: Regression Results (a)































(a) Dependent variable: German gross FDI outflows, deflated (FDIR).
For the definition of variables and data sources, see the text and
Appendix 1. All variables, except GU, expressed in logarithmic terms.
**, * significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels, t-statistic in pa-
rentheses; number of observations: 198. - (b) TAR in the case of
Equation [1]; NTM in the case of Equation [2].
Source: Own calculations.
The equation was fairly well tested (Table 11). In none of the
versions heteroscedasticity was found to be a problem; therefore the
CHISQs are not given here.
As before (see Chapter IV), the highly significant and positive
coefficients of the lag-endogenous variable and host country's market
size (YR) point to a strong market orientation of German FDI, mainly
taking place as extensions of existing companies in DCs (capital
widening). The empirical results reveal a strong additional impact of
German exports on German FDI outflows. The effect of an increase in
exports exceeding the one of host countries' GNP is almost as big as the
effect of an increase in GNP itself. The level of trade barriers is on
average rather an obstacle than an incentive for German companies to
invest in DCs. The estimated coefficients are thus compatible. Further-
more, the indicator for trade barriers captures the country-specific
intercepts much better than the degree of openness with respect to in-
vestment policies (GU). This might, of course, be due to the fact that
This conflicts with an earlier finding of Kayser et al. [1981] who con-
cluded that FDI was often undertaken by German firms to overcome
trade restrictions in DCs. It rather confirms the view that import
protection as an instrument for attracting FDI is likely to be inefficient
(see Section II. 2 for this discussion).54
trade restrictions, especially those in the form of tariffs and other
charges (TAR), can be measured much more precisely than the degree of
openness with respect to investment measures, which heavily relies on
judgements. Also note that the coefficient of the real exchange rate is
negative; i. e. a real appreciation of the DM vis-a-vis the currency of
the host country leads to a decrease in deflated gross FDI outflows.
Valuation effects of exchange rate changes outweigh positive volume
effects, and real FDI is not appropriately measured by deflating the
values in DM by the domestic inflation for capital goods.
From the investigation of both exports and FDI it can be concluded
that exports to a country stimulate FDI, but exports are not reduced by
past and present FDI. However, exports are also not significantly
stimulated by FDI. This supports the generally held view that German
FDI in DCs on average rather serves to secure established market shares
than to replace domestic production. There seems to be neither a strong
substitution nor a strong complementary effect. This is all the more
remarkable as the share of German FDI in manufacturing is particularly
high in DCs.
3. Total Labour Costs and FDI
Notwithstanding mixed empirical evidence, a widely held view on
FDI is that it is motivated by the choice of the least expensive pro-
duction site, especially in terms of labour costs. It is argued that an
increase in labour costs that goes beyond an increase in labour pro-
ductivity is a disincentive for FDI. The reasoning that relatively low
labour costs attract FDI can be derived from various theories. It is part
of the product-cycle hypothesis as well as the locational theory ap-
proach, which is also part of the eclectic theory (see Chapter II). The
argument principally refers to the acquisition (either bought or built) of
new enterprises, and the hypothesis would have to be tested by using
micro data. Moreover, the role of labour costs with regard to FDI
decisions is likely to depend on the specific motivation of foreign
investors to invest in a DC. If FDI is oriented towards serving the
domestic market of the host country, for example, labour costs are un-
likely to be of overriding importance. The same applies to FDI aimed at55
securing access to raw materials, whereas a different picture might
emerge in the case of export-oriented FDI in manufacturing.
According to a simple neoclassical argument, even a positive relation
between labour costs and FDI is possible. The neoclassical investment
function explains investment as a partial adjustment to an optimal capital
stock, which is derived from the assumption of profit maximization. If
the production function is a simple Cobb-Douglas function, i. e. Q =
L K , the optimal capital stock (K*) can be expressed as a weighted
ratio of the wage rate (w) and the user costs of capital (r) with the
weights being the production elasticity of labour (L) and capital (K)
respectively, multiplied by output (Q):
[V.4] K* = ( (w/(l-b))/(r/b) )
X'
b • Q.
Hence, an increase in labour costs increases the optimal capital stock,
while an increase in the user costs of capital reduces the optimal capital
stock.
In this study the analysis is based on aggregated data; i. e. FDI is
considered to be part of the real capital formation in the host country.
German FDI data contain both acquisitions of new enterprises and capital
widening of existing companies. In contrast to US data, types of invest-
ment cannot be differentiated. As the subsequent sample of host coun-
tries of German foreign investors is biased towards Latin America, the
bulk of FDI considered in the following is probably extensions of
existing companies. Moreover, German FDI is mainly oriented towards the
domestic markets of these host countries. An increase in (adjusted)
labour costs is then likely to lead to an increase of the FDI stock in the
2
host country, in order to adjust to a higher optimal capital stock.
This argument dates from the "old days" of investigating FDI [see, for
example, Stevens, 1973].
2
There are, of course, reasons why the neoclassical theory of invest-
ment is not suitable to explain FDI, as the foreign-owned capital stock
in the host country is generally distinctively different from the locally
owned capital stock as well as from the domestic capital stock in the
source country. The foreign investor typically has a competitive ad-
vantage over local producers, at least at that point in time when an
investment decision for a new production plant is made. On the other
hand, theories that are based on the assumption of imperfect markets56
To keep the argument simple it is again assumed that the produc-
tion function is of Cobb-Douglas type in four input factors, domestic
labour in the source country at wage rate w, foreign labour in the host
country at wage rate w., domestic capital stock K and foreign capital
stock K. with user costs of capital r and rA respectively. Then the
optimal foreign capital stock has the following form:
[V.5] ln(K*)*a b^ A
+ ln(r/b2)) + c • ln(p)
with b., b«, b-. and b_. being production elasticity of labour and
capital at home and abroad respectively, p the price for the output Q,
and c = ~(b1 + b«). The optimal foreign capital stock thus increases
both with respect to an increase in domestic and foreign labour costs
(adjusted for the respective production elasticities of labour). If the
production elasticity of labour is higher in the domestic economy than in
the foreign economy, the impact of domestic labour costs is higher than
that of foreign labour costs. An increase in domestic user costs of
capital leads to an increase in FDI outflows, while an increase in foreign
user costs of capital leads to a decline of FDI outflows from the source
country. Assuming that user costs of capital are the same for domestic
and foreign capital (r = r ), an increase of the user costs of capital
leads to an increase of the optimal capital stock abroad, if the pro-
duction elasticity of labour is higher in the domestic economy than in the
2
foreign economy (b_ > b...).
The following empirical analysis is not strictly based on the above
described approach, but picks up the main features without imposing all
the restrictions on the coefficients. In particular it is assumed that the
are microeconomic in nature and often consider aspects of the regional
distribution of the capital stock owned by a single company.
Such an assumption could be based on the argument that an increase
in the capital stock involves domestic capital goods, which are financed
at the lowest interest rate available, regardless of where the capital
stock is located. It is also assumed that there are no differences in
the development of the depreciation rate and the tax rates at home and
abroad.
2
As "abroad" in this context is associated with DCs this assumption is
quite reasonable.57
foreign direct capital stock partially adjusts to its optimal level, which is
determined by total hourly labour costs (TLC) in the domestic and in the
foreign economy (both measured in DM), domestic and foreign labour
productivity (value added per employee (VADP)), foreign GNP (measured
in DM), and user costs of capital in the domestic economy (UCCGER).
No attempt was made to calculate user costs of capital for the German
capital stock in the foreign economy. In order to capture valuation ef-
fects due to exchange rate changes, exchange rates are added to the
equations appropriately (EXDM). As labour cost data are available for
the manufacturing sector only [Riveros, 1989], FDI stocks and labour
productivity refer to the manufacturing sector accordingly.
The analysis has to be based on a very limited number of coun-
tries, as data on total labour costs (in absolute levels) are available only
for a small number of countries. Moreover, data on value added and/or
output per employee (again in absolute levels) in manufacturing could
not be calculated beyond 1985 for most countries. Even within the group
of ten countries selected, the time series for value added per employee
had to be approximated by the development of output per employee in
2
some cases. In order to allow for this difference in the measurement of
labour productivity two variables enter the equation separately
(VADPFOR1 and VADPFOR2). The equation was first estimated in its
most unrestricted form, i. e. , imposing no restrictions on the coefficients
of TLC in the German (TLCGER) and in the foreign economy (TLCFOR)
and on the coefficients of labour productivity in Germany (VADPGER)
and in the foreign economy (VADPFOR1 and VADPFOR2) (for the results
see Table 12, Equation [1]). Then two different restrictions were
imposed on the coefficients:
- As wage rates increase with labour productivity, the two variables are
positively correlated; therefore the coefficients of labour productivity
were set to zero (see Equation [2], Table 12).
Foreign GNP serves as a proxy for the output of the German compa-
nies in DCs. Output in manufacturing in Germany was included at an
early stage of the specification of the equation as well, but it turned
out to be insignificant in all cases.
The ten countries were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Morocco, India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Singapore; time span:
1977-1985.58
Table 12 - Impact of Total Labour Costs and Labour Productivity on the
Change in German FDI Stocks in the Manufacturing Sector of

















































































(a) Dependent variable: change in German FDI stocks in manufacturing
(dSIMAN). Equations [1], [2], [3] as explained in the text. All vari-
ables expressed in logarithmic terms. For the definition of variables
and data sources, see the text and Appendix 1. **, * significant at 1-
and 10 per cent levels, t-statistic in parentheses; number of obser-
vations: 90; CHISQ is omitted, as no heteroscedasticity was found.
Source: Own calculations.59
- FDI does not depend on the level of total labour costs and labour pro-
ductivity, but on the gap of the domestic with respect to the foreign
variables. This hypothesis refers to the industrial organization ap-
proach to explain FDI. The labour cost gap is supposed to have a
positive and the productivity gap a negative coefficient (see Equation
[33, Table 12).
The significant coefficients in Equation [1] are all of the expected
sign. Especially an increase in the total labour costs in the DCs leads to
an increase in German-owned FDI stock. Although the elasticity is
smaller for foreign than for domestic labour costs, the coefficient of
TLCGER turned out to be insignificant. All the labour productivity vari-
ables are insignificant. A closer inspection of the data set on which the
regressions were based showed that labour productivity did not change
much over the relatively short period of time under consideration. The
correlation between total labour costs and labour productivity is low in
the case of Germany and high in the case of DCs. The correlation
between labour costs in Germany and in DCs is positive but not particu-
larly high (correlations not shown).
Re-estimating the equation according to Equation [2] leads to very
similar results as in the "unrestricted" case. This casual inspection is
supported by the F-test (not shown). The collinearity problem of
Equation [1] is reduced but not removed. This is due to the fact that
the two factor cost variables of the German economy, TLCGER and
UCCGER, are highly correlated. If one of the variables is omitted, here
German total labour costs, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of
the user costs of capital declines, but remains significant (not shown).
The results support the major conclusion drawn from neoclassical invest-
ment theory, namely that rising labour costs lead to an increase in the
German-owned capital stock abroad regardless of where the labour cost
increase originated.
Another way of looking at the impact of labour costs on FDI is to
assume that differences in labour costs reflect differences in labour
productivity. If the difference of the two variables is introduced in
the equation instead of the two variables separately, its coefficient
should then be insignificant. This conclusion is supported on the basis
of the respective estimation of the regression equation; the results are
not shown because the equation suffers from misspecification errors.60
In Equation [3] only labour cost and productivity gaps are con-
sidered to be determinants of German FDI in DCs (Column (3)). The
results under this restriction on the coefficients are rather poor. Not
only are the coefficients of the labour cost and the productivity gap of
unexpected sign, but two of them are also significant at a ten per cent
level. If the two indicators of the labour productivity gap are assumed
to have equal sign, both labour cost and productivity differentials turn
insignificant (not shown). Thus the argument that low labour costs
attract FDI could not be verified in the present investigation.
As discussed in the last chapter, changes in the stock data do not
only reflect transactions but also capital gains and losses due to valu-
ation changes and exchange rate movements. Just introducing the ex-
change rate into the equation might be an inappropriate way of tackling
this problem. Transaction data reflect activity more accurately. The
above described investigation was therefore repeated for an equation
explaining gross outflows.
Transaction data, however, are not available on a sectoral basis.
Although the lion's share of German FDI stock in DCs is in manufactur-
ing, this does not necessarily apply to outflows, as the structure of the
stock values is strongly influenced by rather mature investments in
manufacturing in Latin America. Thus, a close comparison to the results
discussed above is not feasible. Furthermore, for one country (Pakistan)
no FDI transaction data are available, i. e. the sample is different from
the above analysis.
The empirical results presented in Table 13 show that none of the
production-cost-related variables is significant. The only coefficient that
turned out to be of expected sign and significant is the one of the
labour productivity gap variable, which applies only to two countries.
When it is assumed that its coefficient is the same as for the other
labour productivity variable the coefficient becomes insignificant (not
shown). Thus on the basis of FDI outflows no significant influence of
the cost-related variables could be detected. This throws some doubts on
the reliability of the results based on stock data. One reason for the
different conclusions that have to be drawn from the investigation of the
By contrast, Mann [1990], for example, found a negative impact of US
labour costs on Japanese FDI inflows to the United States.61
Table 13 - Impact of Total Labour Costs and Labour Productivity in the
Manufacturing Sector on Total German Gross FDI Outflows to













































































(a) Dependent variable: total German gross FDI outflows (NEW). Equa-
tions [1], [2], [3] as explained in the text. All variables expressed
in logarithmic terms. For the definition of variables and data
sources, see the text and Appendix 1. **, * significant at 1 and 10
per cent levels, t-statistic in parentheses; number of observations:
81; CHISQ is omitted, as no heteroscedasticity was found.
Source: Own calculations.62
two data sets is, of course, that the transaction data are not sufficiently
closely related to the data for the manufacturing sector; investments in
the primary and the service sector are determined differently and distort
the picture.
In order to analyse the latter argument somewhat further it is in-
vestigated whether total FDI inflows from all source countries to DCs are
affected by total labour costs and labour productivity. So it is checked
whether the insignificant result is specific for the German case. Based
on the same number of years and countries an equation similar to the
one estimated in Table 13 is estimated for total net FDI inflows
(measured in US$; for results see Table 14). Source-country-specific
variables, however, are not included, which reduces the comparability to
the results in Table 13. The other explaining variables are expressed in
US$ accordingly. The results for total inflows reveal some interesting
differences from the ones for German FDI outflows. In the less restricted
form, the degree of openness (GU) and the real growth rate (dYR) of
the host country turned out to be significant. Both equations in Table
14, however, suffer from heteroscedas ticity, which might be due to sys-
tematic reporting differences of FDI inflows among the individual
recipient countries, a problem that does not occur when source country
data of just one country are used. Total hourly labour costs are highly
significant when taken into account at absolute levels, but turn in-
significant when corrected for labour productivity gains. Thus the
results are more in line with the ones on German stock data in manufac-
turing than with those found for German gross outflows.
The general picture that emerges from the above described analysis
is that foreign labour costs, if at all, have a positive impact on German
FDI (as well as on total FDI). This result, although in contrast to the
hypothesis of the industrial organization approach for FDI, is quite
reasonable, if the production technology allows for substitution between
labour and capital. It has to be kept in mind that FDI is considered at
an aggregate level here, i. e. , it contains capital widening of existing
companies as well as the acquisition (either bought or built) of ne'w
enterprises. If one could differentiate between those two types of invest-
Variables GU and dYR turned out to be insignificant for German FDI
and were therefore dropped from the equations reported in Tables 12
and 13.63
Table 14 - Impact of Total Labour Costs and Labour Productivity on





















































(a) Dependent variable: total FDI inflows from all source countries
(DIUSD). Equations [1] and [2] as explained in the text. All vari-
ables, except GU, expressed in logarithmic terms. For the definition
of variables and data sources, see the text and Appendix 1. **,
* significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels, t-statistic in parentheses.
Number of observations: 81. - (b) Critical value in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.64
ment, as it is possible, for example, in the case of US data, a different
picture about the impact of labour costs on FDI might emerge. Further-
more, the results are based on a small number of countries and the
choice of countries is biased towards Latin America. In this region,
German FDI is mainly oriented towards serving the domestic markets of
the host countries and the bulk of FDI is probably extensions of existing
companies. Also, the time horizon is rather short, especially so with
respect to changes in labour productivity.
4. Political and Economic Stability in Host Countries and FDI
a. A First Test: The Effect of Country Rating on FDI
Political and economic instabilities, especially if they are expected to
continue in the future, tend to increase the problems of cost-benefit
analysis by entrepreneurs and thus to discourage them from investments.
In Chapter II, it was hypothesized that this applies no less to FDI. The
economic determinants of FDI on which many former empirical studies
focused (for an exception, see Edwards [forthcoming]) may even be
overruled if host countries were characterized by serious political and
economic instability. In practice, however, these uncertainties may often
be of moderate magnitudes so that their effect on the decisions of for-
eign investors may not be as great. In this section, therefore, efforts
are made to find out how far German FDI in DCs was affected by politi-
cal and economic uncertainty, and whether the behaviour of German in-
vestors differed from that of other foreign investors.
In a first step, the impact on FDI of the host country's overall
rating with respect to economic and political investment conditions is
assessed. The purpose of investment climate indicators, such as the
Business Environment Risk Index (BERI), is to provide foreign investors
with some ready-made guidance for their investment decisions. Similarly,
the country credit rating published regularly in the Institutional In-
vestor magazine is one such guiding index for lending institutions. In
the following, we refer to the latter index, since the intention of this
study is to examine among other things if direct investors in DCs are
guided by similar factors as lenders of loans to these countries. The65
level of the country rating is considered as a "catch-all" variable for
political and economic conditions in the countries concerned. Therefore,
an attempt is made here first of all to estimate if an effective relation
between FDI and this index exists or not, before evaluating the impact
on FDI of specific variables that may reflect political and economic in-
stability. The underlying regression equation is as follows, with a
positive sign expected for IIMA:
[V.6] FDIfl = a + a IIMA + a LSTOCK.
( + )
FDI,.. represents total FDI flows from all sources (MADIUS), total German
FDI flows (MANEW, MAFITO),
1 and the change in German FDI stocks in
manufacturing (MAFIMA) and trade (MAFICO), respectively. IIMA rep-
resents the three-period moving average of the Institutional Investor's
credit rating of host countries. Lagged FDI stocks (LSTOCK) are intro-
duced as a controlling variable.
The results of the OLS regression estimates quoted in Table 15
demonstrate that the "average" investor cared for the overall credit
rating of host DCs while taking investment decisions. As far as FDI from
all sources (MADIUS) is concerned, the estimate shows the expected
MANEW is based on transaction data, while MAFITO is calculated from
the change in FDI stocks. For detailed definitions of variables and
data sources, see Appendix 1.
2
All dependent variables are expressed as three-period moving aver-
ages. Annual FDI flows and changes in stocks are typically marked by
strong fluctuations not always justified by the political and economic
variables considered in the following. The fluctuations can be partly
attributed to valuation effects which may vary considerably from year
to year. It is hardly feasible to take such valuation effects fully into
account when specifying the estimation equation. To keep problems of
misspecification to the minimum, it is attempted to smoothen short-term
valuation effects by calculating moving averages. Moreover, short-term
fluctuations of the dependent variables are due to the fact that annual
FDI flows to individual host countries heavily depend on the decisions
of one or a few large investors in many instances. Again, the noise
which might be introduced into the estimates by such random effects
can be reduced by the procedure applied here. Tests run for different
specifications of some of the subsequent equations revealed fairly
robust results. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that by using the
standard approach of three-period moving averages in the following the
coefficient values are not seriously biased.66












































(a) For the definition of variables, see the text and Appendix 1.
**, * significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels, t-statistic in pa-
rentheses. - (b) Lagged thrice. - (c) If the chi-square statistic is
significant at the 5 per cent level (denoted by " + "), corrected stan-
dard errors of the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the
t-statistic given in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
positive sign of the coefficient of IIMA which means that FDI stocks
reacted significantly to differences and changes of host countries'
rating. Countries with a deteriorating rating in the 1980s experienced
greater difficulties in attracting new FDI inflows. The pattern of German
FDI is distinctly different. German investors hardly responded to an
impaired rating in the 1980s by curtailing FDI. The most relevant coef-
ficients of IIMA remain completely insignificant.
An exception is observed for German FDI in trade (MAFICO). This is
probably because the engagement in trade is of a more recent nature
and took place only when former risk illusions had been destroyed.
Furthermore, the mobility of capital may be higher in this sector than
in mining or manufacturing where investments once undertaken cannot
be easily moved out of a country. A significantly positive coefficient of
IIMA is also reported for MAFITO. However, as argued in Chapters III
and IV, MANEW is likely to provide a less distorted measurement of
total German FDI flows.67
b. The Impact of Political and Economic Instability
Having considered stability factors en bloc and found significant
differences with regard to German and other investors, an attempt is
made in this section to examine some relevant specific stability and
instability variables in order to locate the sources of these differences.
These variables are related to instability in the political regime, labour
unrest, as well as economic instability with respect to inflation, exchange
rates, capital formation and economic adjustment.
Instability of the political regime has been found as discouraging
for FDI in many survey studies [ US Department of Commerce, 1954;
Basi, 1963; Reuber et al. , 1973], but not always in econometric analyses
based on cross section data [Green, 1972; Kobrin, 1976; Situmeang,
1978]. Schneider and Frey [1985] examined the impact of strikes and
lockouts on FDI and defined this variable as an indicator of political
instability. In the following, these two variables are considered sepa-
rately, whereby the former is defined in terms of frequent changes of
party or parties in power, riots or border conflicts.
As concerns economic instabilities, inflation is a sign of unsound
management of the economy and may deter the inflow of FDI [ Schneider,
Frey, 1985]. If instability of exchange rates adds uncertainty to inter-
national trade, firms may try to avoid it by shifting to FDI [ Harvey,
1989/90]. But they may also abstain from both trade and FDI depending
on the importance of the market. Many studies have examined the impact
of devaluation or revaluation on FDI (see Chapter II). This section does
not consider the long-run trend in the value of a currency, but fluc-
tuations of exchange rates as an indicator of instability of an economy.
Economic instability is also assumed to be characterized by low and
volatile investment ratios. Capital formation is rather essential for the
In a recent study covering total FDI flows in the 1971-1981 period,
Edwards [forthcoming] concluded: "Although our results suggest quite
clearly that political variables (political instability and political
polarization) have played a significant role in determining FDI, they
also show that these political variables have not been the most impor-
tant ones for explaining these flows. In fact, the analysis of stand-
ardized estimates clearly shows that political considerations have been
the least important of all the considered factors in determining FDI".68
growth of an economy, which in turn raises its attractiveness for FDI
(see Chapter II and also Goldberg [1972]). We examine, therefore, the
relation between period averages of the ratio of domestic investment to
GDP and FDI. This should give an idea of how far high investment
ratios as a sign of economic stability have attracted FDI. Alternatively,
the fluctuations of this ratio are considered as an indicator of instability
of the host DCs and are entered into the regressions to find out their
impact on FDI. The final independent variable is based on structural
adjustment programmes of host countries. The success of these program-
mes is likely to raise the attractiveness of the host countries for foreign
investors. However, direct information for all the selected countries is
not available on this variable. Therefore, it is approximated by the
sectoral and structural adjustment loans granted by the World Bank to
these countries.
First of all, a cross-country analysis is carried out at the level of
stock data for 1980 and 1986. The estimates for 1980 should enable us to
discover the relation between the traditional engagement of foreign in-
vestors in the host countries, i.e. between "older" FDI that was under-
taken before the debt crisis, and the said independent variables. The
estimates for 1986 are expected to provide information if there were any
changes in the behaviour of investors after repayment problems had be-
come evident. This latter aspect of adjustment by foreign investors after
the debt crisis is then examined further in detail on the basis of FDI
flows to selected DCs in the 1980s. The set of independent variables has
to be somewhat different in the two cases.
The regression equation underlying the cross-country analysis is as
follows:
[V.7] FDI = a + a PS + a ER + a INV + a INF.
(-) (-) (+/-) (-)
FDI , is measured in three different ways for purposes of this
section. First, stock of total FDI from all sources in host DCs as a ratio
of their GDP (SFDIG) is taken into account. The other two dependent
The expected sign of INV depends on the specific definition of this
variable; see the subsequent paragraphs.69
variables are the ratios of the stock of total (SITOTG) and manufactur-
ing (SIMANG) German FDI to GDP of host DCs.
PS, ER, INV, and INF denote instability of the political regime, ex-
change rate fluctuations, domestic investment and inflation, respectively
(for detailed definitions and data sources, see Appendix 1):
- Instability of the political regime is characterized by frequent changes
of party or parties in power, occurrence of riots or military coup
d'etats, or border conflicts. It is hypothesized to exercise a negative
influence on FDI.
- ER is approximated in the estimates of Equation [V. 7] not by the ab-
solute value of the exchange rate but by its fluctuations because
investors are likely to be more worried about them than about the ex-
change rate itself. Moreover, economic instability, which is to be
examined in this section, can be better defined in terms of fluctuations
of exchange rates. These are measured by the standard error of real
effective exchange rates of host countries (FLRE).
- Inflation is calculated from annual changes of consumer price indices.
INF is defined, first, in terms of period average price changes (AVIF)
and, second, as the fluctuation of annual price changes (FLIF), i.e.
the standard deviation of INF during the given period. In both cases,
FDI is likely to be negatively affected with increasing values of these
independent variables.
- Similar to INF, investment is measured, first, as the period average
ratio of GDI to GDP. High investment ratios are indicative of high ab-
sorptive capacity of a country for FDI via growth of income, infra-
structure, and supply of local inputs. Therefore, a positive relation
between FDI and domestic investment (AVIV) is hypothesized here.
Second, high fluctuations of domestic investment ratios are assumed
to reflect economic instability of a country and may have a negative
impact on the supply of foreign direct capital. This variable (FLIV) is
defined as the standard deviation from the average of annual investment
ratios during the given period.
The OLS estimates of Equation [V. 7] are presented in Table 16.
The correlation matrix of the variables entering the regression is given
in Table Al. The coefficients of the political instability variable PS are
as expected negative in all the estimated equations, but significantly
different from zero in only one case, i. e. total FDI from all sources70
Table 16 - Impact of Political and Economic Instability on FDI Stocks,














































































(a) For the definition of variables, see



















































































jndix 1. **, * significant at 1
parentheses. - (b) AVIV and AVIF calculated as
Source: Own calculations.
(SFDIG) in 1980. Whereas two of the remaining three coefficients of PS
are nearly significant at the 10 per cent level in the case of SFDIG,
they remain completely insignificant in the case of German FDI. German
investors do not appear to be very impressed by political instability in
their host countries. Even in 1980, when other investors did show a
concentration on politically stable host countries, German FDI was not
significantly related to the political instability variable PS. Moreover, no
adjustment in this respect is to be observed from the estimates for 1986".
Results of F-tests for comparable variables in Table 16 show no signi-
ficant changes in the estimated coefficients between 1980 and 1986 for
Germany (Table 17). This applies to both the entire equation (last
column of Table 16) and the individual coefficients. There is only one71
Table 17 - Results of F-Tests on 1986 and 1980 Coefficients of Political
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**, * significant at 1, 5
of variables, see the text
Source: Own calculations.
exception, i.e. the average investment ratio (AVIV) in the case of the
total stock of German FDI in relation to GDP of the host countries
(SITOTG). Here the positive effect of this variable on FDI has strength-
ened during this period. In contrast to Germany, a structural break,
i. e. a significantly different impact of political and economic instability
between 1980 and 1986, is revealed by the F-ratio for the entire equation
in the case of FDI from all sources (SFDIG).
The ambiguous result on PS is quite comparable with the results of
other studies. As already said in Chapter II, empirical evidence pro-
duced by many other studies is mixed. Survey studies based on inter-
view data usually believe that political instability discourages FDI. But
other empirical analyses often fail to pick up this effect in regression
estimates. This may be because investors have the opportunity to insure
their direct investments against non-commercial risks. Guarantees against
such risks are available now almost in every developed country. Since
1988 such risks can be covered also by the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). So it is possible that the influence of political
factors on FDI flows has receded (this issue is analysed in Section V. 6).
Evidence from the regression estimates of Table 16 on economic sta-
bility variables is poor, except on the domestic investment ratio. Do-72
mestic investments raise income which in turn creates additional demand
for foreign goods which may be supplied by exports and/or local produc-
tion by foreign producers. This association between domestic investments
and FDI is supported by the regression results. The average investment
ratio (AVIV) is in most of the cases significantly associated with both
total and German FDI. However, the evidence in favour of this hypo-
thesis is weaker for German FDI in manufacturing than for total German
FDI. This indicates that German FDI stocks in manufacturing are not
focused on host countries characterized by high investment ratios and
favourable future growth expectations. Further, investors were more
concerned with the level of the average investment ratio than with its
fluctuations. In none of the regression estimates, the coefficient of this
latter variable (FLIV) was found to be significant. Investment ratios
tend to be relatively stable and investors are likely to take this fact
more into account than minor fluctuations which may take place from year
to year.
Fluctuations of the real effective exchange rate of host countries as
a determinant of FDI do not show any difference between the response of
German and other investors. The estimated coefficients of this variable
(FLRE) are not significant in any of the cases. Probably, opposing ef-
fects of high exchange rate fluctuations on FDI average out: While
world-market-oriented FDI in host DCs may be discouraged because of
uncertainty about international price competitiveness, export-substituting
FDI devoted to the domestic markets of host countries may be positively
affected to avoid exchange-rate induced uncertainty in bilateral trade
relations.
As FDI data cannot be appropriately split up into a price and a
quantity component this issue is difficult to investigate. Nevertheless,
the result is not as unexpected as one might have thought in the first
place. Similar investigations with export data, which can be decomposed
into prices and volumes, also show no significant influence of real ex-
change rate variability [e.g. Gotur, 1985]. As FDI is driven by similar
forces as exports, but with much longer adjustment lags, a significantly
negative influence of exchange rate volatility is rather unlikely, es-73
pecially so if the latter is measured by the variance of data at a
relatively high frequency.
As far as inflation is concerned, the total stock of FDI from all
sources was not significantly associated with the respective variables
AVIF and FLIF. But German investments - total as well as manufacturing
- were dependent on both the average rate of inflation (AVIF) and its
2
fluctuation (FLIF) with an unexpected positive sign. In addition to
valuation effects, which might be due to inconsistent monetary and ex-
change rate policies inter alia, this result may reflect that German in-
vestments are trapped in debt-ridden Latin American countries where
both the degree and fluctuation of inflation increased in the 1980s.
The above cross-country analysis was based on stocks of FDI in
1980 and 1986. It has revealed some differences between the reactions of
German and other investors to political and economic stability variables.
The following analysis is carried out on the basis of panel data on flows
of FDI (at the sectoral level proxied by the change in FDI stocks) in
order to elaborate on the behaviour of foreign investors in the 1980s,
i. e. , after the widespread payment problems of DCs had destroyed for-
merly prevailing risk illusions of foreign capital providers. The equation
underlying the regression estimates is as follows:
[V.8] FDIfl = aQ + a^S + a2MAPSL + a3SSL + a MAINF + a5MASARWK
+ a.MAINV + a,LST0CK.
D 7
As in Equation [V. 7], PS denotes instability of the political regime.
Additionally, MAPSL stands for the three-period moving average of poli-
tical strikes and lockouts measured as the number of workdays lost per
Peree and Steinherr [1989] investigated trade data with respect to its
sensitivity to exchange rate volatility by taking medium-term uncer-
tainty into account and found significant influences. A similar study on
FDI is not available to the best of our knowledge.
2
The difference in the behaviour of German and other investors with
regard to their reaction to changes in the general price level disap-
pears when the analysis is extended to flow data on FDI in the follow-
ing paragraphs.74
employed person. SSL represents structural and sectoral adjustment
loans granted by the World Bank, lagged by two periods. MAINF is the
three-period moving average of the rate of inflation. MASARWK is cal-
culated as standard deviation of the monthly real exchange rates of host
countries' currencies vis-a-vis the DM in a year. MAINV is the three-
period moving average of the annual investment ratio, and LSTOCK is
introduced as a controlling (lagged endogenous) variable. The expected
signs of the coefficients are noted under the respective variables. The
reasoning behind them has already been explained at the outset of this
section.
The dependent variable FDI,. refers to FDI flows from all sources
(MADIUS) to the selected DCs,
1 total German FDI outflows (in the alter-
native definitions of MANEW and MAFITO), and the change in German
FDI stocks in manufacturing (MAFIMA) and trade (MAFICO).
The regression estimates of Equation [V. 8] are based on pooled
data for the period of 1980-1987. The results given in Table 18 largely
confirm those of the cross-country analysis. This is especially so for PS
that provides a direct measurement of instability in the field of political
conditions in the host DCs. Again the coefficient of PS is, as expected,
negative and proves to be highly significant for total FDI from all sour-
ces. The response pattern of German investors is distinctly different. In
this case, the coefficients of PS are completely insignificant which un-
derlines that, even in the 1980s, German investors were not very much
concerned about instability of the political regime of host DCs.
The picture is less straightforward as concerns the second inde-
pendent variable incorporating a measurement of political instability in
the host countries (MAPSL). As indicated by its negative and statisti-
cally significant coefficients, the reactions of German and other investors
to strikes and lockouts were quite similar at the level of total invest-
ments (MANEW and MADIUS, respectively). However, when these invest-
ments are considered at the sectoral level, the coefficient of this variable
has an unexpected positive sign for German FDI in manufacturing
In this case, the independent variable MASARWK had to be left out in
the regression estimates because exchange rate fluctuations were de-
fined on a bilateral basis against the DM.75
Table 18 - Impact of Political and Economic Instability on FDI, 1980-1987:



















































































































(a) For the definition of variables, see the text and Appendix 1. - (b) If the chi-square sta-
tistic is significant at 5 per cent level (denoted by "+"), corrected standard errors of the esti-
mated coefficients are used to calculate the t-statistic given in parentheses. **, * significant
at 1 and 10 per cent levels.
Source: Own calculations.
(MAFIMA). To some extent, follow-up investments might have been re-
quired to maintain formerly established production facilities. They are
comparable to defensive lending to debtor countries with a considerable
debt overhang insofar as follow-up investments reduced the threat of
sovereign measures against existing FDI (Krugman [1988]; see also Sec-
tion V. 5). Furthermore, an argument may be raised along the lines dis-
cussed in Section V. 3: Strikes and lockouts give rise to an increase in
labour costs, thereby inducing substitution effects which result in a
higher optimal capital stock.
Among the economic stability variables, SSL was not included in the
cross-country estimates of Equation [V.7] because structural and sec-
toral adjustment loans granted by the World Bank are of recent history
(1980 onwards) and are not likely to have influenced the accumulated
stock of FDI. But the impact of SSL on FDI flows in the 1980s has also
remained fairly weak. There is one exception: the coefficient of SSL is
in accordance with the hypothesis significantly positive in the case of
As concerns FDI in the trade sector (MAFICO), the regression esti-
mates may indicate that the German investments remained largely un-
touched from labour unrest.76
German FDI in manufacturing. Thus, the hypothesis cannot be rejected
that the attractiveness for German manufacturing investment improves
after host countries have agreed to implement policy changes which are a
precondition for adjustment loans granted by the World Bank. However,
a similar relationship is neither observed in the case of total FDI from all
sources (MADIUS) nor in the case of German FDI in all sectors (MANEW,
MAFITO) and in trade (MAFICO).
Regarding the remaining economic stability variables, strong similar-
ities prevail between the estimates presented in Tables 16 and 18. For-
eign firms are generally encouraged to invest in DCs which have a high
investment ratio (MAINV). The inflation variable does not prove signifi-
cant in any of the estimates presented in Table 18. The results for the
exchange rate variable (MASARWK) are highly ambiguous. The estimated
coefficients have the expected negative sign and are significant in the
case of MAFITO and MAFICO, whereas they remain completely insignifi-
cant in the case of total German FDI flows (MANEW) and German FDI in
manufacturing (MAFIMA). The ambiguous results for MASARWK are con-
sistent with a regression analysis of US FDI by Harvey [ 1989/90]. He
found the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on international trans-
actions (both capital flows and trade) intriguing: most notably, his re-
sults on FDI differed from industry to industry. Industries which re-
quire relatively longer time to complete the orders and thus have more
problems in finding suitable hedging facilities are likely to be more sen-
sitive to exchange rate risks than industries which can complete their
orders quickly.
The results of the estimates of Equation [V. 8] for the sample coun-
tries divided according to their attitudes towards FDI (restrictive, less
restrictive, favourable) did not yield clearcut results in the sense that
the independent variables have consistently positive or negative signs
(Table A2; the classification is based on the evidence presented in
Chapter IV). Nonetheless, some of the group-wise regressions tend to
support the conclusions based on earlier regression estimates, but the
differences between the country groups remain small. To some extent,
the grant of structural and sectoral adjustment loans to DCs with re-
strictive attitudes towards FDI improves the attractiveness of these
countries for FDI; the coefficients of SSL are completely insignificant for
other host countries. Similarly, economic instability as reflected by ex-77
change rate fluctuations has some negative effect on German FDI in
countries with relatively restrictive attitudes, while the evidence on
MASARWK is again highly ambiguous for countries with favourable atti-
tudes towards FDI. In contrast to this, if anything, a negative impact of
political instability on German FDI is revealed for the less restrictive
group (PS and MAPSL) and the group with favourable attitudes (PS).
This indicates that a relatively open-door policy for foreign direct capital
is useful only if investors can be sure that it will not be disrupted by a
radical change in government or in government policy.
c. Summary
The main aim of this section has been to analyse the effect of polit-
ical and economic instabilities of host DCs on their attractiveness for
FDI, especially during the 1980s which have been marked by the inter-
national debt crisis. This is done at two different levels. In the first
instance, an overall index of political and economic conditions in host
countries has been used, i. e. the country credit rating by the Institu-
tional Investor magazine. The results indicate that investors of direct
capital as a whole have concentrated their investments on countries of-
fering favourable economic and political conditions. They have reacted
fairly strongly by limiting their engagement in countries with a deter-
iorating country rating. In sharp contrast, German direct capital has not
been concentrated in host countries with a favourable rating, and Ger-
man investors have been reluctant to respond to the changes in economic
and political conditions in the past decade.
Similar differences between German and other investors have been
observed at the second stage of our analysis. Here, individual indicators
of political and economic instability of host countries have been examined
in a cross-country analysis based on stock data and in relation to panel
data on FDI flows. While investors of direct capital as a community were
scared by frequent changes of governments, riots or border conflicts in
host DCs, the German investors in general have not been impressed sig-
nificantly by such political factors in their investment decisions. In this
regard, their behaviour has remained unchanged after the debt crisis.78
Only when political instability was defined in terms of strikes and lock-
outs, German FDI as a whole as well as in the manufacturing sector
proved to be sensitive.
Among the economic stability factors, the differences between Ger-
man and other investors were somewhat less pronounced. In both cases,
high investment ratios of host countries proved to be the best guide for
FDI. One could probably conclude from it that what is right for domestic
investors is generally found useful also by foreign investors.
5. Debt Overhang, Sovereign Risk and FDI
a. Major Hypotheses
After risk illusions had been destroyed with the eruption of the
debt crisis in 1982, the sovereign risk of capital transfers to DCs has
become evident. Default on sovereign obligations is not only a matter of
the capital recipients' ability to service external liabilities, but also of
their willingness to pay [Eaton et al. , 1986]. A substantial range of dis-
cretion accrues to the capital recipients after the contract is concluded
and the capital is transferred. The honouring of contractual obligations
becomes a matter of cost-benefit calculus. Rational capital providers will
consider the recipients' incentives to default wilfully when deciding on
whether or not further capital transfers are granted.
Sovereign risk has been discussed intensively in the literature on
international debt [e.g. Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981; Sachs, 1984; Nunnen-
kamp, 1989a; Stiiven, 1988]. But it has been largely neglected in studies
on the determinants of FDI (for an exception, see Juhl [1982]). The
same applies to the well-known debt overhang argument [Krugman, 1988;
Sachs, 1989]. The presence of an inherited debt sufficiently large that
creditors do not expect with confidence to be fully repaid is said to
create strong disincentives for foreign creditors to continue new lending
and for the borrowing countries to implement growth-oriented adjustment
programmes. Domestic investment would be discouraged if foreign credi-
tors enjoyed all or most of the benefits from increased future output
[Sachs, Huizinga, 1987]. New voluntary lending is discouraged because
the market valuation of additional transfers would become identical to the79
value of existing claims [Dooley, 1986]: the higher the current discount
on inherited debt, the higher the immediate capital losses of new credi-
tors. Interestingly enough, it is hardly discussed in the literature that
FDI may be subject to similar disincentive problems.
Because of the neglect of sovereign risk and debt overhang argu-
ments with respect to FDI, recent proposals to replace debt by FDI -
and thereby reduce foreign debt problems of DCs - are based on rather
naive (implicit) assumptions on the substitutability of different types of
capital transfers to sovereign capital recipients. Arguably, many heavily
indebted countries are not only constrained in terms of new lending. The
prevalence of sovereign risk and the existence of a debt overhang may
also result in constraints in terms of FDI inflows. It has to be analysed
whether the decisions of foreign investors are affected in a similar way
as the decisions of foreign creditors, in order to assess the chances to
alter the external capital structure of Third World economies towards
increasing the proportion of FDI.
Against this background, the set of variables that may determine
FDI is extended in two respects in the subsequent paragraphs. First, it
is analysed whether the existence of a debt overhang discouraged FDI in
the 1980s. This is likely to be the case if the profitability of new foreign
investment was impaired along the lines hypothesized by the debt over-
hang argument. Foreign as well as domestic investors may expect that
investment-induced incremental income will be subject to 100 per cent
taxation in order to service the inherited debt [Sachs, 1989]. Under
such conditions, investors will refrain from productive investment, and
the degree of a debt overhang should be strongly and negatively related
to FDI.
This reasoning has been challenged recently, however [Krueger,
1989]: The Sachs model is built on the unrealistic assumption that a
country is a single entity and countries service debt to the extent that
As argued by Dooley [1990], a debt overhang generates private incen-
tives to replace productive investment by non-productive activities. If
the collective contractual claims on future output exceed what is avail-
able, the government will have to impose a distribution. Hence, Dooley
expects investors and other factors of production to position them-
selves in order to extract future income from one another. Resources
will be wasted as long as the expected return on rent seeking exceeds
that on productive investment.80
they can. In the real world, the earnings that stem from productive in-
vestment of a private investor cannot automatically be appropriated to
service debt. Insofar as a debt overhang constitutes a tax on new in-
vestment, it does so through the imposition of higher marginal tax rates,
not through 100 per cent taxation of incremental income. Arguably there
are also positive effects of a debt overhang on FDI flows. This may be
especially so in host countries offering subsidies for FDI, e.g. tax and
tariff exemptions, in particular in the context of debt-equity swaps (see
also Section VI. 2). Foreign investors take advantage of high discounts
on debt by buying loans in the secondary market and receiving the face
value of these loans (or somewhat less) in the host country's domestic
currency. The effect of debt-equity swaps on overall FDI flows of course
depends on the degree to which this instrument is used, and on whether
FDI undertaken in the context of swaps is additional or would have hap-
pened anyway.
Second, it is evaluated whether the risk of wilful default on exter-
nal debt has its counterpart in the risk of expropriation and wilful re-
strictions on profit and capital remittances in the case of FDI. Sover-
eign risk arguments suggest that foreign investment is negatively related
to the potential benefits host countries may reap from sovereign mea-
sures against FDI, and positively related to the potential costs of such a
behaviour. Sovereign risk is expected to be the higher, and therefore
the flow of FDI to be the lower, the more resources the host country
may save by nationalizing foreign property or by not transferring divi-
dend payments. Potential costs of sovereign measures may represent a
safeguard for foreign investors, thereby encouraging FDI. Such costs
are related to the sanctions which may be imposed by foreign investors
and their governments. By contrast, the counterhypothes is suggests a
loose, if any, relationship between the potential benefits and costs of
sovereign measures and FDI: (i) Host countries may succeed to attract
FDI by committing themselves against imposing restrictions on FDI; and
Bergsman and Edisis [ 1988, p. VI] are fairly optimistic as concerns
additionality; they conclude: "In our sample, about one-third of the
investments made by MNCs using swaps would not have been made
unless a swap program was available, and another ten per cent of
those investments were made sooner or for larger projects than they
would have been without the program".81
(ii) sanctions may be difficult to enforce so that they are not credible
[Bulow, Rogoff, 1989].
Similar to Section V. 4, the hypotheses on the impact of a debt
overhang and sovereign risk variables on FDI are tested by contrasting
the decisions of German investors with those of the "average" foreign
investor, i.e. evidence for total FDI from all sources. It is also assessed
whether the reaction of German investors differed with respect to major
sectors in which FDI took place. The host country sample is as in the
previous section. If not otherwise stated, pooled cross-country OLS re-
gressions are run for the 1980s. Data sources and detailed definitions of
variables are given in Appendix 1.
b. The Impact of a Debt Overhang
Data problems render it difficult to empirically assess the impact of
a debt overhang on FDI. Secondary market notations for DC debt (SMN)
may provide the best indicator of the existence and degree of a debt
overhang, notwithstanding that the amount of loans traded in secondary
markets is still fairly low for many debtor countries. But such informa-
tion is only available for 16 countries out of the overall sample. More-
over, comparable data on SMN are collected only since 1986. Hence, the
number of observations is dramatically reduced to less than 30 (Table
19). This is likely to result in a serious selection bias. Therefore, we
decided to construct another proxy indicating a debt overhang by refer-
ring to the Institutional Investor magazine's country credit rating. The
use of this index is distinctly different from Section V. 4, where the
level of the country rating of all sample countries was considered as a
"catch-all" variable for political and economic instability. Subsequently,
only those sample countries are included in the estimates for which the
rating was fairly favourable in 1980 (1180 > 40). Thereby, all those
countries are excluded for which the engagement of private creditors has
traditionally been negligible. Moreover, as explaining variable the change
in the country rating since 1980 (DID is considered. It is assumed that
a strong decline in this rating reflects a considerable debt overhang.
According to the above reasoning, a considerable debt overhang is
indicated by low figures of SMN and strongly negative values of DII.82
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Consequently, the sign of both variables should be significantly positive
if a debt overhang discouraged FDI in the 1980s. Table 19 provides a
first indication that this was indeed the case for total FDI flows from all
sources. The Pearson correlation exercise reveals that a decline in the
country rating went along with lower values of GRDI, i.e. total invest-
ment flows over total FDI stocks. By contrast, the decisions of German
investors were hardly affected by a debt overhang. The Pearson corre-
lation coefficients are fairly low and most of them remain completely in-
significant for GRINEW and GRITOT, i. e. total German FDI flows over
total German FDI stocks. This is all the more so for German investment
in manufacturing industries of host DCs (GRIMAN). A clearly positive
correlation between German FDI and the change in country rating is only
to be observed for investment in trading activities (GRICOM).
In the case of GRITOT, FDI flows are proxied by changes in stocks,
while GRINEW is based on (gross) new investment flows (for details,
see Appendix 1; for the relative merits and flaws of both measures,
see Chapter IV).83
A similar picture is revealed by the simple regression analysis of
Table 20. FDI from all sources (DIUSD) and West Germany (all indus-
tries: NEW, FITOT; manufacturing: FIMAN; and trade: FICOM)
1 re-
present the dependent variable. GDP of host countries is introduced as a
controlling variable to account for the size and income status of sample
countries. The coefficient of GDP has the expected positive sign. DII is
defined as in Table 19.
Traditionally, the investments of both the "average" foreign in-
vestor and German investors had been strongly concentrated in the host
countries that ran into considerable debt problems in the 1980s (see
Chapter III). In this respect, foreign creditors and investors behaved
quite similarly. Apparently, both creditors and investors were subject to
risk illusions so that they became highly exposed in capital-recipient
countries that subsequently experienced severe repayment difficulties.
The attitudes of foreign creditors and the "average" investor are also
similar with respect to their reaction to a decline in country rating. The
reluctance of creditors to provide fresh money to borrowers with repay-
ment difficulties is well documented in the literature [e.g. Nunnenkamp,
1989a]. Similarly, foreign investors were aware of impaired profitability
of FDI due to stagnating markets or higher expected taxes in countries
with a considerable debt overhang. Total FDI flows from all sources
(DIUSD) in the 1980s were comparatively low when the host countries'
rating deteriorated. In sharp contrast, German investors did not adjust
to the emergence of a debt overhang by limiting their engagement. None
of the coefficients of DII is significantly positive, irrespective of the
sector in which German FDI took place.
It can be concluded that, on average, foreign creditors and in-
vestors responded in a similar way to debt problems in DCs. A debt
overhang not only discouraged further lending, but also new FDI. Paral-
lel behaviour of foreign capital providers renders it extremely difficult
for recipient countries to change their external financing structure in
favour of FDI. However, the evidence for German FDI in DCs in the
1980s points to remarkable differences between investors of different
source countries in their reaction to debt repayment difficulties of host
FDI flows proxied by changes in stocks in the case of FITOT, FIMAN
and FICOM.84




























































(a) For the definition of variables, see the text and Appendix 1. De-
pendent variable not equal "0"; regressions run for countries with
1180 ^40; **, * significant at 1 and 10 per cent levels; t-statistic
in parentheses. - (b) In US$ mill. (DIUSD) and DM mill, (remaining
variables) respectively. - (c) In US$ bill, (in the case of DIUSD)
and DM bill, (remaining regressions) respectively. - (d) If the chi-
square statistic is significant at the 5 per cent level (denoted by
"+"), corrected standard errors of the estimated coefficients are
used to calculate the t-statistic given in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
countries. Most notably, German investors did not respond to the emer-
gence of a debt overhang. In the subsequent section, it is analysed
whether the responsiveness of German FDI was more pronounced with
regard to sovereign risk variables.
c. The Impact of Sovereign Risk
Similarities between different types of private capital flows may also
prevail with regard to the effect of sovereign risk on capital transfers.
A recent study on the determinants of bank lending provided some sup-
port to the standard argument advanced by Eaton and Gersovitz [ 1981]
that lending is negatively related to the benefits that sovereign debtors
may realize by defaulting on external debt [ Nunnenkamp, 1989b]. Ambi-
guous results were achieved as concerns the effectiveness of sanctions,
i. e. the potential costs of sovereign measures against foreign creditors85
[Nunnenkamp, 1989b; Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow, Rogoff, 1989]:
apparently, banks relied to some extent on the effectiveness of sanc-
tions. However, a log it analysis on the determinants of default indicated
that the threat of sanctions did not considerably influence the default
decisions of DCs [Nunnenkamp, Picht, 1989].
The relevance of sovereign risk arguments with respect to FDI is
evaluated in the subsequent paragraphs. Three issues figure promi-
nently:
- It is analysed whether FDI was negatively related to the potential
benefits host countries may reap from sovereign measures against for-
eign investors.
- The competing hypotheses on the effectiveness of sanctions which may
be imposed by foreign investors and their governments are tested em-
pirically.
- It is assessed whether industry-specific characteristics provided a
safeguard against sovereign measures.
With regard to the benefits of sovereign measures against FDI two
cases can be distinguished, i. e. unspecific and selective expropriation
[ Agarwal, 1976; Picht, Stiiven, 1988]. The risk of unspecific expropria-
tion (including wilful restrictions on profit and capital remittances) is
related to general economic and political pressures in the host country.
According to political-economy arguments, the host government benefits
from a widely diffused expropriation policy that does not show a strong
sectoral concentration if it thereby obtains support from groups lobbying
in favour of such a behaviour or is able to collect considerable financial
gains from expropriation [see also Schneider, Frey, 1985]. By contrast,
the risk of selective expropriation is related to the technological diver-
sity of FDI that renders industry-specific factors important for the ex-
propriation decision. The risk of selective expropriation is strongly con-
centrated on particular industries. Selective expropriation is the more
attractive, the easier it is for the host country to run foreign-controlled
enterprises on its own, i. e. , the less relevant FDI-specific advantages
are perceived to be. The effect of both types of sovereign risk on FDI
is analysed in turn in the following.
FDI-specific advantages that provide potential safeguards against
sovereign measures by the host country may lie in technical, managerial
or marketing fields, inter alia (see Section II. 1. b. ; see also Jodice86
[1980]; Caves [1982]; Casson [1987b]). Ideally, the host government
draws up a cost-benefit calculus for each foreign investment under con-
sideration for expropriation, so that sovereign risk is firm-specific. For
the purpose of our empirical investigation we have to assume, however,
that one calculation is valid for all foreign investments of a certain type.
Most realistically, this may apply to investments in a particular industry.
Hence we refer to industry-specific rather than firm-specific character-
istics. Moreover, the data situation only allows to construct fairly crude
proxies indicating the technological and managerial standards applied in
particular industries, relative to the host country's capabilities in overall
manufacturing. Firm size (FSIZ), human-capital intensity of production
(HC), and the share of gross fixed capital formation in output (TA) are
considered as proxies in the subsequent regression analysis. FSIZ, HC
and TA are calculated as three-period moving averages relative to the
manufacturing average of the host country (for details and data sources,
see Appendix 1).
The basic equation estimated for the period 1982-1987 is as follows:
[V.9] MAFI = aQ + a^SIZ + a2TA + a3HC + a LSI,
where MAFI denotes three-period moving averages of the change in Ger-
man FDI stocks in five manufacturing industries (chemicals, iron and
steel, machinery, road transport equipment, electrical equipment), and
LSI represents the lagged endogenous variable. The coefficients of
FSIZ, TA and HC should be positive if relatively high technological and
managerial standards were perceived to be a safeguard against sovereign
measures, and thereby encouraged further FDI. Regressions are run for
the overall sample and subgroups of countries with different attitudes
towards FDI by pooling time-series data for the five above-mentioned
industries of the countries included. The sample is considerably reduced
due to the fact that industrial statistics are highly deficient for many
DCs.
For the justification of using three-period moving averages, see Sec-
tion V. 4.87
The empirical results presented in Tables 21 and A3 point to a lim-
ited and ambiguous effect of the risk of selective expropriation on in-
dustry-specific German FDI in DCs in the 1980s. This may be due to two
major shortcomings of the analysis. As argued before, we have to refer
to industry-specific rather than firm-specific characteristics. Moreover,
industry-specific data on German FDI are only available for the five sec-
tors listed above, in which Germany has traditionally held a strong com-
petitive position in world markets (see also Section III. 5). This may give
rise to a selection bias: industries that are characterized by considerably
smaller average firm size and lower human-capital intensity do not enter
the analysis.
The expected positive relationship is only observed for human-capi-
tal intensity. The estimates for all sample countries in Table 21 indicate
that human-capital intensity was a relevant factor for German investors
in deciding on their engagement in particular industries of host coun-
tries. This result also holds for all three subgroups of host countries
with different attitudes towards FDI (Table A3). By contrast, firm size
(FSIZ) and gross fixed capital formation (TA) have unexpected negative
signs. The coefficient of TA becomes insignificant once other industry-
specific characteristics enter the regression, while the coefficient of FSIZ
remains significantly negative (Equation [4] in Table 21). The latter
result may be due to investors' concerns about investments with high
visibility being the first candidates for selective expropriation.
Unspecific expropriation is considered as a reaction to general eco-
nomic and political pressures. The risk of unspecific expropriation is
supposed to be the higher (and thus the flow of FDI to be the lower),
It may be argued that the positive coefficient of HC is subject to si-
multaneity problems. Foreign-controlled enterprises in DCs frequently
apply more human-capital-intensive technologies than domestic produ-
cers. Consequently, a considerable engagement of foreign investors in
a particular industry may cause a higher human-capital intensity in
this industry, rather than the other way round. Three arguments may
be raised against this reasoning: 1) MAFI denotes changes in FDI
stocks in the 1980s that are not necessarily particularly high where
the inherited engagement of foreign investors is strongest; 2) in the
case of severe simultaneity problems, FSIZ should also have a signifi-
cantly positive sign since foreign-controlled firms are typically much
larger than domestic firms; and 3) the relationship between HC and
MAFI is not unambiguously positive, but remains insignificant in sev-
eral cases.88
Table 21 - Industry-Specific Characteristics and FDI, 1982-1987: Regres-
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(a) Dependent variable: three-period moving averages of German FDI in
selected manufacturing industries of host countries (MAFI). For the
definition of variables, see the text and Appendix 1. **, * signifi-
cant at 1 and 10 per cent levels; t-statistic in parentheses. - (b)
If the chi-square statistic is significant at the 5 per cent level
(denoted by "+"), corrected standard errors of the estimated coeffi-
cients are used to calculate the t-statistic given in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
the more resources host countries may save by imposing sovereign
measures on FDI and the lower the potential costs of unspecific expro-
priation. The potential benefits from unspecific sovereign measures are
proxied by the resource outflow that is due to servicing existing FDI
(PROUTG or PROUT), or alternatively by the ratio of FDI stocks from
all sources over host countries' GDP (BENST). The incentives to expro-
priate FDI in an unspecific manner may also increase when balance-of-
payments pressure (PRESCU1 or PRESCU) or the foreign debt situation
(UMS) are becoming unmanageable. PRESCU is calculated as the current-
account balance over the host countries' GDP (resource outflows due to
servicing FDI subtracted in the case of PRESCU1), and carries negative
values in the case of deficits. The foreign-debt situation is captured by
PROUTG and PROUT have negative values in the case of resource out-
flows; for details of calculation and data sources, see Appendix 1.89
setting UMS = 1(2; 3) if reschedulings with official (private; official and
private) creditors took place, and UMS = 0 otherwise.
Potential costs of sovereign measures represent a safeguard for
foreign investors and may thus encourage FDI. Two possible types of
sanctions are considered in the following:
- TRDEP denotes the host countries' dependency on foreign trade rela-
tions (exports plus imports over GDP). The higher TRDEP, the higher
the vulnerability of host countries if foreign capital providers and
their governments threaten credibly to impose trade sanctions on coun-
tries taking sovereign measures against FDI.
- High values of TREND denote high variability of domestic absorption in
the host countries. This may provide a safeguard for foreign investors
against sovereign measures if FDI is considered by the host country as
an income-smoothing and risk-sharing device and the threat of being
cut off from future capital inflows in the case of sovereign measures is
credible. On the other hand, however, foreign investors may perceive
high variation in domestic absorption as indicative of economic instabi-
lity of the host country.
The basic equations estimated on a pooled cross-country basis for
the period 1980-1987 can then be written as follows (the signs of the
sovereign risk variables expected from the above reasoning are given in
parentheses) :
[V.10] FDI = aQ + a1BENST + a^RESCUl + a3UMS + a LSTOCK
(-) (+) (-)
[V.ll] FDI = aQ + a1PR0UTG + a2UMS + agTRDEP + a^STOCK
(+) (-) (+)
[V.12] FDI = aQ + a^ROUTG + a^RESCUl + a3TREND + a^STOCK.
The dependent variable FDI represents three-period moving averages of
FDI flows from all sources (MADIUS), and German FDI flows to all sec-
tors of host countries (MAFITO, MANEW), manufacturing (MAFIMA), and
LSTOCK is introduced as a controlling (lagged endogenous) variable.90
trade (MAFICO).
 l PROUTG, PRESCU1 and TRDEP are also calculated as
three-period moving averages, while BENST and UMS represent lagged
annual observations. For two reasons it proved impossible to introduce
all explaining variables into one equation: First, BENST and PROUTG
are considered as alternative proxies for the economic benefits that may
be reaped from sovereign measures. Second, TRDEP is shown in Table
A4 to be highly correlated with BENST and, though to a lesser extent,
with PRESCU1 and UMS, as is TREND with BENST, UMS and TRDEP; in
order to reduce multicollinearity problems, these variables enter the re-
gressions alternatively.
The regression results for the overall sample of host countries point
to an extremely weak influence, if any, of sovereign risk variables on
FDI. Moreover, many of the few significant coefficients have an unex-
pected sign (Table 22). The coefficients of TRDEP and TREND add to
the widespread scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions that may
be imposed against sovereign capital recipients refusing to service their
external obligations. The potential benefits from sovereign measures
against FDI (proxied by BENST and PROUTG) did not discourage FDI in
the fairly heterogeneous set of host countries, irrespective of the home
country of investors and the sector to which German FDI was devoted.
It is interesting to note that high current-account deficits
(PRESCU1) went along with higher, rather than lower, FDI inflows from
all source countries (MADIUS). Apparently, foreign investors did not
expect high current-account deficits to induce sovereign measures
against FDI. They rather considered high deficits as an indication of the
host country's attractiveness for foreign capital. It may be surprising
that this view was still prevailing in the 1980s when the balance-of-pay-
ments situation of many over indebted DCs proved to be unsustainable.
However, exactly the critical balance-of-payments situation of these
countries may have contributed to the negative sign of PRESCU1: Many
highly indebted countries reduced current-account deficits by cutting
imports dramatically and, less so, by promoting exports. At the same
time, they suffered from a seriously impaired access to foreign capital.
By contrast, DCs without considerable debt problems could still finance
1 As before, MAFITO, MAFIMA and MAFICO denote annual changes in
FDI stocks, while MANEW is based on (gross) new investment flows.91
Table 22 - Sovereign Risk and FDI, 1982-1987: Pooled Regression Results
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relatively high current-account deficits and maintained or even improved
their attractiveness for FDI.
This interpretation is consistent with the observation that FDI from
all sources in the 1980s was negatively influenced by a considerable debt
overhang (see the relationship between DII and DIUSG in Table 20) and
lower current-account deficits, while the coefficients of both DII and
PRESCU1 remain mostly insignificant in the case of German FDI. The
above reasoning is also supported by the significantly negative sign of
UMS (i.e. the proxy for the foreign debt situation of host countries) if
MADIUS is to be explained. Again, the foreign debt situation is of less92
importance in explaining total German FDI flows and German FDI in
manufacturing and trade.
From the poor results for the overall sample of host countries it
cannot be concluded that sovereign risk variables were of no relevance
in explaining FDI in DCs. Though the regression results for subgroups
of host countries with different attitudes towards FDI (Table 23) have to
be interpreted with great caution, because the number of observations is
considerably reduced, they suggest that differences in the impact of
sovereign risk variables on FDI are averaged out in Table 22. The dif-
ferences are most pronounced with respect to BENST and PROUT, i. e.
the two indicators of the potential benefits host countries may reap from
sovereign measures against FDI (Table 23). PROUT shows the expected
(positive) sign as far as total FDI flows from all sources (MADIUS) and
total German FDI flows (MANEW) to host countries with restrictive atti-
2
tudes towards FDI are concerned. The evidence is mixed for host coun-
tries with less restrictive attitudes: German FDI flows continue to be
negatively affected by increasing sovereign risk, while FDI from all
sources is no longer discouraged by higher resource outflows due to
servicing existing FDI. In sharp contrast to restrictive countries, a neg-
ative correlation between PROUT and FDI flows from West Germany and
all source countries is reported for host countries with favourable at-
titudes towards FDI. This indicates that foreign investors were mainly
concerned about sovereign risk in the restrictive country group. By
contrast, a liberal treatment of FDI was considered as a credible com-
mitment by the host country to refrain from sovereign measures in the
future. A similar picture exists with regard to BENST. As expected, the
coefficients of BENST are significantly negative for relatively restrictive
The classification of sample countries into subgroups with different
attitudes towards FDI is again based on information presented in
Chapter IV. In Table 23, PROUTG is replaced by PROUT. Information
on reinvested earnings is only available for a limited number of host
countries. So reinvested earnings are excluded in the calculation of
PROUT in order to maintain a larger number of observations. The cor-
relation between PROUTG and PROUT is extremely high. For similar
reasons, PRESCU1 is replaced by PRESCU in the group-specific esti-
mations .
Similar results are reported in Tables 23 and A5 as far as the impact
of potential benefits from sovereign measures on MANEW and MAFITO
is concerned.93
Table 23 - Sovereign Risk and FDI Flows, 1982-1987: Regression Results
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countries. But high FDI stocks over GDP induced even more FDI flows
to host countries with favourable attitudes towards FDI. High values of
BENST indicated the latter countries' attractiveness for foreign capital,
rather than pointing to increasing sovereign risk.
The differences between country groups are less pervasive for
PRESCU, UMS, TRDEP, and TREND. The results largely confirm those
of Table 22:
- An unsustainable foreign debt situation discouraged FDI flows from all
sources (MADIUS) to restrictive and less restrictive host countries.
The picture is less clear for German investors. At an aggregate level
2
(MANEW), the coefficients of UMS are mostly insignificant.
- The significantly negative coefficients of TRDEP in the case of FDI
flows from all sources to countries with less restrictive and favourable
attitudes towards FDI may be due to import substitution strategies of
host countries which provided a stimulus for export-substituting FDI.
Not surprisingly, the existence of a negative relationship between
TRDEP and FDI depends on whether or not the DCs that restricted
imports allowed for export-substituting FDI. However, a similar re-
lationship is not observed for MANEW, which is consistent with results
presented in Section V. 2. To some extent, German investors may have
considered high trade dependency as a safeguard against sovereign
measures.
- The group-specific results on TREND are ambiguous. The evidence
suggests that FDI is not primarily considered as an income-smoothing
The differences between country groups with different attitudes to-
wards FDI with respect to the impact of potential benefits from sover-
eign measures on German FDI are less pronounced when assessed at
the sectoral level (Table A5). The coefficients of BENST and PROUT
remain largely insignificant as far as German FDI in manufacturing
(MAFIMA) and trade (MAFICO) in countries^ with relatively restrictive
attitudes towards FDI is concerned.
2
The results on UMS reported in Table A5 point to highly ambiguous
effects of an unsustainable debt situation on German FDI in particular
sectors.
The same applies to MAFITO, i.e. the alternative proxy for total Ger-
man FDI flows (Table A5). TRDEP remains completely insignificant for
German FDI in manufacturing (MAFIMA). By contrast, the results on
German FDI in trade (MAFICO) are similar to those reported for total
FDI from all sources.95
device so that high fluctuations in domestic absorption did not provide
a safeguard against sovereign measures by host countries.
d. Summary
Debt overhang and sovereign risk arguments were shown to be re-
levant in explaining FDI in DCs in the 1980s. But the impact was not as
strong as was to be expected. This holds especially true for German
investors. They hardly responded to a debt overhang by limiting FDI,
while this relationship was highly significant for overall FDI flows from
all sources. Industry-specific characteristics did not play a major role in
encouraging German FDI in selected manufacturing industries of host
countries. This indicates that safeguards against selective sovereign
measures against FDI, if any, are firm-specific rather than industry-
specific.
The results on the effect on FDI of sovereign risk variables reflect-
ing the potential benefits and costs of unspecific measures against for-
eign investors are ambiguous. The evidence on possible cost factors adds
to the scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions that may be im-
posed by foreign investors and their governments on host countries re-
fusing to service their external obligations. The impact of the potential
benefits that host countries may reap from unspecific sovereign measures
is largely blurred when assessed for a large sample of countries with
different attitudes towards FDI. Foreign investors were mainly concerned
about sovereign risk in host countries with restrictive attitudes towards
FDI. By contrast, a traditionally liberal treatment of FDI was considered
a credible commitment to refrain from sovereign measures in the future.
Host countries are thus well advised to liberalize restrictions on FDI that
discourage foreign investors to maintain, not to speak of increasing,
their engagement.
From the results on German FDI in trade reported in Table A5, it can
rather be concluded that high values of TREND are indicative of eco-
nomic and political instability, thereby adding to the risk faced by
foreign investors. As other variables reflecting sovereign risk, high
fluctuations in domestic absorption discouraged FDI in trade mainly in
host countries with restrictive attitudes towards FDI.96
6. German Investment Guarantees and FDI
The analysis in the last two sections of this chapter revealed a rel-
atively underdeveloped risk aversion of German investors in DCs, an
outcome that might have taken some readers by surprise. This result can
partly be ascribed to the regional pattern of German FDI. This explana-
tion is, however, not fully satisfactory, as it does not explain the pat-
tern of FDI flows in recent years. As mentioned in Section V. 4, a great-
er portion of the risk an investor has to face in a DC is "non-commer-
cial", a term that includes political as well as certain macroeconomic
risks. These risks can be cheaply insured in Germany through the fed-
eral guarantee scheme, which drives a wedge between the overall coun-
try risk and the risk a German investor has to face. As the federal
guarantee scheme is used relatively extensively by German investors in
DCs, it seems obvious to investigate its impact on FDI flows in more
detail. Before doing so, its structure and size is briefly described.
a. The Federal Guarantee Scheme
The principal idea of a public guarantee scheme is to offer coverage
for certain non-commercial risks at a rate less than the true risk pre-
mium in order to alter the risk pattern of different FDI projects in fa-
vour of DCs. This is supposed to encourage investors to invest in a DC
where they might otherwise not have gone, or invest a higher amount
than they would without public coverage. Generally, the objective and
justification for a public guarantee (as well as other forms of public sup-
port) is "additionality".
The German government has a rather pragmatic stance however.
Additionality is not an explicit criterion, and the specific motivation of
investors is not decisive for approval. Federal guarantees are - as
other policy instruments - generally available for all projects in all DCs
as long as they fulfill certain standards: they must have a development
impact and be environmentally acceptable. In addition to investment
Applications for guarantees can only be approved if the project has
been approved by the authorities of the host government.97
guarantees, there is a whole set of promotional instruments containing
bilateral investment treaties, financial support (partly in form of subsi-
dized loans extended by the federal government and partly in form of
market-oriented equity and loan commitments of a publicly-owned finance
institution) and a whole battery of consultancy services. The federal
guarantee scheme is not only by far the most important promotion mea-
sure in volume terms, but also an important prerequisite to obtain public
support from other sources, although it is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition. On the other hand, federal guarantees are obtain-
able only for projects in DCs which provide a certain legal backing for
the FDI. This is automatically assumed to be fulfilled if there exists a
bilateral investment treaty between Germany and the host country. There
are, however, countries which consider bilateral investment treaties as
inconsistent with their sovereignty, especially in Latin America; never-
theless, there are publicly guaranteed projects in these countries.
The federal guarantee covers non-commercial risks only. These are:
expropriation or nationalization without compensation; default of a project
due to a failure of the host country to commit itself to contractional du-
ties related to the project; destruction through war, revolution and
other conflicts; official moratoria; and certain convertibility risks. The
term of a guarantee is 15 years, which can be extended every 5 years
successively. The project value is covered to 95 per cent, and the re-
maining 5 per cent is not allowed to be covered elsewhere.
Earnings can be covered up to 50 per cent of the project value.
The fees are very low and cover part of the administrative costs only.
Also, the fees are not differentiated with respect to different sectors,
countries, types of risks or capital versus earnings. Applications are
approved by a board of representatives from the responsible ministries.
In the case of a default, the compensation for the German investor is
financed out of the federal budget and the claim on the host country is
transmitted to the German government. Cases of default are, however,
very rare. In 1988, they amounted to 1 per cent of the total value of
guaranteed projects. The host governments often pay at least part of the
amount due after negotiating with the German authorities. If they ulti-
The various instruments are reviewed in more detail in Gubitz [ 1990].98
mately default, projects in their countries are excluded from further
guarantees.
Until the end of 1988, about 2500 applications with a total value of
DM 9.3 bill, for projects in 91 countries were approved [Treuarbeit,
1989]. Very few applications are finally rejected. The scheme has proven
not to be quantitatively restricted in the past, as no application has
been turned down because of budget limitations. The amount of new ap-
proved projects, which peaked in 1988 at DM 0.6 bill. , is strongly in-
fluenced by a few big projects. According to the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, roughly 20 per cent of German FDI in DCs is covered by a
guarantee [von Wurzen, 1989].
The regional pattern of guarantees shows a much heavier weight of
African and Asian countries than does the general regional pattern of
German FDI (Table 24). This is related to three factors: First, most
bilateral investment treaties are established with countries of these
areas. Second, guarantees mostly cover equity capital; some countries,
however, rather attract FDI-related loans due to their repatriation prac-
tices (e.g. Brazil; see Chapter IV). Third, the regional pattern is af-




























- (b) Spain included.
Source: Treuarbeit [1989]; Deutsche Bundesbank [b].
It is not quite clear how this number was calculated. Most likely it
relates guarantee approvals to accumulated net FDI outflows.99
fected by the age structure of German FDI; in Asia, where projects are
much younger on average than for example in Latin America, the average
size of a guaranteed project is considerably larger than in other regions.
The evidence indicates that the guarantee scheme is relatively
widely used for projects in DCs. It will probably expand as a high de-
mand for coverage in Eastern Europe emerged recently. This might also
have a significant impact on the regional pattern of guarantees extended
by the German government.
b. The Effect of Guarantees on FDI Outflows
The assumption underlying public support for FDI in DCs that -
without guarantees - the risk perception of foreign investors is unrea-
sonably high and private insurance markets do not work efficiently,
may, of course, be debated. This is all the more so as the German
guarantee scheme is at least potentially subsidized, although the actual
subsidy might be low. Hence, the mere size of a guarantee scheme can-
not be taken as an indicator for its success.
Once it is decided that public guarantees should be used to direct
more FDI to DCs, their effectiveness depends on whether or not the
amount of federal guarantees has a significantly positive effect on Ger-
man FDI outflows to these countries. An answer to this question is un-
fortunately extremely difficult to obtain. One way often pursued is to
ask the companies directly whether the coverage by a public guarantee
played a significant role in their investment decision. The answer is al-
most invariably "no", as is revealed in many surveys covering this issue
[see, e.g., Wallace, 1989; Konig et al., 1987]. This result is often used
as an argument against public guarantee schemes. However, whatever
one's opinion about public guarantees might be, the results from ques-
tionaires filled in by the companies are not a suitable argument against
them. This outcome rather indicates that the guarantees generally do not
significantly alter market signals or incentives and that the risk pattern
among different investment options is not fundamentally distorted. If the
guarantees support FDI which is principally market-oriented, for ex-
ample, they have, of course, only a limited incremental role and will not
be rated "crucial" by the private companies.100
In order to investigate in some more detail whether there would be
less FDI in DCs if no public guarantees were available, a regression
equation relating gross FDI outflows to DGs (NEW) with exchange rates
(EXDM), host countries' nominal GNP, country credit rating (II), new
approved guarantees relative to GNP (GARNEW), and the host countries'
attitudes towards FDI (GU) was estimated. As the amount of new ap-
proved guarantees increases with country risk, GARNEW is corrected for
this effect by weighting it with the host country's credit rating; i.e.,
the higher the creditworthiness the higher the weight of the actual a-
2
mount of new approved guarantees. For the country credit rating the
annual average of the index of the Institutional Investor was used, i. e. ,
a higher country risk is associated with a lower credit rating. Data on
approved guarantees were available for 17 countries, and the panel
covers the years 1980-1988.
3
[V.13] NEW = 0.61 • NEW(-l) + 0.02 • EXDM + 0.07 • GNP - 0.16 • II
(7.2) (0.4) (1.6) (0.6)
+ 3.65 • GU + 0.06 • GARNEW.
(0.2) (1.8)
R* = 0.88; NOB = 153; CHISQ = 47.8 (critical value: 33.9)
The regression result confirms earlier findings that an increase in
the country risk measured by its credit rating does not lower gross FDI
flows in the German case (Section V. 4). The degree of openness of the
host countries (GU) turned out to be insignificant. An increase in ap-
proved guarantees (relative to GNP and corrected for the risk effect),
All variables, except GU, are expressed in logarithmic terms.
2
As in most empirical investigations the results are subject to various
objections. A major one is that an approved guarantee is by definition
associated with an increase of FDI. In practice, however, approved
guarantees and FDI outflows are not highly correlated, as the induced
outflows are stretched over several periods and the approvals cover
items that are not covered by FDI data.
3
These countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, the Ivoiry Coast, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, and Tunisia. The II index was not
available before 1980.101
on the other hand, significantly increases new German FDI in DCs.
This indicates that ICs can encourage their companies to invest more in
DCs by offering public guarantees. In the case of the German guarantee
scheme, the actual costs involved are relatively low, as defaults are
rare. Thus, once it is decided that public support should be used to di-
rect more FDI to DCs, source countries' policies might be more effective
than host countries' policies especially if the subsidization of FDI in the
latter involves high foregone tax revenues. Probably public guarantees
are relatively cheap also in comparison to other policy instruments avail-
able in the source countries, especially if one keeps in mind that the
additionality effects of equity and loan commitments of publicly owned
finance institutions (such as the German DEG) are at least as little
known as those of public guarantees.
7. Overall Assessment
Traditionally, German FDI in DCs has been strongly market-orient-
ed. In a 1983 survey, German manufacturing companies, which were at
that time also producing in a DC, selected "securing their foreign mar-
kets" most frequently as an argument for investing in the Third World
[Braun et al., 1983]. Sales of their products within the host country
and to third countries, mostly in addition to exports from the German
parent company, played a much more important role than supplying the
domestic market of the parent company. The survey backs an empirically
well-established result, namely that market size, measured for example
by GNP, is a major driving force for FDI outflows. This finding is also
strongly supported by our regression analysis for the German case.
In addition, expected market growth is often considered to increase
FDI in a country. The empirical evidence on German FDI is mixed. The
actual growth rate of the host countries' real GNP as an indication for
expected market growth did not have a significant effect on German
An analogous relationship was also tested for liquidations. It turned
out that a relatively high amount of publicly guaranteed FDI stock did
not significantly reduce the amount of liquidations. The overall per-
formance of that equation was, however, so poor that conclusions could
not really be drawn from it.102
gross FDI outflows and FDI stocks. The hypothesis is supported, how-
ever, when the ratio of GDI to GNP in the host countries is considered
as a proxy for growth expectations.
Market size is not only a major driving force for German FDI but
also for German exports. Actually, German FDI and exports show rough-
ly the same regional pattern (see Chapter III). By analysing the inter-
relations between FDI arid exports, no significant influence of FDI on
exports could be found. In contrast to earlier findings on German ex-
ports to the United States, neither the hypothesis of a substitution nor
of a growth effect could be supported by the results in the case of Ger-
man exports to DCs. On the other hand, the empirical results reveal a
strong additional impact of German exports on German FDI in DCs. The
positive effect of an increase of the ratio of exports to the host coun-
try's GNP was almost as big as the effect of an increase of GNP itself.
The level of trade barriers in the host DCs was an obstacle rather than
an incentive for German FDI. This supports the view that import protec-
tion is an inadequate means to stimulate FDI in the longer run.
Another important motive to invest in a DC classified in surveys as
very important by many German companies is low production costs.
Nevertheless, this argument is hard to be verified empirically. Our at-
tempts to investigate this issue are based on the assumption that it is
mainly labour costs and labour productivity that determine production
costs. For the relatively small country sample and the relatively short
time period for which the data were available, the hypothesis that low
labour costs attract German FDI was rejected in the present investiga-
tion. If at all, foreign labour costs had a positive impact on German
FDI. This result can be attributed to the fact that the sample is biased
towards host countries where market-oriented FDI took place mainly in
the form of capital widening of existing companies, rather than by estab-
lishing new enterprises. As far as capital-widening is concerned, the
result is quite plausible if the production technology allows for substi-
tution between labour and capital.
As Germany itself is a country with 40 years of economic stability
as well as little social and political unrest, one would expect German
foreign investors to be particularly risk averse. But this was apparently
not the case. In some contrast to foreign investors from other source
countries, German investors have not focused their engagement on host103
DCs characterized by relatively little economic and political instability.
They have hardly responded to a deterioration in economic and political
conditions in the 1980s by curtailing their engagement. This result is
again in conflict with earlier survey reports which found political insta-
bility as discouraging for foreign investors (see the literature given in
Section II. 2. ). The discrepancy can be attributed to two factors: First,
German investors got stuck in economically and politically unstable host
countries because, once undertaken, their strong engagement in the
manufacturing sector of Latin American countries had long gestation
periods and became immobile in the-short run. Second, the influence of
political risk on FDI flows has probably abated due to investment
guarantee schemes in developed countries. Measures applied by the Ger-
man authorities to reduce the risk for foreign investors were shown to
have induced more FDI outflows to DCs.
Federal guarantees for German FDI in the Third World may also
have weakened the impact of a debt overhang and sovereign risk argu-
ments that provide another proxy for the relative risk of a host DC. In
sharp contrast to foreign investors from other source countries, German
investors hardly responded to a debt overhang by reducing their FDI.
The relevance of sovereign risk variables depended on the host coun-
tries' attitudes towards FDI. Foreign investors were mainly concerned
about sovereign risk in host countries with relatively restrictive FDI
regulations. The results provided a first indication that credit-con-
strained DCs were typically also constrained in terms of FDI, although
this applies to German investors to a lesser extent only. Under such
conditions, the chances to restructure the external financing of problem
debtors in favour of FDI would be rather bleak. This issue will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VI in some more detail.104
VI. The Role of German FDI in External Financing of Developing
Countries: Current Issues and Prospects
1. German FDI and Financial Restructuring
The results on the impact of sovereign risks and a debt overhang
on FDI flows from all source countries to developing economies (Section
V. 5) strongly suggest that the overall chances to restructure the ex-
ternal financing of the latter countries in favour of FDI and at the ex-
pense of debt are rather bleak. An unsustainable foreign-debt situation
rendered it difficult to attract further FDI. Credit-constrained DCs typ-
ically appear to be also constrained in terms of total FDI inflows. How-
ever, the reaction of German investors to debt problems was not as pro-
nounced as the response of investors from other capital-exporting coun-
tries. According to the results presented in Section V. 6, this was prob-
ably at least partly due to guarantees granted to foreign investors by
the German government.
Differences are also to be observed between the behaviour of Ger-
man foreign investors and that of international commercial lenders. In a
recent study on the determinants of bank lending to DCs in the 1980s
[Nunnenkamp, 1989b], it was shown that the lending behaviour of pri-
vate creditors has changed markedly in recent years. While bank lending
was largely unaffected by the domestic policies of debtor countries until
the early 1980s, net transfers out of credit relations were clearly posi-
tively related to adjustment efforts of debtors subsequently. For poorly
performing debtors, including those which benefited from "involuntary
lending" by concerted credit extension, it was hardly possible to main-
tain, not to speak of increasing, positive net transfers. Moreover, the
behaviour of commercial banks was influenced by sovereign risk con-
siderations. Increasing default risks added to private creditors' reluc-
tance to provide additional transfers:
As policy and performance variables, the investment ratio, the share
in world export markets, the real effective exchange rate, and the
government budget deficit were considered in the first place.105
- Net transfers declined significantly with increasing potential benefits to
be reaped by debtors from wilful default.
- Although the evidence on potential costs of default is not as clearcut,
creditors relied to some extent on the threat to impose trade sanctions
2
and a credit stop on defaulting debtors.
Although there are also similarities in the behaviour of international
lenders and foreign investors from Germany and other source countries,
the above-mentioned peculiarities in the risk attitudes of German foreign
investors might be considered as indicating some potential for financial
restructuring of debt-ridden DCs. -The role of German FDI in the exter-
nal financing of DCs and its prospects will be discussed in the following
sections. First, it will be shown that German FDI is currently fairly
small in comparison to commercial debt of most DCs, so that the imme-
diate chances of financial restructuring by referring to German FDI are
limited. Second, the contribution of debt-equity swaps in enhancing the
chances for financial restructuring will be discussed (Section VI. 2). Fi-
nally, the prospects for German FDI in DCs will be evaluated in Section
VI. 3 by referring to some major factors which might have an impact on
the worldwide competition for these funds in the future.
Germany is one of the relatively important sources of FDI in DCs
[OECD, b]. Nonetheless, German FDI does still not constitute a major
vehicle which debt-ridden DCs might use to restructure their external
financing presently. German FDI stocks accounted for less than 4 per
cent of outstanding long-term bank debt in a sample of 16 major capital
recipients in the Third World in 1988 (Table 25). The share was con-
siderably higher than this average figure in countries where the need
for financial restructuring due to acute debt problems was less pressing
(Egypt and Tunisia). Among the major problem debtors, the stock fig-
Potential benefits from default were proxied by total external debt out-
standing as per cent of the debtor's GNP and debt service obligations
as per cent of GNP.
2
In some instances, net transfers were positively related to the debtors'
dependence on short-term trade financing and the need for foreign
credits for absorption-smoothing purposes.
Most notably, all three types of capital transfers to DCs (i.e. bank
loans, German FDI flows and FDI from all sources) were positively
related to higher investment ratios in the capital-recipient countries.106

































































Columns 1-3. - (b





















































































Columns 4-6. - (c)
d) Without 1987 for Columns 4-6.
Source: World Bank [b]; Deutsche Bundesbank [unpubl. data base];
own calculations.
ures reveal a relatively high ratio of German FDI to bank debt only for
Brazil.
The stock figures referred to so far even overstate the current role
of German FDI in the external financing of DCs. Notwithstanding the
decline in bank lending during the 1980s, the average ratio of German
gross FDI outflows to disbursements of commercial credits in the period
1980-1988 was even lower than the ratio based on 1988 stock data. Most
notably, this applies to all major problem debtors. Excluding the excep-107
tionally high figure for Egypt, German FDI flows on average accounted
for only 1.5 per cent of long-term credit disbursements from commercial
banks.
Not only does German FDI currently play only a marginal role in
the external financing of most DCs, there are also signs that the above-
mentioned peculiarities in risk behaviour are rather due to a relatively
longer time lag in the reactions of German investors than to persistently
different risk attitudes. This would indicate a fairly small potential for
financial restructuring of major debtor countries by referring to German
FDI in the immediate future. Some evidence on the time lag in the reac-
tions of German investors as compared to investors from other source
countries is presented in Table 26.
The relatively slow response of German investors in redirecting FDI
flows is most evident for countries such as South Korea and Thailand
(Table 26). These countries are hardly credit-constrained and improved
their attractiveness for foreign capital further by liberalizing FDI re-
strictions. FDI inflows from source countries other than Germany re-
sponded fairly quickly to this development. Already in the period 1983-
1985, a significant increase of FDI flows from all sources (both relative
to these host countries' GDP and as a share of total FDI flows to DCs)
is to be observed. By contrast, German FDI flows reacted with a longer
time lag. A somewhat strengthened engagement in South Korea and Thai-
land only took place in the late 1980s.
Though to a lesser degree, similar differences are revealed in Table
2
26 for the two most important problem debtors, i. e. Brazil and Mexico.
For the same country sample, this figure amounts to 30 per cent if FDI
flows from all sources are related to long-term credit disbursements
from commercial banks [IMF, a; World Bank, b]. This indicates that
financial restructuring has taken place already to a significant degree
at an aggregate level, but that German FDI played a marginal role in
this respect only. However, also for FDI from all sources the ratio of
FDI inflows to credit disbursements is particularly high for capital
recipients without pressing debt problems (above 50 per cent for Co-
lombia, Malaysia and Tunisia), while it is considerably lower for prob-
lem debtors (most notably so for the Ivory Coast, Peru and Venezuela
where the ratio is below 5 per cent).
2
Argentina is a clear exception to the typical pattern of a relatively
stable investment behaviour in DCs of German foreign investors as
compared to investors from other source countries. In Chile, the dif-
ferences in the reactions of German and other investors were less pro-
nounced.108










































































































(a) The index on credit constraints ranges from "0" (lowest prob-
bility that a country is credit constrained) to "9" (highest prob-
bility). The classification is based on several indicators, e.g. the
level and change in international
the level and change of
reserves (in months of imports),
undisbursed credit commitments as a share of
disbursements, and the amount of rescheduled debt in total debt. For
details of calculation
[1989b]. - (b) Total FDI
flows to about 25 major





total gross German FDI proxied by
host countries. -
L and 3 . -
c) Gross FDI flows. - (d)
(e) Without 1986 in Columns 1 and
Source: IMF [a; d]; Bundesbank [ unpubl. data base]; own calculations;109
The relatively stable investment behaviour of German foreign investors is
most pronounced in the case of Brazil; the share of German FDI in 25
major host DCs devoted to Brazil was constantly about 30 per cent when
calculated for the three subperiods considered in Table 26. Similarly, the
respective share of Mexico declined only slightly during the 1980s. In
sharp contrast, foreign investors from all other source countries reduced
their additional engagement in Mexico considerably immediately after the
debt crisis erupted in 1982. This short-term reaction was later com-
pletely reversed; the increase of overall FDI inflows in the late 1980s
may at least be partly due to immediate responses of foreign investors
from source countries other than Germany to the economic policy reforms
initiated by Mexico recently.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this section points to a
fairly limited role of German FDI in the external financing of most DCs.
Furthermore, the investment behaviour of German investors was relative-
ly more stable than that of other foreign investors, i. e. , the time lags
in reacting to changes in investment conditions were somewhat longer.
This indicates that the potential for short-term financial restructuring of
DCs with pressing debt problems is only limited as far as German FDI as
an alternative source of foreign finance is concerned. In the following
section, it will be assessed whether this situation may be improved by
formalized debt-equity swap programmes.
2. The Role of Debt-Equity Swaps
The debt crisis and the resulting reverse flow of financial resources
from DCs in the 1980s have once again led many people in the creditor
as well as debtor countries to pin their hopes on additional flows of FDI
to solve the impasse between debt and development of a major part of
the Third World. Debt-equity swaps are conceived as an important device
of transforming this hope into reality in many heavily indebted coun-
tries. They are expected to reduce the foreign debt and to increase FDI
inflows simultaneously. Though swaps were earlier used by Brazil (in the
1960s) and Turkey [ Blackwell, Nocera, 1989; Kume, Ito, 1989], they
emerged on the current international debt scene after some of the Latin110
American countries, especially Chile, introduced formal programmes for
such swaps in the early 1980s. In this section the recent developments
and problems of debt-equity swaps are shortly summarized. Subsequent-
ly, it is assessed whether the introduction of swap programmes had a
positive impact on German FDI. This exercise is subject to severe data
constraints. Finally, the propriety of implicit subsidies granted to the
foreign investors through these swap transactions is discussed.
a. Recent Developments and Problems
In 1988, there were nearly 20 countries participating or intending
to participate in formal debt-equity swaps [Kume, Ito, 1989]. Eight
countries for which the data are available in greater detail [ DiLeo,
Remolona, 1989], authorized debt-equity swaps amounting to the face
value of nearly US$ 13. 5 bill, during 1985-1988. This was ten times more
than the amount of debt-equity swaps transacted during 1981-1984 (Table
27). Most of this phenomenal growth was registered during 1988. As
compared to their total outstanding debt to private foreign creditors as
the suppliers of obligations on the secondary market, the value of debt-
equity swaps was not dramatically high (about 10 per cent for the entire
period 1981-1988 as a whole). But if the debt-equity swaps are put in
relation to the net inflow of FDI, the former seem to have constituted a
major channel for foreign investments in the debtor countries. This
poses the question if foreign investors were not willing to commit additi-
onal FDI funds outside debt-equity swap programmes once they were
allowed to buy local currency at subsidized rates through these swap
arrangements.
Recently, some debtor countries (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia and the
Philippines) eliminated debt-equity swaps from their formal debt re-
duction programmes. As a result, the total amount of debt-equity swaps
was expected to fall substantially from its peak level of 1988 [ World
According to OECD [d], FDI amounted to USS 6.6 bill, during the
same period in the given debtor countries. This figure on FDI trans-
actions is, however, not strictly comparable with the face value of
swap authorizations. Inter alia, the difference is due to the discounts
on the secondary market.Ill



























(a) In eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, the Philippines, and Venezuela. - (b) Debt owed to private
creditors excluding suppliers' credit at the beginning of the period;
1983 for 1981-1984; - (c) For some countries data do not cover full
year.
Source: DiLeo, Remolona [1989].
Bank, b]. This decision was mainly due to concerns about adverse ef-
fects of the swaps on monetary expansion. The recent change in the
attitudes of some DCs indicates that the reduction in foreign liabilities
via swaps might involve considerable costs. The net advantages of any
particular exchange of debt into equity may prove to be positive or neg-
ative depending on several conditions:
- The inflationary effects of debt-equity swaps depend on whether local
currency for the swaps is provided by the central bank by creating
new money [see, e.g., Kume, Ito, 1989]. Chile, for example, avoided
an expansionary monetary impact by financing swaps by issuing local
bonds resold on the local capital market.
- Given the thin domestic bond market in the heavily indebted DCs as it
is until now, financing of debt-equity swaps through capital markets
raises domestic interest rates. This has two adverse effects on the
economy of the countries concerned. First, private domestic investors
are crowded out of the local capital market. Second, the burden of
DiLeo and Remolona [ 1989] have estimated that foreign liabilities were
reduced by 29 per cent of the face value of the swapped debts in
1988.112
interest payments on the fiscal budget rises depending also on the
previous amount of domestic debt of the government.
- The balance-of-payments effect of debt-equity swaps is not necessarily
positive. Banks participating in swaps are typically interested in re-
ducing or completely abandoning their engagement in the countries
concerned. This may prove quite burdensome for the balance of pay-
ments of the debtor country in the short run as compared to the cor-
responding effect of some other forms of debt renegotiations and
2
settlements.
Whether the above problems or some misuses of debt-equity swaps
(e.g. roundtripping) are so serious as to drop them entirely depends to
a large degree on whether or not the swaps induce additional FDI. The
extremely high ratios of authorized debt-equity swaps to FDI inflows
point to substantial substitution effects, i. e. , FDI undertaken in the
context of swaps would have been undertaken anyway. The extent to
which debt-equity swaps substitute the normal inflow of FDI is likely to
depend on the type of investors. Bergsman and Edisis [ 1988] found that
banks as direct investors in DCs bring additional FDI when they convert
their debt into equity capital. But in the case of other multinational cor-
porations this is more doubtful. Of all the debt-equity swaps examined
by them, 33 per cent of those by the multinational non-banking corpora-
tions constituted additional FDI flows [ibid., p. 58].
Again, Chile has been able to avoid this problem by tying the swap
programme to the privatization of public enterprises.
2
Debtor countries have tried to reduce the short-run balance-of-pay-
ments problems by forbidding the investors the transfer of dividends
and capital in early years of investments.
Though the figures on authorized swaps [Schneeberger, 1989] and FDI
transactions [ OECD, d] are not strictly comparable, they may provide
a rough indication. The ratio amounted to 0.96 in the case of Argen-
tina, for example. It even exceeded unity in the case of Brazil, Chile
and Mexico. Ffrench-Davis [ 1990] found a large displacement effect in
the case of Chile.fiir Wettwirtschaft Kiel
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b. Debt-Equity Swaps and German FDI
Severe data constraints render it difficult to evaluate whether debt-
equity swap programmes had a positive impact on German FDI in DCs.
Information on the participation of German foreign investors in debt-
equity swaps of DCs is hardly available. Scattered evidence on Brazil
and Mexico indicates that German investors played only a minor role:
- In Brazil, for which the relevant data for 1988 are available, debt-
equity swaps undertaken by German participants amounted to only US$
28 mill., i.e. 2 per cent of all the-formally swapped debts in that year
[Banco Central do Brasil, 1989]. The United States (30 per cent) and
Japan (15 per cent) accounted for the largest shares [Schneeberger,
1989].
- In Mexico the share of German firms was higher (8 per cent) than in
Brazil [ ibid. ].
A rough indication of the effect of swaps on German FDI may be
provided by testing Equations [VI. 1] and [VI. 2]:
[VI.1] NEW = aQ + a1 NEW(-l) + &2 GNP + a3 CONV
[VI.2] NEW = b + b NEW(-l) + b GNP + b DUM.
In Equation [VI. 1], the impact of the total amount of debt conver-
sions (CONV) on German gross FDI outflows is assessed. Lagged FDI
outflows (NEW(-l)) and host countries' GNP are introduced as controlling
variables. In Equation [VI. 2], CONV is replaced by a dummy variable;
DUM takes the value "1" for countries and years with a swap programme
in operation, and "0" otherwise. The results presented in Table 28 are
based on six Latin American countries and the period 1980-1988 for
which the data on CONV were available [ Institute of International
Finance, 1990].
The overall statistical fit of the estimations is fairly good. All co-
efficients of NEW(-l), the lagged endogenous variable, and GNP have
the expected positive sign, and most of them are significant. Also the
coefficients of CONV and DUM are significantly positive, indicating that
debt-equity swaps had a favourable impact on overall inflows of German
FDI. This result may be somewhat surprising in view of the above-men-114
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tioned scattered evidence on the participation of German foreign inves-
tors in swap operations in Brazil and Mexico. It may be argued that
CONV and DUM capture the overall effect of recent economic reforms and
adjustment efforts in Latin American debtor countries, rather than the
effect of swap programmes which were implemented along the reforms.
However, several arguments can be raised against this reasoning:
- The impact of debt-equity swaps is considerably smaller (DUM) or even
insignificant (CONV) once those countries for which debt conversions
were negligible or non-existent (Colombia, Peru) are excluded from the
sample.
- The economic reforms implemented by Latin American problem debtors
in the late 1980s can hardly be considered as sufficiently comprehen-
sive and consistent to induce substantial inflows of additional German
FDI. This is supported by the fact that the extension of structural115
and sectoral adjustment loans did not have a significant effect on total
German FDI flows in the 1980s (see the results on the variable SSL in
Table 18).
- Mexico may represent an exception in the above-mentioned respect.
However, the results are hardly affected if Mexico is excluded from
the sample (Table 28), while the impact of CONV and DUM on German
FDI should be considerably weaker if it were to be attributed to
broader economic reforms rather than swap programmes.
On the whole, the simple regression analysis points to some additi-
onality induced by debt-equity swaps as far as German FDI in Latin
America is concerned. This does not mean, however, that debt-equity
swaps are necessarily the best way to encourage FDI inflows. The above
exercise cannot show the extent to which additional FDI inflows can be
induced by reducing sovereign risk and implementing sound and stable
economic policies, as compared to the effects of subsidizing foreign in-
vestors via swap programmes.
c. FDI Subsidization through Debt-Equity Swaps
Allowing the investors to avail a part or whole of the margin be-
tween face and secondary market values of debt has been interpreted as
subsidization of FDI. Whether debt-equity swaps lead to subsidization of
foreign capital depends on the extent to which the value of equity ac-
quired through a swap transaction is higher than the price of the swap-
ped debt plus the other charges paid by the investor. It would be un-
realistic to equate subsidies with the discounts on debt existing on the
secondary market. While the cost side of the transaction is easily deter-
minable, the value of the equity cannot always be realistically assessed.
Book values of the acquired assets may not always be relevant for
defining the subsidy element because they usually do not depict the
market valuations correctly. In many cases the acquired equities are
not tradable internationally. Even if they were tradable domestically,
the domestic prices are not quite relevant for ascertaining the subsidy
element of the swap transaction. This is because in the case of the
actual sale of the equities, receipts cannot be legally transferred out
of the debtor countries, and at the black market rate the foreign ex-
change value of the sales proceeds of the equities are likely to be
much smaller than at the official exchange rate.116
Thus it is very difficult to quantify the proportion of subsidies involved
in debt-equity swaps. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the
investors do realize some savings or subsidies in debt-equity swaps.
Otherwise they would prefer to undertake their investments more directly
and avoid some of the unpleasant bureaucratic formalities typically
associated with swaps.
The subsidization of FDI inherent in debt-equity swaps may be re-
garded as a compensation for the increased risks in debt-affected DCs,
which stem from low or even negative GNP growth, failed attempts to
reduce high inflation, foreign exchange shortage, and other policy-in-
duced uncertainties for investors. It takes time to correct policy mis-
takes and to restore the confidence of - foreign and domestic - inves-
tors, once the credibility of governments has been substantially eroded.
During this transitional period, subsidization of FDI through swaps may
be justified unless this is regarded as a substitute for economic policy
2
reforms. In order to avoid a waste of public resources, the subsidi-
zation of FDI through swaps should be limited to the degree which is
necessary to compensate for increased risks in a transitional period.
This may be achieved by introducing auction mechanisms into swap oper-
ations. Moreover, similar incentives should be granted to domestic in-
vestors. In this way, distortions due to unfair competition between for-
eign and domestic investors can be avoided. The adverse effects of
debt-equity swaps on the government budget may be contained if DCs
were prepared to sell public enterprises to private investors.
1 Wulfken [ 1989, pp. 32 ff. ] is of the opinion that subsidization of the
investors arises only if the debtor countries are in position to buy
back their debts on the secondary market as in the case of Bolivia.
2
Subsidies available through debt-equity swaps are different from other
investment subsidies in as much as they are realized by the investor
already at the time of investment. In the case of other incentives,
investors have usually to wait until their investments begin to yield
income in order to benefit from the subsidies. Insofar, the effective-
ness of subsidies granted in the context of swaps may be higher than
that of other FDI subsidies (for a detailed discussion of the effective-
ness of the latter subsidies in increasing FDI inflows, see OECD [a]).117
3. Prospects of German FDI in DCs
The share of DCs in German FDI declined considerably in the 1980s
(Table 29). This was also the general trend of their FDI from all sources
[ Tolentino, 1990]. On the other hand, DCs increasingly liberalized their
policies towards FDI during this period, which should exercise a favour-
able effect on their FDI inflows, albeit with a time lag needed for in-
vestors' decisions. This effect might, however, be reduced or even re-
versed by an improved attractiveness for FDI of other countries, es-
pecially in Southern and Eastern Europe.
In this section, an attempt is made to assess the prospects of Ger-
man FDI in the Third World in the coming years. This has been a sub-
ject of great concern and speculation in the developing and developed
countries alike in view of the two recent internationally very important
developments in Europe in which Germany occupies a central role. First,
the plan of the EC to remove all barriers to the movements of production
factors and products within the Community and create a single internal
market by the end of 1992. It is feared, especially in the Third World,
that this could divert some of the future investment funds to the com-
peting member countries of the Community, viz. Greece, Portugal and
Spain. Second, the countries of Eastern (and Central) Europe have
shifted or are shifting from centrally planned to market economies. They
are liberalizing their policies towards FDI in order to broaden and mod-
ernize their industrial base and raise their productivity and product
quality. Here again it is suspected that the German investors would be
under market pressure as well as under moral pressure to devote con-
siderable resources to these countries and that future German FDI in
Eastern Europe including the Eastern part of Germany would go at the
cost of the share of the rest of the world including DCs.
Although these apprehensions cannot be dismissed outright, it
seems that the positive aspects of EC 1992 and of the downfall of com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe have been largely ignored from the
point of view of FDI flows to the Third World [Hiemenz, 1991]. In the
following paragraphs, both the pros and cons of these developments will
Meetings of the German bankers with the German Bundeskanzler and
exhortations of the German politicians to the business community point
in this direction.118
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be discussed in order to derive some conclusions on the chances of DCs
in the competition for equity capital originating from Germany. First, we
consider the EC 1992 programme and its likely consequences for FDI
flows to DCs.
a. EC 1992
Any analysis of the effect of EC 1992 on DCs at this stage is bound
to be conjectural because the final shape of the Community resulting
from the completion of the internal market is not clear. Both of the big-
ger EC reports on internal market integration [ Cecchini et al., 1988; EC
Commission, 1988] do not even deal with the question of the EC's rela-
tions with the outside world. Trade and foreign investment as explained
in Chapter V are related with each other. It is not yet known how the
Community is going to harmonize the differing protection levels of its
member countries by the end of 1992. Investment flows are going to de-
pend partly on the fact whether the EC would look like a "fortress" for
the third countries or be a very liberal trading partner [ Grimm et al. ,
1989]. Notwithstanding the uncertainties about the future shape of the
Community, the following points appear to be in order for dealing with
the question posed here, viz. implications of EC 1992 for German FDI in
DCs.
Due to the EC 1992 programme, the Community has become an at-
tractive location for FDI from ICs, both members and non-members of the
EC. Most notably, deregulation of the service sector is opening indu-
stries such as banking, insurance and telecommunications to FDI in the
Community. This will reinforce the trend towards FDI in the service sec-
tor which has already become evident in the 1980s. It may be argued
that the increased attractiveness of the Community for FDI will have an
indirect negative effect on FDI in DCs in the future. However, FDI in
DCs is still focused on the manufacturing sector (Chapter III). The
significant differences in the sectoral distribution of FDI limit the ad-
verse effects of higher FDI in the Community on FDI flows to the Third
World. Moreover, most of the larger multinational corporations within and
outside the Community have already taken into account the EC 1992 as a
unified single market in their strategic plans. This impression is based120
on surveys and data on mergers and acquisitions [ Gittelman, 1990]. This
means that a greater part of the effect of EC 1992 on FDI flows - as far
as the static impact is concerned - may have already occurred. Whereas
in 1982 about 30 per cent of the stock of the German FDI was located in
the EC, it had increased to 40 per cent by 1988 (Table 29). This was
at the cost of DCs and many ICs including the United States, which has
proved to be very attractive for FDI in the 1980s. The German example
indicates that the peak of the negative effect of EC 1992 on FDI flows to
DCs seems to lie in the past. The impact of the smaller and medium-sized
firms which are still in the process of adjusting their structures to the
internal market [Gittelman, 1990] may not be as great.
Insofar as the Mediterranean member countries (Greece, Portugal,
Spain) compete in terms of their factor endowments and locational advan-
tages with DCs, some of the FDI from Germany and other members of the
EC may be diverted to the former at the cost of the Third World. This
tendency is likely to be reinforced by the subsidies granted from the
regional structural fund of the EC. However, some of the locational ad-
vantages (e.g. relatively low wages) of the Mediterranean member coun-
tries may disappear in the hot too far future due to the "Social Charter"
of the Community which will tend to equalize the wage differentials
among the member countries. Moreover, the expected monetary union
might lead to a revaluation of their currencies with its negative impact
on the inflow of FDI.
The 1992 programme to create an internal market and to remove all
restrictions on the movement of goods, services, capital, and persons is
expected to add significantly to the GDP growth of the Community; opti-
mistic observers forecast an increase of the annual growth rate of about
one percentage point [Hiemenz, 1991]. In the medium term, the Com-
munity's GDP might increase by nearly 20 per cent. This would not only
increase the EC's demand for imports from DCs, but also the financial
resources of the member countries - ceteris paribus - available for FDI
in the Third World. This positive aspect of the EC 1992 is often ignored
1 The flow data for 1989 show a further increase to 63 per cent [BDI,
1990]. The share of the DCs in the net outflow of German FDI in 1989
declined to nearly 3 per cent. The figures quoted here are not strictly
comparable with each other, because (i) the membership of the EC has
increased and (ii) the sources are different.121
in the current discussion. In view of the relation between trade and
FDI, primarily the DCs that are integrated into the international division
of labour and on which the EC's import demand is concentrated might
benefit from larger FDI inflows.
Much of the effect of EC 1992 on German FDI flows to DCs will de-
pend on the final trade policy of the EC, especially on local-content re-
quirements and rules of origin. If the borders around the single market
are kept open to imports from non-EC countries, international competition
will force the German firms to look for low-cost locations from which DCs
might benefit. But if the Community implements policies in favour of
internal sourcing, the German investors shall be encouraged to divert
their existing or future export-oriented FDI from the Third World to the
member countries. Both local-content requirements and rules of origin
are instruments used to influence the sourcing activities of multinational
companies. If they are tightened, firms would be under pressure to fa-
vour locations within the Community for their foreign investments.
b. Economic Liberalization in Eastern Europe
There have been dramatic developments in Eastern Europe in the
recent past. Not only has the Berlin Wall fallen but German unification
has been realized within a period of less than one year since then.
Especially Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are implementing demo-
cratic and market-based political and economic systems in place of
centrally planned communist economies. The Soviet Union and countries
like Bulgaria and Romania are lagging somewhat behind in this respect
but may proceed in the same direction. Although many of the basic data
needed for a sound economic assessment are not available, the following
points are expected to highlight some of the important aspects of emerg-
ing competition from Eastern Europe to the DCs for German FDI.
As shown before (Chapter V), German FDI has traditionally been
market-oriented in the first place. This motivation may encourage a rel-
atively strong engagement of German investors in East European coun-
tries. German investors regard these countries as their "home" market as
Japanese do the countries in East Asia. Both geographically and cul-
turally, East European countries are too near to Germany to be left over122
to competitors from countries like Japan or the United States. If these
markets cannot be served by exports due to a persistent lack of foreign
exchange or any other reasons, German investors would have to move in
with their direct investments. Even before the liberalization movement in
these countries, Germany, of all the Western countries, occupied the
leading position in terms of the number of joint ventures established
there [FAZ, 1988].
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A strengthened engagement in Eastern Europe may negatively affect
German FDI in DCs if the overall resources at the disposal of German
investors were limited. Limitations may arise especially in the field of
trained managerial personnel which can be sent from the headquarters or
subsidiaries of the investing firms to assume responsibilities in the new
host countries at least in the initial stages. As far as financing of FDI is
concerned, constraints on the supply of capital from internal as well as
external sources may arise. Some of the German multinationals have re-
ported lower profits in the second quarter of 1990. The real interest
rate on the DM capital market has reached a very high level. Some
crowding out of private firms by the public authorities due to their need
for financing the German unification may occur. The public requirement
for capital funds is likely to continue in the medium term. This is keep-
ing the interest level high, which inherently tends to discourage the in-
vestors to seek external finance on the capital market. Also from a bal-
ance-of-payments point of view, the relative supply of capital in the
united Germany will decrease because its export surplus is likely to go
down. The industrial sector in the Western part of Germany experiences
a very high rate of capacity utilization, and additional absorption of
goods in the Eastern part will lead to increased German imports and/or
reduced world market sales.
The German Development Agency (DEG) is of the opinion that the Ger-
man firms are already concentrating their attention on Central and
Eastern Europe [ Handelsblatt, 1990]. The share of East European
countries in total German FDI increased in 1988 as compared to 1984
but did not reach the level of 1980 (Table 29). The period after 198.5
is marked by an increase of the number of joint ventures established
in this region by German firms. It increased from 1 in 1985 to 9 in
1987 and 19 in 1989. These figures are for Hungary and the Soviet
Union. For others, the corresponding data from the same source are
not available [FAST, 1990].123
Also, export-oriented FDI in Eastern Europe may gain in importance
if East European countries are granted further trade preferences by the
EC. In this way, the trade preference margins of DCs in the EC will be
eroded in relative terms, and the intensified competition on EC markets
may negatively affect the export sales of Third World suppliers. East
European countries will then become - ceteris paribus - more attractive
locations for German FDI than DCs. This tendency may be strengthened
by the increased flow of official financial assistance from German and
international agencies, e.g. the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
Notwithstanding the ensuing competition from Eastern Europe, many
DCs will be able to maintain their comparative locational advantages for
German FDI (as well as for FDI from other sources) at least in the near
future. The tremendous adjustment problems in Eastern Europe reduce
the DCs' risk of impaired access to FDI in the short run:
- The high foreign indebtedness of some East European countries ren-
ders it difficult for them to raise private funds on the international
capital market. According to the argument given in Section V. 5, the
debt overhang may also discourage the flow of FDI to these countries.
As is the case for severely indebted DCs, the bulk of investments in
Eastern Europe has probably to be financed out of domestic savings.
- Moreover, the potential of foreign capital absorption is still limited in
many Eastern European economies. In several cases, the reform pro-
cess is still in its initial stage, and foreign investors may be scared
due to lack of credibility. German firms are said to be waiting for
some crucial institutional reforms and definite decisions with regard to
property rights to start their largei—scale investment activities. The
reform of the legal framework in Eastern Europe may take time before
it becomes attractive for foreign investors. Furthermore, the infra-
structure in this region is quite underdeveloped for any massive wave
of FDI.
- German (and other) investors will not like to ignore the growing mar-
kets and cost advantages offered by some DCs. In this respect, how-
ever, the spectrum of DCs is very wide and this should be taken into
consideration while evaluating the prospects of German FDI in the
Third World.124
c. Reorientation of German FDI among DCs?
In the longer run, the political and economic reforms in Eastern
Europe do offer promising prospects for foreign investors who aim at
penetrating growing markets and exploiting cost advantages. But this is
unlikely to be at the expense of all DCs. The prospects of German FDI
in DCs are likely to differ considerably between major regions.
Economic growth in the Far Eastern DCs has accelerated in the past
decade. This has drawn the recent attention of German investors, al-
though their reaction was somewhat delayed compared to investors from
other source countries (Section VI. 1). The rate of growth of German FDI
in these countries during the 1980s was higher than in any other Third
World region, viz. Africa or Latin America (Table 29). This trend is
expected to continue in spite of the foreseeable developments related
with EC 1992 or reforms in Eastern Europe. The Far Eastern countries
have implemented fairly liberal investment policies, and they are ex-
pected in the future also to achieve relatively high growth of their GDP
and trade. The DCs in the Far East are relatively open towards world
markets and successful suppliers of manufactured exports. This will en-
able them to take advantage of additional world market demand which
might arise from further trade liberalization after the completion of the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, the EC 1992 project and economic reforms
in Eastern Europe. Moreover, these countries offer good infrastructure
for FDI including favourable facilities for worldwide communication. This
renders it easier for multinationals to achieve cost reductions through
worldwide sourcing and networking. As a result, the prospects for FDI
in this region are expected to remain good in the 1990s. This holds so
all the more for German (and other European) investors who are still
underrepresented in this growing region compared with their US and
Japanese competitors [Agarwal, 1988].
In contrast to this, the prospects for the flow of German FDI to
Latin American countries can at best be judged as uncertain, notwith-
standing that they have been the major targets of German FDI in the
past. Most of them are highly indebted, have very high rates of inflation
and economic growth leaves much to be desired. The inflow of FDI in the
coming years there will depend very much on the solution of these prob-
lems and favourable internal economic policies. The fiercer competition125
among different locations for foreign equity capital in the 1990s will
rather increase the negative effects of domestic policy failures on FDI
inflows.
The prospects of Africa as a recipient of FDI remain rather bleak.
African countries have always stood behind in the locational competition
for FDI from Germany, except those at the Mediterranean coast. This
situation will not change very much until the economic conditions and the
institutional framework in these countries improve considerably to make
them attractive for foreign investors. This leads us to conclude that a
regionally differentiated approach is appropriate in judging the prospects
of German FDI in DCs.126
VII. Summary and Policy Conclusions
With declining debt inflows, FDI has again become one of the major
pillars of private financial flows to the developing countries. This has
created some expectation to "replace" private bank lending by FDI. Not
only would this alternative to external debt financing ease contractional
payments for the DCs, but the latter would also gain in terms of techno-
logical and managerial skills. The DCs are by now well aware of the ad-
vantages of FDI, and hostility vis-a-vis FDI, still widespread in the
1970s, disappeared considerably in the 1980s. Many countries warmly
welcome FDI, some of them with quite generous incentives.
One of the major source countries of FDI is Germany. On average
over the last few years, Germany ranked fourth after the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Japan. In terms of total FDI outflows, German
FDI activities have been influenced by special factors in the last few
years, most notably favourable investment opportunities in the United
States and the upcoming of a Single Market in Europe after 1992. With
respect to DCs, Germany's contribution declined markedly while Japan
became a major contributor. Why has it nevertheless been worthwhile to
investigate German FDI flows to DCs in such great detail?
- First of all, Germany is much more active as an exporter than as a
foreign investor. The higher the penetration rate of German products
in a host country, the more attractive it becomes to eventually move
production to the host country.
- Second, German companies are rather young foreign direct investors in
many regions, for example in Southeast Asia.
- Third, Germany has a well-established and in quantitative terms rather
important policy instrument to support FDI in DCs, namely its federal
guarantee scheme.
The potential for more German FDI in DCs is therefore higher than
the actual amount. But the attractiveness for German FDI is likely to
differ considerably between different Third World regions. In particular
the weight of Latin America, although still especially high, will probably
continue to decline unless the economic problems of this region are over-
come. This may also affect the sectoral structure of German FDI in DCs.
The high share of FDI in manufacturing is strongly influenced by the
sectoral distribution in a few major host countries (especially Brazil and127
Mexico). Although Germany is a country short of natural resources, the
share of FDI in mining is only 8.7 percent (including oil extraction in
the OPEC countries).
The regional and sectoral distribution of FDI in DCs shows that
German investors are mainly market-oriented. This is supported by our
regression analysis as well. Large domestic markets provided a strong
incentive for investment, even if the economic performance of a country
was not that good. This indicates that FDI is not an area where policy-
makers in the host countries get fast success from promotion program-
mes. To a large extent, market size is given to a country, even though
the recent upswing of FDI in the EC has demonstrated that up to a point
market size can be created by political will. The EC is at the same time
an example how time-consuming, difficult and costly the process of mar-
ket integration is in a culturally and economically heterogeneous region.
In the Third World, economic integration in the traditional sense (cu-
stoms unions, common markets, joint investment planning) has proven
not to be viable. It seems to be more promising to agree to regional co-
operation in specific areas of common interest among partner countries,
e.g. joint production of public goods. An intraregional approach towards
human resource development, expansion of R&D, energy management, en-
vironment problems, international marketing and improved flows of in-
formation and communication should help attract FDI inflows into the
partner countries.
Regional integration and cooperation among DCs cannot be a substi-
tute for appropriate domestic economic policies in order to attract further
FDI. This can also be concluded from the observation that even very
large DCs cannot afford unfavourable investment policies in the longer
run, notwithstanding that German FDI is characterized by relatively high
stability as compared to FDI from other sources. On the other hand,
smaller economies which were determined to improve their investment
climate did so successfully not only to the advantage of foreign investors
but also of the whole economy.
The issue of the host countries' openness towards FDI covers re-
strictions laid down in the investment legislation, regulations of FDI re-
lated activities as well as special incentives for FDI. Host countries often
combine constraining and generous rules at the same time; for example,
they impose ownership restrictions, but offer tax and tariff exemptions128
to certain types of FDI (e.g. joint ventures). In this study, factors that
contribute to the degree of openness towards FDI were compressed into
an overall indicator that allows a ranking of the host developing coun-
tries. This procedure is, of course, highly judgmental. Nevertheless,
the regression results offer some support for the view that liberalization
of investment regulations in DCs helps increase new foreign investments.
But the empirical evidence remained insignificant in several cases.
Therefore, the focus on liberalizing investment codes might have been
too sharp in relation to other policy instruments in the recent discus-
sion.
In particular, the effectiveness of tax and tariff exemptions as well
as related privileges for FDI, some of which are very costly for the host
countries, is uncertain at best. They may even result in a vicious circle
if privileges granted to foreign investors give rise to hostile feelings
against FDI in the recipient countries. The consequences may be a new
wave of regulations, intensified efforts to circumvent the restrictions,
and finally the retreat of foreign investors. It appears more promising to
adhere to the rule: "what is good policy for domestic investors is also
good for foreign investors", by creating a stable and favourable general
framework for investment. Ad hoc interventions should be kept to the
minimum. It is not only the rules and regulations that matter, but also
how they are applied in practice. The approval procedure should be fast
and transparent as it is a crucial element in the investment decision of
foreign companies.
Another important factor of the policy framework for FDI concerns
the trade regime of the host countries. Sometimes it is argued that im-
port barriers serve as an incentive for FDI as the latter is a medium to
jump over protectionist fences. In the empirical analysis, however, ex-
port activity turned out to be a predecessor of German FDI in DCs. Mar-
ket penetration (measured by German exports in relation to host coun-
tries' GNP) had a significantly positive impact on FDI, while the degree
of import barriers in the host countries affected German FDI negatively.
On the other hand, German FDI did not have a significant influence on
exports to the host countries, i. e. neither a growth nor a substitution
effect could be detected.
Hence, contrary to a popular belief, openness of the host economy
with regard to foreign trade is in general an incentive rather than an129
obstacle to FDI. Especially small economies aiming at increased FDI in-
flows should therefore continue to abandon import substitution strategies
and strengthen their world market orientation. Even for fairly large
countries, import protection as an instrument to attract FDI is bound to
fail in the longer run. The goods produced in sheltered economies typi-
cally involve high costs and are not competitive in international markets.
By revising protectionist trade regimes, DCs should aim to improve' their
position in world market competition. This would be a major precondition
to take advantage of additional world market demand which might arise
from the completion of the Uruguay Round, the EC 1992 project and
economic reforms in Eastern Europe. This, in turn, will enable DCs to
attract more FDI by companies aiming at worldwide sourcing and net-
working, even though a fast reaction of German investors after easing
trade barriers cannot be expected due to their rather stable investment
behaviour.
Cost reductions through worldwide sourcing can also be achieved in
host countries with relatively low labour costs. However, this argument
is hard to be verified empirically. For a fairly small country sample, the
hypothesis that low labour costs encourage German FDI was rejected in
the present investigation. This can be attributed to the fact that the
analysis was mainly based on host countries where market-oriented FDI
took place in the form of capital widening of existing companies; for this
type of FDI, an increase in labour costs induces a substitution of capital
for labour. While this result does qualify the widely held view that la-
bour cost advantages in general create large FDI inflows, it does not
contradict with findings of a negative impact of high and rising labour
costs on FDI based on micro data. It would be strongly misleading for
DCs to conclude that labour costs are irrelevant for the decisions of
foreign investors. The creation of new plants is highly likely to be in-
fluenced by labour costs. Especially DCs which are not yet major reci-
pients of FDI or try to stimulate FDI in sectors where foreign partici-
pation has still to be established are well advised to maintain or
strengthen their locational advantages in terms of production costs. This
requires limiting nominal wage increases and/or improving labour pro-
ductivity relative to existing or new competitors, e.g. in Eastern and
Southern Europe.130
With new competition arising from reform-minded Eastern European
countries, political and economic stability in DCs is likely to become
rather more important in the future than it was in the past. Stability
and risk considerations play a crucial role for FDI, as investment de-
cisions are longer term in nature. Moreover, the persistent debt prob-
lems of many DCs have increased the risk of sovereign measures against
FDI as well. In several instances, the repatriation of earnings and
capital was restricted due to limited access to foreign exchange. The
inherited debt overhang which plagues many debtor countries has made
investors sceptical about a sustainable future growth path and a stable
social environment.
In view of the economic, political and social stability that charac-
terized Germany during the past decades, one would expect German for-
eign investors to be particularly risk averse. This was apparently not
the case. In contrast to overall FDI flows from all sources to DCs, Ger-
man FDI hardly reacted to differences in the overall country risk rating
and more specific measures of political instability.
Similar peculiarities of German FDI behaviour were observed as con-
cerns the impact of a growing debt overhang on FDI. Also the inves-
tigation of the threat of selective and unspecific sovereign measures
against FDI and their effect on German versus overall FDI in DCs re-
vealed a relatively underdeveloped risk aversion of German investors.
But the results vary between different subsamples with respect to the
degree of openness of host countries towards FDI. Foreign investors
were mainly concerned about sovereign risk in host countries with rel-
atively restrictive attitudes towards FDI. These countries should, there-
fore, liberalize restrictions that discourage foreign investors to maintain,
not to speak of increasing, their engagement. Countries with a tradition-
ally liberal treatment of FDI are well advised to remain open, as their
attitude is considered by foreign investors as a credible commitment to
refrain from sovereign measures.
To some extent, the peculiarities of German FDI behaviour can .be
attributed to the federal guarantee scheme which covers non-commercial
risks of German FDI in DCs. As public guarantees are granted at a fee
lower than the true risk premium, they drive a wedge between German
investors' risk perception and a market-oriented evaluation of country
risk. The assumption underlying public support for FDI in DCs, that -131
without guarantees - the risk perception of foreign investors is unrea-
sonably high and private insurance markets do not work efficiently, is
debatable. However, the actual amount of subsidies might be low in the
German scheme as cases of ultimate default were very rare.
Another reason for the above-mentioned peculiarities is that German
investors got stuck in economically and politically unstable host countries
with considerable debt problems. Their strong engagement especially in
the manufacturing sector of Latin American countries, once undertaken,
had long gestation periods and became immobile in the short run. Part of
the recent FDI in those countries -was involuntary, due to repatriation
restrictions. But it is also occasionally argued that German investors
have a relatively long planning horizon and are more prepared to ar-
range themselves with the prevailing situation in a country than inves-
tors from other source countries, most notably the United States.
Its rather stable behaviour, compared to the overall movements of
FDI, renders it more difficult to attract German FDI for well-performing
DCs where German investors traditionally did not go before. At the same
time, this behaviour represents the attraction of German FDI from the
point of view of host countries experiencing economic problems. Never-
theless, economic reforms are indispensable in the latter countries in
order to maintain or restore their attractiveness for foreign equity fi-
nance. First of all, the contribution of German FDI to the external
financing of most DCs is much too small to be relied on exclusively.
Moreover, German FDI is more likely to stay for some time when the in-
vestment climate deteriorates; but recent evidence strongly suggests that
the peculiarities in risk behaviour are rather due to a somewhat longer
time lag in the reactions of German investors than to persistently dif-
ferent risk attitudes. Credit-cons trained DCs are typically also con-
strained in terms of total FDI inflows. In the longer run, this picture is
also likely to prevail as far as German FDI is concerned.
Also, debt-equity swaps should not be regarded as a substitute for
economic policy reforms. Although German FDI was positively related to
the implementation of debt conversion schemes in some DCs, the extent
to which additional FDI can be induced in this way remains open to
question. It is rather doubtful whether these or other costly promotion
schemes will lead to a sustained improvement of FDI inflows. The sub-
sidization of FDI through debt-equity swaps must be limited to the de-132
gree which may be necessary to compensate for increased risk and un-
certainty of investors in a transitional period. Similar incentives should
be granted to domestic investors to avoid distortions due to unfair com-
petition.
It takes time to correct policy mistakes and restore the confidence
of - foreign and domestic - investors once the credibility of governments
has been substantially eroded. But this should not be considered as an
excuse for postponing economic policy adjustment. Quite the contrary,
the fiercer competition for foreign equity capital emerging from the re-
cent changes in the international environment, most notably the EC 1992
programme and economic reforms in Eastern Europe, requires immediate
action by DCs with impaired attractiveness for FDI. The negative effects
of domestic policy failures on FDI inflows will probably increase in the
1990s.
There is little need for the host developing countries to focus on
narrowly defined promotion measures to attract FDI. They should rather
improve the general policy framework for more competition and real ca-
pital formation. Openness towards world markets appears to be crucially
important in this context, as is the revitalization of domestic investment.
Developing countries succeeding in this respect will remain or become
attractive locations for FDI from Germany and other sources. Otherwise,
however, the prospects for the inflow of FDI in the 1990s are rather
bleak.133
Appendices
1. List of Variables
AVIF: period average of INF (1976-1987)
AVIV: period average of INV (1976-1987)
BENST: proxy for the potential benefits sample countries may reap
from sovereign measures against FDI; calculated as the
stock of total FDI over GDP, twice lagged (SFDI/GDP)
BUV: entrepreneurs' income in Germany [OECD, e]
CONV: amount of debt conversions in 1980-1985 [Institute of Inter-
national Finance, 1990]
DII: Institutional Investor's credit rating; change vis-a-vis 1980
in percentage points; calculated for countries with 1180 > 40
[Institutional Investor, various issues]
DIUSD: total FDI flows from all sources to sample countries; in mill.
USS [IMF, a]
DUM: dummy variable; set to "1" for countries and years with a
debt conversion programme in operation, and "0" otherwise
[ Institute of International Finance, 1990]
ER: exchange rate fluctuation of host developing country's cur-
rency (enters the regression analysis in the alternative de-
finitions of FLRE and FLDM)
EXDM: local currency per DM (end-of-period for stock equations;





P. • EXDM; P., P.: GNP-deflator in the export equa-
tion, GDI-deflator in the FDI equation [World Bank, c]
German exports of goods to sample countries, deflated by
the overall German export unit value (1980=100) [IMF, b;
d]
= (EXR/YR) • 100















FICOM: = SICOMt - SIC0Mt ^
FIMAN = SIMANt - SIMANtl
FITOT = SITOTt - SITOTt x
FLDM: fluctuation in nominal exchange rates of sample countries
vis-a-vis DM; calculated from standard errors of trend esti-
mates for 1976-1987 [IMF, d]
FLIF: standard deviation of INF (1976-1987)
FLIV: standard deviation of INV (1976-1987)
FLRE: fluctuation in real effective exchange rates of sample coun-
tries; calculated from standard errors of trend estimates for
1976-1987 [Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, unpubl. data base]
FS: measure of the degree of openness towards FDI in sample
countries; a higher average score indicates a more favour-
able policy regime [Frost & Sullivan, 1988]
FSIZ: average firm size in selected manufacturing industries of
sample countries, relative to total manufacturing; calculated
as three-period moving averages of the ratio of the number
of employees in industry i and the number of establishments
in industry i, relative to the respective ratio for total
manufacturing [UN, various issues]
GARNEW: new approved guarantees for foreign investors granted by
the German government, relative to host countries' GNP and
corrected for risk effects [Treuarbeit, 1989]
GDI: gross domestic investment, nominal and real (in prices of
1980) [World Bank, unpubl. national accounts data base]
GDP: gross domestic (national) product of sample countries,' in
(GNP) US$ (DM) mill, if not otherwise stated [IMF, d]
GRDI: = (DIUSD/SFDI) • 100
GRICOM: = (FICOM/SICOM) • 100
GRIMAN: = (FIMAN/SIMAN) • 100135
GRINEW: = (NEW/SITOT) • 100
GRITOT: = (FITOT/SITOT) • 100
GU: classification of sample countries with regard to their atti-
tudes towards FDI; 0 = restrictive; 1 = quite restrictive; 2
= semi-open; 3 = open (own judgement; for details, see
Chapter IV)
HC: proxy for human-capital intensity in selected manufacturing
industries of sample countries, relative to total manufac-
turing; this variable is calculated as the ratio of wages and
salaries of" employees in industry i and the number of em-
ployees in industry i, relative to the respective ratio for
total manufacturing; three-period moving averages [UN,
various issues]
IFO: index of impediments towards FDI in sample countries;
higher index figures indicate less restrictive impediments
[Osterkamp, 1983]
II: Institutional Investor's credit rating, annual ratings and
(IIMA) three-period moving averages respectively [Institutional
Investor, various issues]
1180: Institutional Investor's credit rating in 1980 [ Institutional
Investor, various issues]
INF: annual rate of inflation, based on consumer price indices
(1979-1980=100) [UNCTAD, a, Table 2.9]
INV: gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP
[UNCTAD, a, Table 6.4)
LSFDI: SFDI thrice lagged
LSI: stocks of German FDI in selected manufacturing industries
of sample countries (chemicals, iron and steel, machinery,
road transport equipment, electrical equipment) in DM mill. ,
thrice lagged [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]
LSICOM: SICOM thrice lagged
LSIMAN: SIMAN thrice lagged
LSITOT: SITOT thrice lagged
LSTOCK: stock of FDI, thrice lagged: equals LSFDI, LSITOT,
LSIMAN, LSICOM, depending on the regression run
MADIUS: three-period moving averages of DIUSD
MAFI: three-period moving averages of the annual change in the
stocks of German FDI in selected manufacturing industries
















road transport equipment, electrical equipment) in DM mill.
[Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]. The following
calculation procedure is applied: 1) FDI stocks are convert-
ed into the local currency of the host country by applying
end-of-period exchange rates; 2) the change in FDI stocks
in local currency is then converted back into DM by ap-
plying period average exchange rates
three-period moving averages of FICOM
three-period moving averages of FIMAN
three-period moving averages of FITOT
three-period moving averages "of INF
three-period moving averages of INV
three-period moving averages of NEW
three-period moving averages of PSL
standard deviation of monthly changes in real exchange
rates of host countries' currencies vis-a-vis DM; three-
period moving averages [ IMF, d; Wharton Econometric Fore-
casting Ass., various issues]
gross German investment outflows to sample countries in DM
mill. [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]
indicator for the frequency of non-tariff trade measures of
the sample countries [UNCTAD, b]
proxy for the balance-of-payments situation of sample coun-
tries; three-period moving averages of the current-account
deficit (surplus) in per cent of GDP; negative values of
PRESCU in the case of deficits [ IMF, a]; in the case of
PRESCU1 without resource outflows due to servicing FDI
see PROUTG; reinvested earnings excluded
proxy for the potential benefits sample countries may reap
from sovereign measures against FDI; calculated as the sum
of resource outflows due to servicing FDI and reinvested
earnings over GDP; three-period moving averages; higher
FDI service payments result in more negative values of
PROUTG [IMF, a]
proxy for political instability; 1 = unstable government
characterized by more frequent changes of party or parties
in power and /or occurrence of riots or military coup d'etats
or border conflicts; 0 = stable government characterized by
no or less frequent changes of power by democratic means
and absence of riots, political unrest, military coup d'etats
or border conflicts [Banks, 1989]137
PSL: political strikes and lockouts measured as the number of
workdays lost per employed person [ ILO, various issues]
REER: real effective exchange rates of sample countries [ Institut
fur Weltwirtschaft, unpubl. data base]
SFDI: stock of total FDI in sample countries; in USS mill, and per
(SFDIG) cent of sample countries' GDP respectively; calculated by
adding FDI flows since 1979 to the 1978 stocks [UNCTC, a;
IMF, a]
SICOM: stock of German FDI in the trade sector of sample coun-
(SICOMG) tries; in DM mill, and percent of sample countries' GDP
respectively [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]
SIMAN: stock of German FDI in manufacturing industries of sample
(SIMANG) countries; in DM mill, and percent of sample countries' GDP
respectively [Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]
SITOT: stock of total German FDI in sample countries; in DM mill.
(SITOTG) and percent of sample countries' GDP respectively
[Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data base]
SMN: secondary market notations of LDC debt in per cent of face
value [World Bank, unpubl. data base]
SSL: structural and sectoral adjustment loans received by the
host developing countries; "1" is assigned to a country for
the year in which SSL is received by it, and "0" for the
remaining years and countries without adjustment loans
[Nicholas, 1988]
TA: investment activity in selected manufacturing industries of
sample countries, relative to total manufacturing; calculated
as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation in industry i
and output in producers' prices of industry i, relative to
the respective ratio for total manufacturing; three-period
moving averages [UN, various issues]
TAR: unweighted average of total import charges (tariffs and
para-tariffs) [ UNCTAD, b]
TLCFOR: total hourly labour costs in manufacturing of sample coun-
tries in DM [Riveros, 1989; IMF, d]
TLCGER: total hourly labour costs in manufacturing in Germany in
DM [Riveros, 1989; IMF, d]
TRDEP: proxy for the dependency of sample countries on external
trade relations; calculated as the sum of exports and im-
ports over GDP (in per cent); three-period moving aver-
ages [IMF, d]138
TREND: proxy for the degree of instability in economic activity of
sample countries; standard error of logarithmic trend esti-
mates of GDP for 1976-1987
UCCGER: user costs of capital in Germany; calculated as: PGDI
(i-DLPGDI), where PGDI = (GDI/GDI. qRn) • 100; i =
government bond yield [IMF, d]
UMS: proxy for foreign debt problems of sample countries, twice
lagged; 0 = no reschedulings; 1 = reschedulings with of-
ficial creditors; 2 =• reschedulings with private creditors; 3
= reschedulings with both official and private creditors
[World Bank, b;~ Hardy, 1982]
VADPFOR1: real value added in manufacturing (in prices of 1980) per
employee in sample countries (for which value added per
employee in manufacturing is available) in DM (at exchange
rates of 1980) [World Bank, c; UNIDO, various issues]
VADPFOR2: VADPFOR1 in 1980 multiplied with the index for real output
per employee (1980=100) (for countries which do not report
sufficient data on value added and employment in manufac-
turing) [World Bank, c; UNIDO, various issues]
VADPGER: real value added in manufacturing (in prices of 1980) per
(VADPGER1) employee in Germany in DM [World Bank, c; UNIDO, vari-
ous issues]; for the calculation of productivity differentials,
all country columns corresponding to host countries for
which VADPFOR2 had to be used were set to zero
VADPGER2: VADPGER1 in 1980 multiplied with the index for real output
per employee (1980=100); corresponds to VADPFOR2 [World
Bank, c; UNIDO, various issues]
YR: real GNP of sample countries, in prices and exchange rates
(either DM or USS per local currency) of 1980 [World Bank,
c]139




















need to be joint
ventures, excep-
tions, liberaliza-








only in new FDI,
joint ventures
in oil sector






















































































can be re- years, ex-
stricted ceptions
restricted only orgi-
































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF [c]; UNCTC [c]; US Department of Commerce [1985]; Frost
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yes 4/yes incentives as well as per-
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geared to the project
yes 2/yes no special regulation for
foreign investors
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ranging from 1 (worst) to 5 (best) [Frost & Sullivan,
Source: IMF [c]; UNCTC [c]; US Department of Commerce [1985]; Frost
& Sullivan [1988]; Becsky et al. [1989]; Pfeffermann [1988];
Scharrer, Kragenau [1988].149
3. Appendix Tables





























































































































































































(a) Pearson correlation coefficients. For the definition of variables, see the text and
Appendix 1. Number of observations in parentheses; * significant at 5 percent level.
Source: Own calculations.150
Table A2 - Impact of Political and Economic Instability on FDI, 1980-1987:
Pooled Regression Results for Country Groups with Different

























37 < IFO < 40
3 < FS < 3.9
KANEV
GU = 2
37 < IFO < 40
3 < FS < 3.9
KAFITO
GU = 2
37 < IFO < 40












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37 < IFO < 40
3 < FS < 3.9
HAFICO
GU = 2
37 < IFO < 40







































































































































































































variables, see the text anc
levels; t-statistics in parenthese





































































































































































































































cases, where degrees of
in the first regression estimates with all independent variables in the equa-
tion. - (c) If the chi-square statistic is










Table A3 -Industry-Specific Characteristics and FDI, 1982-1987: Regres-













IFO < 37 [4]
FS £ 3 [3]

























































37 < IFO < 40 [3]





















































































































(a) Dependent variable: three-period moving averages of the change in German FDI stocks
in selected manufacturing industries of host countries (MAFI). For the definition of
variables, see the text and Appendix 1; **, * significant at 1 and 10 percent levels; t-
statistic in parentheses. - (b) Only those regressions are reported for which at least
one of the variables reflecting industry-specific characteristics (FSIZ, TA, HC) is sig-
nificant; equation numbers refer to the equation specification as in Table 21. - (c) If
the chi-square statistic is significant at the 5 percent level (denoted by "+"), cor-
rected standard errors of the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the t-sta-
tistic given in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.153
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(a) Pearson correlation coefficients. For the definition of vari-
ables, see the text and Appendix 1; current annual observations for
BENST, PROUTG, PRESCU1, UMS, and TRDEP (while lagged observations of
BENST and UMS, and three-period moving averages of PROUTG, PRESCU1
and TRDEP enter the regression analysis). Number of observations in
parentheses; * significant at 5 per cent level.
Source: Own calculations.154
Table A5 -Sovereign Risk and German FDI in Different Sectors,
1982-1987: Regression Results for Country Groups with Dif-





IFO < 37 [1]
IFO i 37 [2]
IFO i 37 [3]
HAFIHA
FS i 3 [1]
FS < 3 [3]
HAFICO
FS < 3 [2]
IFO i 37 [2]
FS i 3 [3]
HAFITO
37 < IFO < 40 tl]
GU = 2 [2]
3 < FS < 3.9 [2]
HAFIKA
GU = 2 [2]
MAFICO
GU = 2 [1]
3 < FS < 3.9 [2]
3 < FS < 3.9 [3]
HAFITO
GU = 3 [1]
FS i 3.9 [1]
GU = 3 [2]
FS I 3.9 [2]
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GO = 3 [1]
rs i 3.9 [l]
rs i 3.9 [2]
rs i 3.9 [3]
KATICO
GO = 3 [1]
GO = 3 [2]
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1] and [V.12], as specified in the
statistic is significant at the 5
Source: Own calculations.156
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